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Foreword 
Finland has a long tradition of planning ahead in anticipation of looming 
changes. The topic of this book, sustainability and its implications for the 
economy is a case in point. Over the past two decades, countless studies have 
evaluated the likely consequences of ageing for economic growth and fiscal 
sustainability, and the policy responses available to alleviate them.  More often 
than not these studies have used numerical methods, and to analyze the 
compound problems of ageing and structural change in the economy, the largest 
Finnish research institutes have devoted considerable resources to develop 
models capable of tackling these problems.  
This book collects results from five recent studies, all utilizing numerical  
models, but focusing on slightly different aspects of the problems of ageing and 
sustainability. Together, they give a good overview of the joint capabilities of  
the models used in VATT, the Government Institute for Economic Research, the 
Bank of Finland, and the ETLA, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy. 
I would like to extend my warmest thanks to the contributors, Jukka Lassila and 
Tarmo Valkonen from ETLA, Juha Kilponen, Helvi Kinnunen, and Antti Ripatti 
from the Bank of Finland, and Juha Honkatukia and Saara Tamminen from 
VATT. I would also like to thank Jouko Vilmunen from the Bank of Finland for 
his support for the project, and Peter Dixon for taking the time to comment on 
the book and for putting it into a larger perspective in his introduction. 
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Introduction 
Peter B. Dixon1 
 
This book describes numerical general equilibrium models created in three Finish 
organizations: the Government Institute for Economic Research (VATT); the 
Research Institute of the Finish Economy (ETLA); and the Bank of Finland 
(BOF).  Each of the models is theoretically rigorous, contains detailed data, is 
solved by sophisticated computer programs and gives insights on major policy 
issues.   
Many prominent economists are sceptical about the value of numerical general 
equilibrium modelling. Among them is my good friend Max Corden, Australia’s 
most eminent economist.  Often when I have managed to explain a difficult result 
to him, he responds with something along the lines: “That’s pretty obvious.  I 
could have worked that out with a diagram.  You don’t need a big complicated 
model for that.” I have a few reactions to this.  First I am quietly pleased: once 
the result is declared obvious, I know that I must have explained it well.  Second, 
I don’t doubt that Max could show the result with a diagram: no-one is more 
brilliant with diagrams than Max.  But that doesn’t mean that I, or even Max, 
could work out the result without the help of a formal model involving 
mathematics and computers. Models often reveal results that are not initially 
fully anticipated, but once revealed they can be understood and explained in a 
simple way. I will go further. A modelling result that cannot eventually be 
understood in a simple way is not worth having.  Third, while Max’s sharp 
theorizing can point in qualitative directions, for many problems this is not 
enough. Numerical general equilibrium modelling combining strong theory with 
real-world data provides the best chance of obtaining policy-relevant quantitative 
insights. 
Econometricians are also sometimes sceptical about numerical general 
equilibrium modelling. They worry about relationships that are specified without 
statistical tests and about parameters that are calibrated by judgement rather than 
estimated from a database. But the problem is that if we confine ourselves to 
modelling that can be comprehensively supported by econometric techniques, 
then we narrow attention to issues that have historical precedents.  While we 
should get as much as we can from historical databases, we must be prepared to 
build models that are capable of describing  
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“the behaviour of individuals in situations that have not been 
experienced before, such as in the case of longer lifetimes in the 
future” (Lassila, Valkonen and Alho in chapter 5 of this volume). 
With reduced reliance on the historical record, there is increased responsibility 
for modellers to explain and justify their results. What is the theory built into  
the model that leads to the projected effect y on variable v from shock x? Is this 
theory realistic?  While it may not be possible to provide a formal econometric 
justification, are there other arguments or evidence that can be brought to bear?  
All of the modellers contributing to this book understand this responsibility.  
They all work hard to give common-sense and back-of-the-envelope explanations 
of their results.   
The models presented here are well established with histories stretching  
back between 10 and 20 years. In each chapter, the model descriptions are 
accompanied by applications addressing policy challenges posed by an ageing 
population.  This is a major issue in Finland, and one that is amenable to analysis 
via economic modelling.  As Juha Honkatukia puts it in the first chapter:  
“The challenge is two-fold: the ageing of the population increases 
age-related expenses, which should be met with rising tax revenues; 
but it also decreases labour supply, which tends to have the effect of 
lowering tax revenues. However, as taxation also has an effect on the 
incentives to work and to invest, solving this two-fold problem calls 
for a comprehensive re-evaluation of the structure of the whole tax 
system.” 
All of the models trace out in different ways and with different emphases the 
interactions that Honkatukia describes.  
VATT’s model is a recursive dynamic, computable general equilibrium (CGE) 
model with a detailed industry dimension. A feature of the version of the  
model described in chapter 1 is the specification of consumption/leisure/saving 
choice by the household sector. This specification is critical for Honkatukia’s 
application which is concerned with the welfare effects of different broad-based 
approaches to increasing government revenue: taxes on labour; taxes on capital; 
and taxes on consumption. Honkatukia sees increased taxation and a general 
strengthening of Finland’s budgetary situation as a necessary prelude to building 
an effective policy response to population ageing. His simulations show a 
preference for taxes on consumption and capital, rather than taxes on labour.  
One way of thinking about this is that Finland already has high taxes on labour 
income, generating distortions in favour of leisure and against consumption and 
saving.  This situation should not be exacerbated by further increases in labour 
taxes.  In chapter 2, Honkatukia and Tamminen apply VATT’s model to examine 
the effects of a specific proposal involving revenue-neutral cuts in income taxes 
Introduction 
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and increases in value added and excise taxes.  In view of the results in chapter 1 
it is not surprising that they find that implementation of this proposal would 
increase overall welfare.   
VATT’s model used in chapter 1 treats the household sector as a single utility-
maximizing entity.  In the version of the model used in chapter 2, this is extended 
to 10 entities: households distinguished by income decile.  As in most other CGE 
models, the households in VATT’s model are static: they don’t get older or die 
and they don’t change their preferences (utility functions).  Static households are 
a reasonable simplification for the VATT exercises reported in chapters 1 and 2 
that are concerned with the short to medium term (going out no more than 15 
years). However, for looking at long-term issues (going out say 50 years), we 
must allow explicitly for demographic change.   
This is done in the ETLA and BOF models. In these models households evolve 
dynamically in accordance with an overlapping generations specification. In 
period t, households are classified into age cohorts. In period t+1, new 
households arrive and households from period t move on in age, change in 
composition or disappear.  Households’ preferences, including their preferences 
for work and leisure, change with age and composition as do their requirements 
for public expenditures on health and education.   
In the ETLA analysis presented in chapter 5, Lassila, Valkonen and Alho use 
their overlapping generations model to calculate changes in the rates of different 
taxes that will be required out to 2060 to finance pensions, age-related health 
programs and other public expenditures under a variety of demographic 
projections. In chapter 3, Kilponen, Kinnunen and Ripatti use the BOF model to 
calculate the long-run effects 
of changes in  
life expectancy, average retirement age, fertility and pension payments 
on  
required contribution rates by workers and firms to pension funds, tax rates and a 
variety of macro variables.   
In chapter 4, using another version of the BOF model, Kinnunen investigates the 
benefits of smoothing out the financing of pensions to avoid sharply elevated 
taxes or contribution rates during periods of rapid increase in pension liabilities.  
By avoiding spikes in tax and contribution rates, Kinnunen shows that work 
disincentive effects can be reduced, easing the burden of ageing. 
In an environment of quantitative ignorance, ageing and associated financing 
problems seem frightening. But numerical modelling allows us to look at the 
situation in a calm quantitative fashion.  It is true that ageing will mean either 
higher taxes and contribution rates or lower retirement benefit rates in the future. 
But for me, the quantitative results in this book are reassuring. For example, the 
Peter B. Dixon  
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BOF results in chapter 3 indicate that no long-run ageing-related increases in 
taxes and contribution rates will be required if retirement pensions are reduced by 
12 percentage points in relation to wages: from 55 per cent in a no ageing 
scenario to 43 per cent in the main ageing scenario.  While no one would like to 
see such a cut in pensions, it should be remembered that the cut would be phased 
in over many years, and that with normal productivity and wage growth, 
pensions would still rise in real absolute terms.   
Over the last 5 years I have made annual visits to Helsinki to work for a couple 
of weeks with Juha Honkatukia and his team at VATT. This has been a 
wonderful experience.  I have seen first hand some of the excellent modelling 
research that has been performed in Finland.  I am impressed that major policy 
institutions in Finland create, maintain and operate models of the type described 
in this book.  The existence of these models is a testament to Finland’s 
commitment to evidence-based economic policy. 
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1. The marginal cost of funds in Finland – an AGE 
evaluation 
 Juha Honkatukia 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Coping with the effects of an ageing population is among the foremost fiscal 
challenges in most industrialized countries.  The challenge is two-fold: the 
ageing of the population increases age-related expenses, which should be met 
with rising tax revenues; but it also decreases labour supply, which tends to have 
the effect of lowering tax revenues.  However, as taxation also has an effect on 
the incentives to work and to invest, solving this two-fold problem calls for a 
comprehensive re-evaluation of the structure of the whole tax system. Finland 
provides an interesting case for studying the pressures of ageing on public 
finances, as the large post-war baby-boomer generations are some years older 
than in most other countries, and the country thus already has to cope with the 
effects of ageing. The aim of this study is to compare the costs of different taxes 
thus providing analysis and assessments that can be used in the evaluation of tax 
reforms and the effects of public spending. We focus on the effects of labour and 
capital income taxes, and consumption taxes. In the current study, we model 
welfare with the help of a single representative consumer, abstracting for the 
moment from distributional issues. 
We are using the VATTAGE model to compare the welfare effects of various tax 
increases designed to reduce Finland’s budget deficits by using the concept of 
marginal cost of funds (MCF) for different taxes.  VATTAGE is a MONASH-
style model2 of Finland documented in Honkatukia (2009).  However, unlike the 
original MONASH model, VATTAGE has been extended to include leisure and 
savings choice in the specification of household behaviour, Dixon – Honkatukia. 
– Rimmer (2011). This extension is necessary for useful MCF calculations 
because the essence of these calculations is tax-induced distortions in choices 
between consumption, leisure and savings. The VATTAGE database relies on 
disaggregated data on the economy and allows us to distinguish between 
commodity taxes and taxes on different types of factor incomes as well as taxes 
on income transfers. 
The aim of this chapter is to compare the costs of raising labour income, capital 
income taxes, or consumption taxes. In the current study, we model welfare with 
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the help of a single representative consumer, abstracting for the moment from 
distributional issues. But even so, VATTAGE contains 82 industries and 91 
commodities, and it is not easy to see the mechanisms at work from the full-scale 
model. To understand the results, we develop a simple model of the full-scale 
model, often called a Back-of-the-envelope model. 
The main contribution of this paper is the development of a back-of-the-envelope 
(BOTE) equations – what is often referred to as a “model of a model” – to guide 
the explanation of MCF results generated from a full-scale, dynamic AGE model.  
We apply the equation in a discussion of the welfare effects of raising extra 
revenue by an increase in the rate of taxation on labour income.   
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 introduces the concept of MCF 
and discusses its application in CGE modelling.  Section 1.3 overviews the 
VATTAGE model and introduces the extensions necessary to deal with labour-
supply and saving-aspects of taxation.  Section 1.4 develops the back-of-the-
envelope equations for explaining MCF results from a full-scale dynamic CGE 
model.  Section 1.5 applies the back-of-the-envelope equation. Concluding 
remarks are in section 1.6.   
1.2 The concept of marginal cost of funds 
The large literature on the excess burden of taxation suggests that the costs of 
raising revenue differ across tax instruments.  But as argued by Creedy (2000), 
measures of excess burden are often concerned with comparisons of distortionary 
and non-distortionary (such as lump-sum) tax systems. In practice, however, 
changes in the tax system often involve collecting increased revenue with an 
existing, distorted tax system to finance increased public spending, for example.   
In the analysis of optimal tax structure, the use of marginal cost of funds (MCF) 
based analysis has become popular. Similarly, applied general equilibrium 
modelling has gained strong momentum especially in analysing the dynamic 
effects of large policy changes. Dahlby (2008) points out that changes on just one 
tax rate can affect the collection of other tax types due to the common 
interdependence of the different tax types. Similarly, public spending in the form 
of a public projects or cash transfers also affects the revenue collected from 
taxes.  The analyses of different types of policy changes with dynamic AGE 
models have also revealed that the effects of policies can be significantly 
different in the long run compared to the short run. In the long run all production 
factors are usually rather flexible, while in the short run particularly capital and 
nominal wages show rigidity. For these reasons we have selected to use a 
dynamic AGE model also for the analysis of marginal cost of funds. 
The concept of marginal cost of funds, while related to excess burden 
considerations, is a broader concept that takes into account the type of effects that 
The marginal cost of funds in Finland – an AGE evaluation 
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may arise when existing tax systems are modified, or when there are changes in 
public spending. Often, there are both types of effects. 
MCF is usually defined as a money-metric measure of the loss of welfare 
resulting from the collection of extra revenue.  Surprisingly, there seem to be 
several definitions for MCF. Here, we use the definition 
 
where EV is the equivalent variation resulting from the tax change and is the 
change in revenue. 
The equivalent variation is often normalised by deducting the change in tax 
revenue (R) from EV in the denominator in the above equation, in order to 
account only for the changes in consumer’s welfare consequential to the tax 
structure change, but not the increase in public spending itself  (Chisario and 
Cicowiez, 2010). In this case, MCF can be either negative or positive. Here, we 
shall exogenise real government spending by assuming the extra revenue is used 
to pay back government debt. This does not isolate our measure completely from 
other government policies, since the price of public expenditure can be expected 
to differ under different tax regimes. Perhaps more importantly, the value of 
public transfers to the households and the other sectors of the economy is 
dependent on the changes in relative prices caused by the tax changes. But while 
this makes the definition of revenue targets difficult, it does not pose a problem 
fro the welfare measure, since the measure should take these effects into account. 
An example of the application of the MCF concept in the context of AGE 
modelling to measuring the potential effects of a tax change is Go et al. (2005), 
which studies the effects of a value-added tax reform in South Africa.  They 
compare the effects of an increase in VAT and income taxes on different 
households, finding marked differences in MCF across household types.  
Crucially, they assume no changes in factor supplies, government spending or the 
government’s budget balance. Revenue is re-distributed in a lump-sum fashion, 
whence, as they point out, MCF is more of a measure of the overall inefficiency 
of the economy than that of just the tax system3. 
Working on Argentina, Chisario et al. (2007) study the impacts of the taxes 
under different regulatory systems. Using the alternative definition for MCF, 
they adopt similar assumptions to Go et al. and find MCFs ranging from 0.1. to 
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    
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0.5 for income taxes, -0.1 to 0.13 for capital income taxes, and 0.127 to 0.206 for 
value added taxes.  
In the AGE studies cited above, the determination of labour supply and saving is 
not at the centre of the analysis.  This is somewhat surprising, because the 
theoretical literature on MCF considers the effects on labour-leisure choice 
extensively. As Dahlby (2009) shows, labour markets affect the costs of taxation 
in several ways.  First, the effects of income taxes depend on the supply and 
demand elasticities for labour.  They also depend on labour/capital ratios, as part 
of the burden of labour taxes is actually borne by capital, depending on whether 
the price of labour inputs is affected. The latter, in turn, depends on the labour 
market specification, that is, whether wages are competitive, or whether there are 
wage rigidities.  
The empirical literature on MCF also suggests that labour supply matters. A 
study by Kleven and Kreiner (2006) estimates MCFs from income taxes for 
several European countries, finding MCFs ranging from 0 to 0.32 for a 
proportional increase in income taxes, when they consider labour supply 
elasticities for the intensive margin (that is, for hours worked).  Tax reforms have 
been also studied econometrically in several other European countries, but to our 
knowledge, the concept has not been introduced in recent European AGE 
applications. 
Our study for Finland is similar in spirit to the South Africa and Argentina 
studies in the sense that it uses an AGE model for evaluating the costs of 
different tax regimes.  However, the calculation of the marginal cost of funds 
with a dynamic, applied general equilibrium models is still not common, while 
the use of static, applied GE models for MCF calculations was started already a 
long time ago (Ballard et al ,1985). More importantly, where we differ from the 
earlier studies is that we introduce endogenous labour/leisure choice and 
endogenous saving decisions, allowing us to consider effects that are excluded 
from the earlier analyses by the model formulation, and bringing our model 
closer to the theoretical literature on MCF. 
1.3 An outline of VATTAGE 
VATTAGE is a dynamic, applied general equilibrium (AGE) model of the 
Finnish economy. It can be used to study the effects of a wide range of economic 
policies. The VATTAGE database contains detailed information on commodity 
and income taxes as well as on the public sectors and thus covers most policy 
instruments available to the government.  
VATTAGE is based on the MONASH-model developed at the Centre of Policy 
Studies in Monash University. MONASH-type models are used in countries 
ranging from China and South Africa to the United States (Dixon and Rimmer, 
The marginal cost of funds in Finland – an AGE evaluation 
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2002) In Europe, models based on MONASH have been developed for Denmark, 
Finland, and the Netherlands.  
In VATTAGE, there are three types of inter-temporal links connecting the 
consecutive periods in the model: (1) accumulation of fixed capital; (2) 
accumulation of financial claims; and (3) lagged adjustment mechanisms, 
notably in the labour markets. Different fiscal rules for the balancing of the 
public sector budgets can also be specified.  
The VATTAGE database collects information on the structure of the Finnish 
economy derived from the national accounts, arranged in a presentation 
reflecting the theoretical structure of the model. The database also contains the 
behavioral parameters that are used to operationalise the behavioral assumptions 
made in the model. National accounts collect data on the use goods and services 
by industry and by product, but it also contains accounts for production as well as 
financial positions by institutional sector. (Eurostat 1997, 1.) The institutional 
sectors are viewed as independent decision-makers (Statistics Finland 2000, 11.), 
and it is the behaviour of these decision-makers that the model parameters and 
coefficients derived from the data describe and control. 
A large part of the database consists of input-output data that captures the 
structure of demand for intermediate goods and primary factors by industries, the 
final good consumption by consumers, the public sector, and the rest of the 
world. However, input-output data does not contain data on income flows, which 
must be obtained from other sources in national accounts.  
Furthermore, the data base also presents the transactions in the economy taking 
place between the institutional sectors of the economy. In the database, 
transactions take place both between domestic sectors, and between domestic and 
foreign sectors. The domestic sectors are divided into three domestic 
subcategories whereas the foreign sectors represent foreign countries and 
multinational and international organizations. These institutional sectors are 
mutually exclusive and their role in the economy can thus be unequivocally 
presented. For example, export demand is final demand for domestic goods and 
services by the foreign sectors. 
 
Juha Honkatukia 
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Figure 1  The structure of VATTAGE 
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VATTAGE models production with conventional, nested production functions. 
The idea behind industrial classification is to group activities whose production 
processes or the products they make are similar. However, VATTAGE also 
allows for multi-production of commodities. The VATTAGE database uses the 
national industrial classification TOL 2002, basing on NACE 2002 and ISIC 
Rev. 3.1, to classify industries, and the CPA-classification to group products. The 
detailed data on commodities allows us to study the production of goods almost 
at a process level.  
In VATTAGE, households are assumed to be the recipients of factor incomes. 
They also possess assets and liabilities abroad and domestically, which implies 
that a part of domestic incomes will be channeled abroad. To study MCF, we 
have extended the basic VATTAGE model by allowing households to make 
endogenous choices between leisure (or equivalently labour-supply), 
consumption of commodities and savings.  To do this we have adopted the 
simplest approach, treating leisure and saving (deferred consumption) as two 
more “commodities” in household choice.  The household’s problem has been 
amended to allow for the treatment of full income, that is, income inclusive of 
the value of leisure.  
VATTAGE allows for different treatments of the labour markets. The labour 
market equations relate population and population of working age, and define 
unemployment rates in terms of demand and supply of labour. In dynamic 
simulations, labour supply is typically taken as exogenous, while wages adjust 
only gradually and unemployment is determined endogenously.  
1.4 A Back-of-the-envelope model for understanding 
VATTAGE results for the marginal cost of funds 
1.4.1 Production 
We assume that the Back-of-the-envelope (hereafter BOTE) economy produces 
one good with a production function given by  
 .    (1) 
where  
Y is output; and 
K, N and M are inputs of capital, labour and imports.    
In the BOTE model we assume that all imports are used as intermediate inputs.  
This is a convenient assumption and not limiting.   
Under cost-minimizing assumptions, K, N and M satisfy  
 Y F K, N, M
Juha Honkatukia 
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 .     (2) 
 .    (3) 
 .    (4) 
where  
FK, FN and FM  are the marginal products of capital, labour and imports 
(derivatives of F);  
PY is the price of a unit of output; 
PQ is the pre-tax rental per unit of capital ;  
PM is the c.i.f. price of a unit of imports; and 
TM is the power of the tariff on imports (one plus the rate). 
 
Apart from the tariff on imports, we assume that there are no indirect taxes on 
inputs to production.  This is realistic for Finland.   
Totally differentiating (1) and substituting from (2) to (4) gives: 
     (5) 
where  
dY, dK, dN and dM are the policy-induced deviations in output, capital, 
employment and imports.   
1.4.2 Household behaviour in the Back-of-the-envelope model 
We assume that in each year the household sector chooses its quantities of 
consumption (C), leisure (L) and reserved consumption (R) to maximize a utility 
function.  By reserved consumption we mean the number of units of consumption 
that the household sector expects to be able to finance in the future through this 
year’s saving. In VATTAGE the utility function is additive (Stone-Geary).  
Reflecting this, for the BOTE model we assume that households maximize: 
     (6) 
subject to  
    (7) 
and 
Y K QP * F P
Y N WP *F P
Y M M MP * F P *T
Q W M M
Y Y Y
P P P *TdY *dK *dN *dM
P P P
  
C L RU (C) U (L) U (R) 
W
C R
W
PP *C P *R Z * N
T
      
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        (8) 
where  
H is total hours available for work; 
B is hours in involuntary unemployment;  
N is hours of employment; 
PW is the pre-tax wage rate; 
TW is the power of the tax on labour income;  
Z is household non-labour income; 
PR is the price of a unit of reserved consumption (to be discussed in 
subsection 1.2.6);  
PC is the price of a unit of consumption. 
 
In (8), we assume that involuntary unemployment is not leisure and consequently 
gives no utility.   
The price of consumption is given by 
      (9) 
where  
TC is the power of the tax on consumption.   
The first order conditions from problem (6) to (9) are:  
     (10) 
     (11) 
     (12) 
where  
the superscript prime denotes derivative; and  
 is the Lagrangian multiplier which can be interpreted as the increase in 
utility that the household would derive from an extra dollar of income (a 
unit increase in Z).   
In specifying the demand functions arising from (10) – (11), we assume that the 
relevant price for leisure is the nominal after tax wage rate.  For saving, the 
choice of a price level is more complicated and is treated in section (6).  To 
implement the new formulation, we use demand elasticities with respect to full 
income for leisure of 0.3 – which implies a labour-supply elasticity of roughly 
0.1 on the average - and of 0.5 for savings.  
L H B N  
C Y CP P *T
/
C Y CU (C) *P *T 
/
L W WU (L) *P / T 
/
R RU (R) *P 
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As is apparent from the demand equations, consumption of commodities, leisure 
and saving are now interrelated, whereas in the old model formulation, labour 
market specification drives the reaction of employment to taxes, and saving is 
affected by taxation only to the extent household disposable income changes. It is 
not a priori clear how large an effect these differences will make and thus the 
experiments below also illustrate the differences in model specifications.  
The differences between the new and old model formulation can be summarized 
by comparing the effects of changes in income and prices on demands in the old 
and new expenditure functions. From Table 1, it can be seen that the new 
formulation introduces several new channels for taxes to have an effect. In the 
table, the negative cross-price effect calls for a comment. The effect is apparent 
from equation (4), whence it can be seen to reflect the effect of subsistence 
demands for commodities, leisure, and saving on the demand for other goods. Its 
magnitude depends on the consumption shares of the other goods as well as the 
levels of subsistence demands.  
 
Table 1 The expected effects of income and prices on demands 
 
Model   Demands for  Disposable 
income 
CPI  RW  PCAP 
OLD  Consumption  +  ‐     
NEW  Consumption  +  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
   Leisure  +  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
   Saving  +  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
 
1.4.3 Economic welfare in the Back-of-the-envelope model 
We assume that households in year t derive welfare from their consumption and 
leisure, but not from their reserved consumption which will give them welfare in 
some future year.  Under this assumption, welfare (W) in any year is given by  
     (13) 
and the deviation in welfare in the year caused by implementation of a policy is 
calculated as  
 d     (14) 
where  
dC and dL are the policy-induced deviations in consumption and leisure.   
 Substituting from (10) and (11) into (14) gives  
C LW U (C) U (L) 
/ /
C LW U *dC U *dL 
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     (15) 
where  
   .     (16) 
 is the monetary gift that would generate the same change in household welfare 
as that generated by the policy.   
1.4.4 National accounts identity and contribution of accumulated 
savings in the Back-of-the-envelope model 
We define national savings (S) by  
    (17) 
where  
G is public consumption; and 
V is net payments of interest and dividends to foreigners. 
 
Equation (17) is expressed in real terms.  To understand it we can think of output 
Y as a number of bags of wheat.  Similarly, C, G and V are numbers of bags of 
wheat that are: consumed by households; consumed by the government; and paid 
to foreign asset holders.  (PM/PY)*M is the number of bags of wheat owed to 
foreigners as payment for imports.  S is then the increase in the nation’s assets 
(i.e. saving) calculated in bags of wheat.   
In deviation form (17) can be written as  
  .  (18) 
Then using (5) in (18) yields, after rearrangement 
     
 (19) 
The last term in (19) is the contribution to national income in year t of the policy-
induced change in capital less the policy-induced increase in net dividends and 
interest payments to foreigners.  If the policy is implemented in year 1 then this 
contribution in year t arises from the accumulation (dA) of policy-induced 
increases in savings between years 1 and t-1.  Under the simplifying assumption 
that investments, whether physical or financial, earn a constant exogenously 
given rate of return of , we can write the last term in (19) as  
W
C
W
PP *dC *dL
T
 
dW  
 M
Y
PS Y *M C G V
P
    
M M
Y Y
P PdS dY d *M *dM dC dG dV
P P
        
  QW M MM
Y Y Y Y
PP P PdS *dN * T 1 *dM d *M dC dG *dK dV
P P P P
                
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     (20) 
where  
dA for year t is given by  
  ,    (21) 
or alternatively  
      for  = 1, 2, …, t  (22) 
and 
 .    (23) 
1.4.5 The effects of  policies on welfare: an interpretable back of the 
envelope equation 
Rearranging (19) and inserting (20) gives 
  (24) 
From (8), with dH = 0, we obtain 
    .    (25) 
Now substituting from (24), (25) and (9) into (15) gives 
 
(26) 
Q
Y
P
*dK dV *dA
P
     
t 1
1
dA dS




1 1dA dA dS   
0 0dA dS 0 
   W M MM
Y Y Y
P P PdC *dN * T 1 *dM d *M dG *dA dS
P P P
          
dL dB dN  
 
   
   
 
W
W C
W
M C M
M C M Y
W
W
Y C
P * N0.01* * T *T 1 *n employment/leisure effect
T
0.01* P *M *T * T 1 *m import effect
0.01* P *M *T * p p terms-of-trade effect
P *B0.01* *b involuntary unemployment effect
T
P *T * *dA dS inter-tempora
     
 
 
    
  
Y C
l trade-off effect
0.01*P *T *G *g government consumption effect
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where  
n, m, pM, pY, b and g are policy-induced percentage deviations in the 
variables denoted by the corresponding upper-case symbols.   
Equation (26) is a BOTE decomposition of the effect on welfare in year t of 
policy changes implemented in years 1 to t.   
Employment leisure effect 
The first term on the right hand side of (26) shows the welfare effect of policy-
induced changes in employment.  To understand this term we should think of 
unemployment, B, and total hours, H, as fixed: the effects on welfare of 
movements in B are calculated in the fourth term on the right hand side of (26) 
and, in the derivation of (26), H was explicitly held constant (that is not affected 
by the policy).  With B and H fixed, increases in employment, N, are at the cost 
of leisure, L.  However, because of tax effects an extra hour of work generates 
more welfare than an extra hour of leisure.  Specifically, an hour of work 
generates PW/PY extra units of output, see (3).  The value to households of this 
extra output is PC*PW/PY, that is TC*PW.   The value of an extra hour of leisure to 
households is PW/TW.  Thus the net effect on welfare of an extra hour of labour 
with a corresponding loss of one hour of leisure is TC*PW - PW/TW.  From here 
we can quickly arrive at the employment/leisure effect given in (26).   
Import effect 
The second term on the right hand side of (26) shows the welfare effect of 
policy-induced changes in imports.  To understand this term we should start by 
thinking of K and N as constant: the effects of movements in these variables are 
accounted for in the first and fifth terms.  With K and N constant, an extra unit of 
imports generates an increase in output of PM*TM/PY units, see (4).  But not all of 
this increase in output can be consumed.  We should think of S, G, V and PM/PY 
as being constant, with the effects of their movements accounted for in other 
terms.  With these variables constant, (18) implies that a unit increase in imports 
must be financed by a payment to foreigners of PM/PY units of output.  Thus, a 
unit increase in imports allows  an increase in consumption of PM*TM/PY - PM/PY 
units.  To find the value of this to consumers we multiply through by PC.  This 
leads to the second term on the right hand side of (26).   
Terms-of-trade effect 
If the terms of trade decreases by 1 per cent, that is if the c.i.f. price of imports 
increases by 1 per cent relative to the price of domestic output (pM – pY = 1), then 
foreigners will need to receive 1 per cent more units of domestic output to pay 
them for any given level of imports.  With S, K, N and M held constant, this 
means that payments to foreigners must increase by 0.01*PM*M/PY units of 
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output, with a corresponding reduction in consumption.  The value of this 
reduction in consumption can be found by multiplying through by PC, leading to 
the third term on the right hand side of (26).   
Involuntary unemployment effect 
With H and N held constant an increase of one hour in involuntary 
unemployment generates a reduction in leisure of one hour.  The value of an 
hour’s leisure to households is PW/TW.  Thus, the effect on welfare of a b per cent 
increase in unemployment is given by the fourth term on the right hand side of 
(26). 
Inter-temporal trade-off effect 
The policy-induced deviation in accumulated saving up to year t allows 
consumption to increase by *dA units of output in year t whereas extra saving 
in year t requires a reduction in consumption of dS units in year t.  On translating 
these two effects (one positive and one negative) into monetary units by 
multiplying through by PC, we obtain the inter-temporal trade-off effect which is 
the fifth term on the right hand side of (26).     
In a simulation in which there is a sustained policy-induced increase in saving, 
the inter-temporal trade-off effect is negative in early years but positive in later 
years.   
Government consumption effect 
In deriving (26) we assumed that government expenditure does not generate 
welfare. Under this assumption an increase in government expenditure of one 
unit, with a corresponding reduction in consumption of one unit, generates a 
welfare loss with a monetary value of PC. This leads to the last term on the right 
hand side of (26). It would be a relatively simple matter to modify VATTAGE 
and the BOTE model to allow public consumption to be welfare generating.   
1.4.6 The price PR of reserved consumption 
When households in year t save a unit of output worth PY dollars, we assume 
that they expect this to be transformed into a unit of capital.  [For simplicity we 
assume that a unit of capital is created from one unit of output.]  They expect the 
unit of capital to generate extra units of output in the future in line with the 
current marginal product of capital (PQ/PY).  They take into account the power 
of the tax on capital income (TK) and recognize that their entitlement to the extra 
output is limited to PQ/(PY*TK).  They assume that the extra output that they are 
entitled to is translated into extra units of consumption (an increase in reserved 
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consumption R) by multiplying by the ratio of output prices to consumption 
prices (PY/PC).  Putting all of this together, we have   
    ,    (27) 
that is, saving of PY in year t yields a quantity of reserved consumption that is 
proportional to the expression on the right hand side of (27).  Where the factor of 
proportionality is , (27) gives us the price of a unit of reserved consumption as  
    ,  (28) 
that is, 
    ,   (29) 
The role of PR in VATTAGE is clear from section 1.4.2.  If PR increases relative 
to the prices of consumption (PC) and leisure (PW/TW), then the household 
sector allocates more of its full income to consumption and leisure and less to 
reserved consumption, that is less to saving.  Thus, under (29) saving is inhibited 
by increases in taxes on capital income and stimulated by increases in the 
marginal product of capital (PQ/PY).  An increase in taxes on consumption (TC) 
generates an increase in PR but it also generates an increase in PC.  Thus it is  
not clear a priori how an increase in consumption taxes affects the 
savings/consumption ratio.  However, it is clear that an increase in consumption 
taxes will increase leisure relative to both savings and consumption.   
1.4.7 A Back-of-the-envelope model for the effects of taxes on the 
macroeconomy  
In a dynamic setting, it is not immediately obvious what is meant with a balanced 
budget. Fixing a deficit will affect the accumulation of debt by the government; 
but assuming lump-sum redistribution of revenue involves more of a 
redistributive tax change analysis than an evaluation of the costs of specific 
taxes. Here, we assume that the extra revenue is spent exhaustively by the 
government. To keep the three tax scenarios as comparable as possible, we 
assume the revenue is used to cut the government deficit, or, to increase 
government saving. This implies that the revenue in the first hand is used to 
paying back government debt. However, since any of the taxes will affect the 
ability of other taxes to raise revenue, we do not specify the target in terms of the 
deficit itself, since this might imply that real government spending differs 
Q Y
Y
Y K C
P PP *
P *T P
        
   YR Q Y K C
P1P *
P / P *T * 1/ T
             
 Y C KR Q Y
P *T *T1P *
P / P
          
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between the three scenarios. Furthermore, if the aim of the policy is to increase 
national saving, there is a real possibility of government saving crowding out 
private saving, resulting, again, in differences between the scenarios. We attempt 
to solve this problem by specifying the revenue target in terms of national saving. 
This implies the same national saving in each of the scenarios, but government 
deficits may vary between the scenarios. 
The experiments considered in this section involve the collection of revenue by 
raising either wage income taxes, capital income taxes, or all commodity taxes 
paid by the consumer. For illustrative purposes, we assume an extra 1 billion 
euros as the revenue target, to be implemented 2010. The tax bases for the three 
taxes are unequal, with wage income taxes estimated to raise about 14.3 billion in 
our baseline for 2009, capital taxes about 12.9 billion, and commodity taxes 
about 23.4 billion euros. The choice of magnitude for the experiment will affect 
the results, since MCF depends on the scale of the change. This can easily be 
seen with the help of our BOTE model for production and the consumer’s choice. 
Abstracting from intermediate inputs, the value marginal product of labour can 
be expressed as  
 ,     (30) 
where  
W is the nominal before-tax wage rate;  
Pg is the price deflator for GDP; 
Tg is the power of the indirect tax rate applying to production in Finland 
(can also include taxes in inputs, but in this stylized model we will ignore 
non-primary-factor inputs); and 
 is the marginal product of labour derived from the constant-
returns-to-scale production function, Y= A*F(K,L). 
 
Thus 
 ,    (31) 
where  
W is the nominal pre-tax wage rate;  
Tw is the power of the tax on labour income; and  
Pc is the price deflator for consumption. 
 
Consumer prices are linked to the price of GDP by , where  is the 
power of consumption taxes (1+ad valorem equivalent rate). 
g
g
P KW *A *f
T L
    
 A *f K L
g
c g c
PW K 1*A *f *
P T L P
    
c g cP P *T cT
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With a CES production function, the percentage change in f(K/L), when K is 
held constant, is given by: 
,    (32) 
where  is the percentage change in employment, Sk is the capital share in 
returns to primary factors and  is the elasticity of substitution between capital 
and labour.  The consumer’s utility maximization problem implies that labour 
supply is linked to the demand for leisure, with the price of leisure being given 
by the after-tax real wage, and of full income, which in turn is also affected by 
real wages. Thus we have a link between labour supply and real wages, which is 
of the form 
 ,    (33) 
where is the elasticity of labour supply with respect to after-tax real wages, and 
, ,and  are the percentage changes in the nominal wage level, consumer 
prices and the power of wage taxes, respectively. The elasticity depends on the 
share of labour income, as well as the elasticity of substitution between leisure 
and other consumption. We calibrate the latter to imply a supply elasticity of 0.1, 
following the estimates for several EU countries obtained in Kleven et al. (2006). 
Since we assume only one good, we have  
Substituting (33) and (32) in (31), we have, for pre-tax real wages, 
 
,
   (34) 
where 
 ,    (35) 
and 
  ,     (36) 
and where  is the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour in (1) and 
 the percentage change in the power of consumption taxes. Under our 
specification, with a capital share from value added at around 0.35, the value of 
 is reoughly -.84, whereas  is roughly 0.18. 
From (34) it is clear that the base for different taxes is relevant for the behavior 
of labour supply and thus for the economy as a whole. If the tax base is large – as 
in the case of , the relative effect on real wages will be smaller.  
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Finally, the production function in the BOTE model can be used to get a rough 
estimate of the effects of the taxes on GDP. The change in GDP is given by  
 +a.    (37) 
and the demand for labour is implied by the production function, being given by 
 .    (38) 
Once the behavior of real wages is clear from (34), we can get employment 
effects from (38), which, recognizing that capital stock is fixed in the short run, 
implies the effects on GDP. 
We can now study the effects of our three experiments with the help of the 
BOTEs for production and welfare. 
1.5 The effects of increases labour, capital, and consumption 
taxes  
We compare the costs of raising labour income, capital income, or consumption 
taxes in terms of their effects on welfare. We assume that the revenue target is a 
billion euros, to be achieved over four years. This could be modelled as a target 
on government deficit as a fall of 250 million Euros a year.  
1.5.1  The macroeconomic effects of labour, capital, and consumption 
taxes 
Table 2 below gives our BOTE calculations for the effects of labour taxes on real 
wages, employment, and GDP. From the table, it can be seen that the collection 
of 250 million in real revenue via increased taxes on labour income imply a 0,54 
per cent increase in the power of labour taxes. The power of taxes over GDP is 
also affected, since  will capture the increase in labour taxes relative to value 
added. The power of consumption taxes is affected for compositional reasons: 
the decrease in real wages implied by both the BOTE and the simulation results 
will feed into the relative prices of consumption goods, changing the composition 
of the consumption basket slightly, and thus affecting the revenue from 
consumption taxes, from which we calculate the overall power of consumption 
taxes.  
The BOTE overestimates the magnitude of real wage changes compared to the 
actual simulation under the parameter values used here. The BOTE also 
overlooks the effect of changes in intermediate and product taxes on GDP, which 
in Finland is fairly high. In the actual simulation, a fall in indirect tax revenues is 
k ky S l S k 
 
L
l * w p
S
  
gt
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marked and contributes to the overall fall in GDP, as can be seen from Figure 2. 
Accordingly, the BOTE overestimates the effect on employment of real wages 
compared to the full simulation. The reason for the positive contribution of 
technology in the simulation results is only apparent when we consider the 
structural effects of taxes falling on the consumer. They tend to favour export 
industries, where the productivity of labour is higher than in the domestic-market 
industries, partly because the fall in real wages increases competitiveness by 
lowering the terms of trade, partly because the fall in domestic consumption 
directly frees up resources for the export industries. The latter effect is evident 
also with the other taxes, but it is most marked under labour taxes. This effect is 
apparent from Figure 3 which depicts changes in the expenditure side GDP, 
showing exports to benefit but consumption to fall. The terms of trade effect is 
largely behind a fall in imports, which shows up as a positive contribution to 
GDP. 
 
Table 2  The effects of taxes on labour income 
 
   2010  2011  2012  2013  2014  2015 
Tg  0.000  0.107  0.121  0.110  0.107  0.013 
Tl  0.000  0.540  0.559  0.493  0.462  0.000 
Tc  0.000  0.051  0.016  0.023  0.015  ‐0.017 
Technological change  0.000  ‐0.054  ‐0.042  ‐0.045  ‐0.041  0.000 
Pre‐tax real wage (BOTE)  0.000  ‐0.005  ‐0.065  ‐0.074  ‐0.066  0.003 
Pre‐tax real wage (SIM)  0.000  0.001  ‐0.009  ‐0.007  ‐0.016  ‐0.026 
Post‐tax real wage (SIM)  0.000  ‐0.538  ‐0.565  ‐0.495  ‐0.474  ‐0.026 
Employment (BOTE)  0.000  0.000  0.003  0.002  0.005  0.008 
Employment (SIM)  0.000  ‐0.004  ‐0.020  ‐0.007  ‐0.008  0.001 
Real GDP (BOTE)  0.000  ‐0.054  ‐0.041  ‐0.044  ‐0.038  0.005 
Real GDP (SIM)  0.000  ‐0.056  ‐0.055  ‐0.049  ‐0.046  0.000 
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Figure 2  Contributions to income-side GDP under labour taxes 
 
 
Figure 3  Contributions to expenditure-side GDP under labour taxes 
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Table 3 shows our BOTE for capital taxes. The increase in capital taxes is 
captured by  but again, also consumption taxes are affected for the 
compositional reasons mentioned earlier. Compared to labour taxes, the increase 
in both of these powers is smaller, but since there is no compensating change in 
labour taxes, the effect on real wages is actually larger than with labour taxes. 
Thus there is an increase in labour demand, and again, the export industries 
benefit compared to the labour tax case. However, the rise in capital taxes will 
tend to raise the pre-tax rate of return on investment, which has a negative impact 
on investment. This can be seen as a negative contribution of investment to 
expenditure-side GDP in the short run in Figure 5, and in the long run as a fall in 
the contribution of primary factors to GDP in Figure 4.  
 
Table 3  The effect of taxes on capital income 
 
   2010  2011  2012  2013  2014  2015 
Tg  0.000  0.050  0.065  0.059  0.055  0.005 
Tl  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Tc  0.000  0.052  0.014  0.020  0.014  ‐0.027 
Technological change  0.000  ‐0.054  ‐0.049  ‐0.055  ‐0.055  ‐0.009 
Pre‐tax real wage (BOTE)  0.000  ‐0.132  ‐0.108  ‐0.113  ‐0.105  0.011 
Pre‐tax real wage (SIM)  0.000  ‐0.103  ‐0.129  ‐0.106  ‐0.114  ‐0.024 
Post‐tax real wage (SIM)  0.000  ‐0.104  ‐0.129  ‐0.106  ‐0.114  ‐0.024 
Employment (BOTE)  0.000  0.030  0.038  0.031  0.033  0.007 
Employment (SIM)  0.000  0.045  0.030  0.038  0.035  ‐0.006 
Real GDP (BOTE)  0.000  ‐0.035  ‐0.025  ‐0.035  ‐0.034  ‐0.005 
Real GDP (SIM)  0.000  ‐0.025  ‐0.030  ‐0.030  ‐0.033  ‐0.013 
 
 
gt
Juha Honkatukia 
26 
 
Figure 4  Contributions to income-side GDP under capital taxes 
 
 
 
Figure 5  Contributions to expenditure-side GDP under capital taxes 
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The results for the consumption tax experiment are shown in Table 4. The rise in 
power of consumption taxes is 0.283 per cent, but it leads to a fall in 
consumption which in turn shows up as a fall in the power of taxes on GDP. The 
BOTE implies a 028 per cent fall in real wages, which is highest of all the three 
taxes considered here. Again, the simple BOTE overestimates the effect on 
positive effect on labour demand and on GDP, but in the actual simulation, the 
fall in indirect tax revenue is accounting for most of the fall in GDP for the first 
years of the simulation, as can be seen from Figure 6. Once the taxes cease to 
rise, after 2014, real wages no longer fall, and in the longer run the demand for 
labour ceases to grow. Even under consumption taxes labour is directed to the 
exporting sectors. Invesment in these sectors grows, but this is offset by the 
decrease in investment in service sectors, which is why the contribution of 
primary factors to GDP is ultimately negative. 
 
Table 4  The effect of taxes on consumption 
 
   2010  2011  2012  2013  2014  2015 
Tg  0.000  ‐0.025  ‐0.018  ‐0.017  ‐0.016  0.003 
Tl  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Tc  0.000  0.283  0.261  0.246  0.229  ‐0.014 
Technological change  0.000  ‐0.045  ‐0.036  ‐0.036  ‐0.032  0.003 
Pre‐tax real wage (BOTE)  0.000  ‐0.277  ‐0.235  ‐0.223  ‐0.207  0.012 
Pre‐tax real wage (SIM)  0.000  ‐0.257  ‐0.271  ‐0.237  ‐0.233  ‐0.015 
Post‐tax real wage (SIM)  0.000  ‐0.257  ‐0.271  ‐0.237  ‐0.233  ‐0.015 
Employment (BOTE)  0.000  0.075  0.079  0.069  0.068  0.004 
Employment (SIM)  0.000  0.022  0.012  0.019  0.016  0.001 
Real GDP (BOTE)  0.000  0.004  0.016  0.010  0.012  0.006 
Real GDP (SIM)  0.000  ‐0.031  ‐0.028  ‐0.023  ‐0.022  0.004 
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Figure 6  Contributions to income-side GDP under consumption taxes 
 
 
 
Figure 7  Contributions to expenditure-side GDP under consumption taxes 
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1.5.2 The welfare and efficiency effects of labour, capital, and 
consumption taxes 
We now turn to the welfare effects of the three taxes. Figures 8, 9 and 10 show the 
decomposition of the welfare effects in the components derived in section 1.4.5 
above. It is apparent that, under the assumption of perfectly competitive labour 
markets, the unemployment effect is not contributing to the overall results. 
Similarly, since we have fixed government spending, there is no contribution from 
government consumption either. The import effect also plays a minor role here. 
Thus the results are dominated by the intertemporal and terms of trade effects but 
the differences between the taxes are largely due to the leisure effect, as can be seen 
from Table 5 below, which concentrates on the results for a single year, namely, 
2014. 
The employment-leisure effect is driven by what happens to employment (n).  In the 
absence of involuntary unemployment (assumed in these simulations), n is 
determined by the choice of leisure.  With the consumption tax, households choose 
less leisure than with the labour tax.  Correspondingly they choose more work (a 
higher value for n) with a consumption tax than with a labour tax.  This gives a 
higher value for the employment-leisure effect under the consumption tax.   
The key to understanding this result is to recognise that with no involuntary 
unemployment, and exogenous national savings, the major welfare problem of taxes 
is that they reduce the price of leisure relative to the price of consumption and 
saving. This encourages leisure and discourages work, but because of tax effects an, 
extra hour of work generates more welfare than an extra hour of leisure.  The reason 
that the employment-leisure effect is less positive4 for labour taxes than for 
consumption taxes is that the reduction in the relative price of leisure is greater for 
labour taxes than for consumption taxes, whereas under capital taxes, the fall in the 
relative price of leisure is the lowest of all.  
Table 5  Welfare decomposition for 2014 
   Labour taxes Consumption taxes Capital taxes 
Govt. consumption effect  0.00 0.00 0.00 
Import effect  0.00 0.00 0.00 
Intertemporal effect ‐0.90 ‐0.90 ‐0.90 
Leisure effect  ‐0.02 0.03 0.06 
Terms‐of‐trade effect ‐0.25 ‐0.25 ‐0.26 
Unemployment effect 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Total effect  ‐1.17 ‐1.13 ‐1.11 
                                              
 
4 With either tax the employment/leisure effect is positive.  This reflects positive income 
elasticities of demand.  With either tax in place, households cut back on current consumption, 
deferred consumption and leisure.  A reduction in leisure means that they choose more 
employment. 
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Figure 8  Welfare decomposition for the effects of labour taxes 
 
 
 
Figure 9  Welfare decomposition for the effects of capital taxes 
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Figure 10  Welfare decomposition for the effects of consumption taxes 
 
 
 
We next turn to the effects on government revenues. Our experiment has 
assumed a fixed target for national saving, keeping real government demand 
constant. However, since a large part of government transfer expenditures are 
indexed, the implications for government revenues and government deficits can 
be expected to differ between the experiments, since we have shown that prices 
will behave differently under the three taxes. This can be seen in Figures 11 and 
12, which show changes in net tax revenues and the level changes in government 
deficits, compared to the equivalent variations in consumer welfare. From the 
figures, it is clear that the labour tax will raise more revenue than the other two 
taxes under the national saving target, but it will also have the largest absolute 
welfare effects. It would appear difficult to compare the relative merits of the 
taxes without taking into account the relative gain in revenue in proportion to the 
loss of welfare. But then, this is precisely what our MCF measure does.  
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Figure 11  Welfare effects and total net tax revenue for labour, capital, and 
consumption taxes 
 
 
Figure 12  Welfare effects and government deficit for labour, capital, and 
consumption taxes 
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Figure 13 shows the marginal cost of funds for the three taxes. The labour tax 
and capital tax have a higher efficiency cost than consumption taxes. We 
estimate that the MCF from labour taxes is around 1.5-1.6, the MCF for capital 
taxes almost as high, and the MCF from consumption taxes around 1.4-1.5. 
These estimates fall in the range of findings from other countries. Obviously, a 
number of assumptions affect our estimates. We shall discuss the most important 
of them in the concluding section. 
 
Figure 13 Marginal cost of funds for labour, capital, and consumption taxes 
 
 
 
 
1.6 Concluding remarks 
In this study, we have extended the VATTAGE model to include labour/leisure 
and savings/consumption choice. We have done this to facilitate the application 
of the model in the estimation of the marginal cost of raising funds from labour, 
capital and consumption taxes. We have used back-of-the-envelope model for 
explaining results from a full-scale dynamic AGE model on the welfare effects of 
the imposition of the taxes. Back-of-the-envelope equations are necessary for 
figuring out how an AGE model works and what has been taken into account in 
any set of results and what has been left out.   
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We find that, under perfectly competitive labour markets, welfare effects are 
dominated by intertemporal, terms-of-trade, and leisure effects. According to our 
estimates, MCF is larger for labour than capital and consumption taxes, which 
can be explained by the effects of the taxes on real wages with the BOTE model.  
This possibility is discussed in the theoretical literature on MCF as well, but here, 
we can establish the differing <actual tax bases as the root of the differences 
between the scenarios.  
We find that intertemporal effects contribute equally much to welfare losses 
under all of the taxes.  Terms-of-trade effects, in contrast, vary more between the 
scenarios. This may be due to the taxes affecting capital formation differently, 
which will eventually have an effect on relative export prices.  
We have found it challenging to exclude non-tax related policies from our tax 
experiments. This difficulty is recognized in literature (e.g Dahlby 2008), who 
discusses the effects of relative prices on the measures of MCF.  Dahlby also 
emphasizes the scale-dependency of MCF.  We have deliberately chosen a policy 
target that is not directly linked to the prices of public expenditure – national 
saving – but since any of the taxes we consider will affect the ability of other 
taxes to raise revenue, and, moreover, the nominal level of government transfer 
expenditure, we expect that the implications of different taxes for government 
deficits are different.  Our approach has the advantage of excluding scale effects. 
The paper shows that it is possible to compare the efficiency costs between tax 
instruments with a dynamic AGE modeling approach, and to isolate the key 
reasons for the differences between the taxes. This provides a powerful tool for 
analyzing the effects of taxation. 
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2. The dynamic effects of a tax reform in Finland 
Juha Honkatukia – Saara Tamminen 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Several studies have analyzed effects of tax reform proposals with Applied 
General Equilibrium (AGE) models. While most of these studies have used static 
models, they all demonstrate the difficulty of focusing on the effects stemming 
from the tax structure itself. This is especially the case when a reform aims at 
revenue neutrality or a given revenue target, since changes in taxation tend to 
affect the costs of public spending as well. Moreover, most studies find that 
rigidities affect the efficiency costs of taxation. Many of the studies also show 
that a tax reform may give rise to distributional issues.    
In this chapter, we use a dynamic AGE model of Finland to study a recent tax 
reform proposal under alternative assumptions about other policies. We also 
study the effects of wage rigidities on the effectiveness of the reform. We use the 
VATTAGE AGE model of Finland to estimate the dynamic effects of the 
proposed tax structure changes and the marginal welfare cost of these changes in 
the collection forms of public funds.  
VATTAGE is well suited for the analysis of tax structure changes as it includes 
all major tax types and has a detailed industry dimension for the Finnish 
economy at great sector detail. Here, the model is extended to cover decile-
specific employment/leisure and saving choices, based on the representative 
household model developed in Dixon, Honkatukia, and Rimmer (2011). 
We focus on the tax reform proposal published in 2010 by the Finnish Tax 
Committee, consisting of experts and representatives of interest groups. Broadly, 
recognizing the results from previous research, which has found income and 
corporate taxes the most distortionary with regard to economic growth and 
employment, and consumption based taxes and property income taxes less 
distortionary, in its report (VM, 2010) the committee proposed to: 
1) cut income and corporate tax rates; and  
2) raise the capital tax rate, value added taxes and excise taxes.  
Our previous work broadly supports the basic assumptions behind the 
committee’s proposal. In particular, according to our estimates, the Marginal 
Cost of Funds (MCF), which compares the welfare loss from taxation to the 
revenue raised, is in Finland considerably higher for wage and capital income 
taxes than for consumption taxes.  
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Here, we use the concept of the MCF to study the effects of the proposal and to 
demonstrate, which factors may affect its success. Underlying our interest for 
measuring the efficiency of taxation and tax reforms is the well-known result 
from general equilibrium theory, found in e.g. Dahlby (2008) and Liu (2004), 
that a government should aim at a tax structure where the marginal cost of funds 
for each tax type is the same. The literature also suggests that the interactions 
between different taxes, as well as the changes in the cost of public sector 
production induced by a tax reform, will have an effect on MCF. The MCF 
analysis of Liu (2004) takes into account these effects by basing the estimate for 
MCF on public excess revenue, that is, gross revenue less expenditure, while 
keeping both public sector inputs and outputs constant. Our measure for 
government revenue is in essence similar to Liu’s, and we also fix government 
expenditure and investment in real terms.    
Our aim is to analyze the effects of the tax reform on efficiency and income 
distribution. While our central scenario will assume perfect competition and 
flexible wages, many previous AGE studies on tax reforms suggest that rigidities 
in the labour market may affect the efficiency of a reform. Thus, for example, 
Chisario and Cicowiez (2010) find that the welfare cost of taxation depends on 
regulatory regimes and also on wage formation, with real wage rigidity 
increasing especially the marginal cost of funds for labour taxes significantly 
compared to scenarios with more flexible real wages. Similarly, we find that 
wage rigidities can undermine the efficiency gains of the reform. 
Some studies also examine capital taxes. For example, Radulescu and 
Stimmelmayr (2010), using a static AGE model,  find that the capital tax reform 
of 2008 in Germany that increased the capital gains tax,  lead to a decrease in 
GDP, investment and labour demand. Duarte Lledo (2005) uses a dynamic, 
overlapping generations AGE model to calculate the effects of a replacement of 
corporate taxes and financial transaction taxes in Brazil by a broad-based, 
uniform federal VAT. He finds that while the reform would not decrease 
incomes, it would have distributional effects. In the Finnish case, in contrast, the 
corporate and capital tax reform would likely encourage investment on balance. 
We also find that the reform would have distributional effects, the magnitude of 
which depends on nominal rigidities in the labour markets and also on the social 
security -related transfers from the government to the households. Furthermore, 
we find that sector effects are important not only for the structure of output but 
also for the distribution of factor incomes between the deciles.  
The structure of this chapter is as follows. The second section gives an outline of 
VATTAGE and discusses the effects of income taxes under the new decile 
specification. Section 2.3 presents our analyses of the tax reform proposal 
studying macro-level effects, distributional effects, effects on different industries, 
and finally, analyzing the proposal from the point of view of efficiency and 
sustainability. Section 2.4 concludes. 
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2.2 The VATTAGE model  
2.2.1 An outline of VATTAGE 
VATTAGE is an applied, dynamic general equilibrium model for Finland that 
covers the whole economy and models all major tax types including labour 
income taxes, capital taxes and indirect taxes of various forms. The VATTAGE 
database contains detailed information about commodity and income taxes as well as 
the expenditures and transfers of the public sector, thus covering most policy 
instruments available to the government. The model accounts for changes in public 
deficit and debt and can be used to evaluate the impact of the policy shocks on 
public sector sustainability. Further, the government cost structure accounts for 
the different types of public transfers to households, including e.g. age related 
benefits and unemployment benefits, as well as public investments.   
VATTAGE is based on the MONASH-model developed at the Centre of  
Policy Studies at the Monash University. MONASH-style models are used in 
countries ranging from China and South Africa to the United States and Australia  
(Dixon and Rimmer, 2002). In Europe, models based on MONASH have been 
developed for Denmark, Finland, and the Netherlands. VATTAGE is described 
in detail in Honkatukia (2009). 
To study MCF, we have extended the basic VATTAGE by allowing households 
to make endogenous choices between their leisure (or equivalently labour-
supply), their consumption of commodities and their savings (Dixon et al, 2011). 
We  
have adopted the simplest approach, treating leisure and saving (reserved 
consumption) as two more “commodities” in household choice. The household’s 
problem has been amended to allow for the treatment of full income, that is, 
income inclusive of the value of leisure. 
Formally, households i maximize the utility from 
 
    (1) 
subject to  
    (2) 
and 
        (3) 
where  
C is consumption 
L is leisure 
R is reserved consumption (i.e. saving) 
H is total hours available for work; 
iC i iL i iR iU (C ) U (L ) U (R ) 
i
W
iC i iR i i i
W
PP *C P *R Z * N
T
       
i i i iL H B N  
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B is hours in involuntary unemployment;  
N is hours of employment; 
PW is the pre-tax wage rate; 
TW is the power of the tax on labour income;  
Z is household non-labour income; 
PR is the price of a unit of reserved consumption (to be discussed in 
subsection 2.2.6);  
PC is the price of a unit of consumption,  
and where the index i denotes decile. 
 
In (3), we assume that involuntary unemployment is not leisure and consequently 
gives no utility.   
The price of consumption is given by 
      (4) 
where  
TiC is the power of the tax on consumption (that is, 1 + ad valorem-
equivalent rate of commodity taxes), PY is the price of GDP.  
The first order conditions from problem (1) to (3) are:  
     (5) 
     (6) 
     (7) 
where  
the superscript prime denotes derivative; and  
 is the Lagrangian multiplier which can be interpreted as the increase in 
utility that the household would derive from an extra dollar of income (a 
unit increase in Z).   
As is apparent from the demand equations, consumption of commodities, leisure 
and saving are now interrelated, whereas in the original formulation of 
VATTAGE, the labour market specification drives the reaction of employment to 
taxes, and saving is affected by taxation only to the extent that households’ 
disposable incomes change.   
In specifying the demand functions arising from (5)-(7), we assume that the 
relevant price for leisure is the nominal after tax wage rate, whereas the price of 
saving captures the opportunity cost of current consumption. 
iC Y iCP P *T
/
iC i i Y iCU (C ) *P *T 
/
iL i i iW iWU (L ) * P / T 
/
iR i i iRU (R ) *P 
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To link the consumption and labour supply choices, we have coupled data on 
decile-specific consumption with data on decile-specific income. On the income 
side, our databases cover decile and occupation-specific labour, capital and 
transfer incomes. To link this data to labour demand by the 82 VATTAGE 
industries, we use industry and occupation specific labour data. This enables us 
to link the two data sets, as illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1  Labour income by occupation and decile 
 
 
 
To calibrate the labour supply elasticities implied by the utility maximization 
problem in (1) to (3), we have used the estimates of Kleven and Kreiner (2006), 
who find considerably higher elasticities for lower income deciles than for higher 
ones. On the average, the implied elasticity of supply is here around 0.1, with the 
elasticity in the lowest two income deciles nearing 0.2-0.3 but being well below 
0.1 for the higher-income deciles.  
Decile-specific consumption data stems from VATT’s income-distribution model 
(TUJA). The parameters for the decile-specific consumption functions cover 91 
commodities, and have been estimated using the large consumption data bases of 
the income-distribution model. They are reported in Honkatukia, Kinnunen and 
Rauhanen (2011). 
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2.2.2 Baseline scenario 
The literature on MCF suggests that welfare costs are scale-dependent. This 
means that the baseline scenario of the economy matters for the results of the 
analysis. VATTAGE baseline is constructed to conform to medium-term official 
forecasts at the macro level. However, at the sector level, it is based on an 
extensive study of the structural trends of the economy, as well as a very large 
scale foresight effort encompassing dozens of sector and regional experts. This 
section gives a brief description of the procedures followed in forming the 
baseline. 
The structural trends concern changes in demand patterns by commodity and user 
(domestic consumption, exports to EU and elsewhere, investment, and the public 
sector) that stem from a historical analysis of the development of the Finnish 
economy (Honkatukia and Marttila 2011). In the historical analysis, VATTAGE 
uses data on the actual changes in demand, production, relative prices and the tax 
structure over a period of the time to decompose the observed changes in the 
economy into contributions by structural variables. For example, historical 
analysis allows us to show that the largest contribution to the 37.3 per cent GDP 
growth from 1995 to 2004 stemmed from employment, which alone would have 
explained a 15.7 per cent increase in GDP. More importantly, we find that 
technological change – mainly primary factor productivity growth – explained 
8.3 per cent of GDP growth, while trade and domestic prices together explained 
more than 10 per cent of GDP’s growth. The historical analysis is conducted at 
commodity and industry level and allows us to obtain trends for the development 
of factor productivity and demand patterns, which can be used in forecasting the 
baseline for the future. 
The baseline forecast also uses macro and, to an extent, industry level forecasts 
from other studies. We use macroeconomic forecasts for the early years of the 
scenario, and population and age-related expenditure forecasts for the whole 
scenario. The main medium-term macroeconomic assumptions in our scenario 
conform to the medium term forecast of the Ministry of Finance and the EU 
Ageing Working Group. In the longer run, macroeconomic development is 
determined by population trends, which affect public demand for services and 
other public expenditures, as well as private consumption, whereas industry-level 
development depends on productivity trends and commodity-level export trends. 
The baseline also evaluates the development of public sector debt and deficit, 
given policy measures already taken. The sector-specific baselines have been 
developed in the context of a long term foresight project, where we have 
benefitted from the scrutiny and comments of dozens of sector and regional 
experts and interest groups (Honkatukia, Ahokas and Marttila, 2010; Ahokas and 
Honkatukia, 2010). 
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2.2.3 A Back-of-the-envelope model of the effects of income tax cuts 
One of the key findings of the MCF literature is that labour supply responses 
have a large impact on the efficiency of the tax system. In this section, we study 
the labour supply responses in VATTAGE to changes in labour income taxes and 
to changes in taxes on transfers, which form a significant part of the Tax 
Committee’s proposal. To see what the responses depend on, we use a stylized 
model of the full simulation model, a back-of-the-envelope (BOTE) model, to 
see what the crucial mechanisms are and how they can be expected to work in the 
full simulation.  
The link between labour supply decisions and production can be illustrated with 
a simple back-of-the-envelope model of the full model. For simplicity, we shall 
only consider value added, which, for the whole economy, is given by 
    .    (8) 
VATTAGE assumes that investment takes time. Since we want to study the 
short-run connections between taxes, labour supply and production, we can then 
focus on the short run production function (assuming a fixed capital stock), given 
by  
     (9) 
We assume that labour is paid its value marginal product, which is given by 
 
   (10) 
where  
W is the nominal before-tax wage rate; Pg is the price deflator for GDP; 
Tg is the power of indirect taxes applying to production in Finland, power 
of a tax being defined as (1 + ad valorem-equivalent rate of indirect taxes); 
and 
 is the marginal product of labour derived from the constant-
returns-to-scale production function, Y= A*F(K,L). 
 
Thus the real pre-tax wage level is given by 
  (11) 
where  
W is the nominal pre-tax wage rate;  
Tw is the power of the tax on labour income (1+ tax rate on labour income); 
and Pc is the price deflator for consumption.   
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Consumer prices are linked to the price of GDP by , where  is the 
power of consumption taxes (1+ad valorem equivalent rate). 
With a CES production function, the  short-run changes in the marginal product 
of capital are given by 
  (12) 
where  is the percentage change in employment, Sk is the capital share in 
returns to primary factors and  is the elasticity of substitution between capital 
and labour.   
The consumer’s utility maximization problem implies that labour supply is 
linked to the demand for leisure, with the price of leisure being given by the 
after-tax real wage, and of full income, which in turn is also affected by real 
wages. Thus we have a link between labour supply and real wages, which is of 
the form 
  (13) 
where is the elasticity of demand for labour supply with respect to pre-tax real 
wages, and where the lower case variables , ,and  are the percentage 
changes in the respective upper-case variables for nominal wage level, consumer 
prices and the power of wage taxes, respectively. depends on the share of 
labour income, as well as the elasticity of substitution between leisure and other 
consumption. We have calibrated the latter to imply an average supply elasticity 
of 0.1, following Kleven et al. (2006). 
Substituting (13) and (12) in (11), we have, for the percentage change of the pre-
tax real wages, 
 
, (14) 
where 
 
, (15) 
and 
 
,  (16) 
 
and where  is the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour and  
the percentage change in the power of consumption taxes. Under our 
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specification, with a capital share from value added at around 0.35, the value of 
 is roughly -0.84, whereas  is roughly 0.18. 
Equation (14) gives a concise BOTE formula for understanding the aggregate 
effect of changes in taxes on real wages. We can use this for interpreting the 
results, and also for forming a prior for the expected simulation results. 
To study how an income tax cut may affect labour supply, we first simulate the 
effects of a cut in taxes on wage income alone. Under our assumption of phasing-
in, the tax rate on labour income would fall by about 2.3 per cent on the average 
each year between 2012 and 2015.  
 
Table 1  BOTE for results of wage tax cuts (deviation) 
 
   2011  2012  2013  2014  2015 
Tg  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Tl  0.00  ‐0.48  ‐0.96  ‐1.43  ‐1.90 
Tc  0.00  ‐0.04  ‐0.03  ‐0.05  ‐0.05 
Technological change  0.00  0.04  0.09  0.13  0.18 
Pre‐tax real wage (BOTE)  0.00  0.00  ‐0.04  ‐0.05  ‐0.07 
Pre‐tax real wage (SIM)  0.00  0.02  0.12  0.22  0.37 
Post‐tax real wage (Bote)  0.00  0.48  0.92  1.38  1.82 
Post‐tax real wage (SIM)  0.00  0.50  1.08  1.67  2.30 
Labour supply (BOTE)  0.00  0.05  0.09  0.14  0.18 
Labour supply (SIM)  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.00  ‐0.02 
Employment (SIM)  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.00  ‐0.02 
Real GDP (BOTE)  0.00  0.07  0.06  0.09  0.11 
Real GDP (SIM)  0.00  0.05  0.10  0.13  0.17 
Consumption (SIM)  0.00  0.30  0.59  0.94  1.30 
Investment (SIM)  0.00  0.39  0.16  0.34  0.24 
Exports (SIM)  0.00  ‐0.38  ‐0.53  ‐0.92  ‐1.24 
Imports (SIM)  0.00  0.21  0.27  0.42  0.50 
 
The results of this simulation for the first years of the policy are shown in Table 
1 as deviations from baseline (i.e. cumulative per cent changes). From the table, 
it can be seen that the policy cuts the power of labour taxes by half a per cent in 
2012. It also affects the average power of consumption taxes. This is due to 
distributional effects both in consumption patterns and over deciles: the overall 
consumption of highly taxed commodities increases less than consumption on the 
average. Furthermore, overall consumption actually falls for those deciles of 
whose incomes wages form a large part (the lowest three income deciles). Based 
1C 2C
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on equation (14), we expect real after tax wages to rise, which according to 
equation (13) should cause an increase in labour supply. As the table shows, this 
is what happens in the full simulation. Finally, based on equation (9), we can 
then also calculate the effect on GDP. 
The effects on the GDP components shown in Table 1 can be understood starting 
from the labour supply response. Consider the GDP identity 
  .   (17)   
Recalling the short-run production function in equation (9), from the fact that 
more labour is now available it follows that GDP (Y) must rise in the short run 
(since the capital stock is fixed). From the increase in incomes it is also clear that 
consumption (C) rises. Both of these effects contribute to an increase in 
investment (I). However, since GDP increases only a little (value added only 
increases slightly because of the small labour input contribution), but 
consumption increases relatively more, there must be a reduction in (X-M) (i.e. 
exports less imports), since we assume that government demand (G) is fixed. The 
mechanism behind this is a rise in the domestic price level, which puts exports in 
a disadvantage and leads to a deterioration of the trade balance. 
From Table 1, it is clear that BOTE overestimates the labour supply increase. 
This is due to the fact that the simple BOTE formula for labour supply does not 
consider the effects on disposable income due to the effects on the overall price 
level (which rises as the economy expands as a result of the tax cut boosting 
consumption).  
The BOTE also misses effects rising from income distribution. The full 
simulation takes into account the effects of income tax progression, as well as the 
differences in the supply elasticities of labour between the deciles. In the actual 
simulation, both of these effects are important, since the tax breaks are smaller 
for the mid- and high-income deciles, whose labour supply elasticities have been 
estimated to be lower than average, than those of the low-income deciles, whose 
supply elasticities are thought to be higher than average. Overall, these effects 
accentuate the labour supply response; indeed, when we run the same simulation 
in the single-household VATTAGE, using the average elasticity of supply for 
labour, the labour supply increase is smaller than under the decile specification. 
On the other hand, if we run the decile model under the assumption of equal 
proportional tax cuts for each decile, the response is larger than under 
progression. Clearly then, tax progression and differences between the deciles’ 
labour supply elasticities do make a difference, motivating the use of a multi-
household model. 
Before turning to the analysis of the full reform proposal, we consider the effects 
of changes in other taxes. In the proposal, the labour income tax cut is 
Y C I G X M    
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compensated for with an increase in indirect taxes. This is significant from the 
point of view of labour supply, since the resulting rise in the domestic price level 
will have opposite effects on real wages than the income tax cut. Table 2 shows 
our results for this simulation. The BOTE predicts only a small increase in post 
tax real wages and labour supply; in the actual simulation, real wages and labour 
supply rise even less by 2015. Consequently, there is no short-run boost to GDP 
(the slight fall in GDP is due to a negative contribution of indirect tax revenues to 
GDP). However, the falling pre-tax real wage is making investment more 
profitable, to the extent that there is a terms-of-trade adjustment also in this case. 
 
Table 2  BOTE for results of income tax cuts and consumption tax rises 
(deviation) 
 
   2011  2012  2013  2014  2015 
Tg  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Tl  0.00  ‐0.48  ‐0.96  ‐1.43  ‐1.89 
Tc  0.00  0.42  0.84  1.25  1.67 
Technological change  0.00  ‐0.03  ‐0.08  ‐0.13  ‐0.19 
Pre‐tax real wage (BOTE)  0.00  ‐0.46  ‐0.92  ‐1.39  ‐1.86 
Pre‐tax real wage (SIM)  0.00  ‐0.48  ‐0.94  ‐1.41  ‐1.87 
Post‐tax real wage (Bote)  0.00  0.02  0.03  0.04  0.03 
Post‐tax real wage (SIM)  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.02 
Labour supply (BOTE)  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Labour supply (SIM)  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.01  ‐0.01 
Employment (SIM)  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.01  ‐0.01 
Real GDP (BOTE)  0.00  ‐0.03  0.00  ‐0.01  ‐0.02 
Real GDP (SIM)  0.00  ‐0.03  ‐0.07  ‐0.13  ‐0.19 
Consumption (SIM)  0.00  ‐0.12  ‐0.25  ‐0.36  ‐0.46 
Investment (SIM)  0.00  0.16  0.07  0.10  0.04 
Exports (SIM)  0.00  0.01  0.07  0.01  ‐0.07 
Imports (SIM)  0.00  ‐0.03  ‐0.12  ‐0.20  ‐0.30 
 
Finally, we consider the effects of a cut in capital income taxes in connection 
with an increase in indirect taxes on intermediate inputs. The results for this 
simulation are given in Table 3. We estimate that the combined effect of the Tax 
Committee’s proposals for capital and corporate taxes would amount to a one 
percent decline in the average capital income tax rate over the next four years. 
The direct effects on investment are positive, since they amount to an increase in 
the after-tax rate of return on investment. However, the results on investment 
also depend on the rest of the economy, and crucially, on the effects on labour 
supply.  
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While the cut in capital taxes does not directly enter our BOTE for real wages, 
indirect taxes do, and the effect of higher indirect taxes amounts to raising the 
power of indirect taxes on GDP by 0.06 per cent in 2012. This causes a fall in 
real wages, labour supply, and GDP. In the simulations, consumption is also 
falling because of the rise in the price level.  
Table 3 BOTE for results of capital tax cuts and indirect tax rise 
(deviation) 
 
   2011  2012  2013  2014  2015 
Tg  0.00  0.06  0.12  0.17  0.23 
Tl  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Tc  0.00  0.00  ‐0.01  ‐0.01  ‐0.01 
Technological change  0.00  ‐0.01  ‐0.02  ‐0.03  ‐0.04 
Pre‐tax real wage (BOTE)  0.00  ‐0.06  ‐0.11  ‐0.17  ‐0.22 
Pre‐tax real wage (SIM)  0.00  ‐0.13  ‐0.27  ‐0.39  ‐0.52 
Post‐tax real wage (Bote)  0.00  ‐0.06  ‐0.11  ‐0.17  ‐0.22 
Post‐tax real wage (SIM)  0.00  ‐0.13  ‐0.26  ‐0.39  ‐0.52 
Labour supply (BOTE)  0.00  ‐0.01  ‐0.01  ‐0.02  ‐0.02 
Labour supply (SIM)  0.00  0.00  ‐0.01  ‐0.01  ‐0.02 
Employment (SIM)  0.00  0.00  ‐0.01  ‐0.01  ‐0.02 
Real GDP (BOTE)  0.00  ‐0.01  ‐0.01  ‐0.01  ‐0.02 
Real GDP (SIM)  0.00  ‐0.01  ‐0.03  ‐0.04  ‐0.05 
Consumption (SIM)  0.00  ‐0.03  ‐0.06  ‐0.08  ‐0.10 
Investment (SIM)  0.00  0.01  0.02  0.04  0.03 
Exports (SIM)  0.00  ‐0.01  ‐0.03  ‐0.04  ‐0.06 
Imports (SIM)  0.00  ‐0.02  ‐0.04  ‐0.05  ‐0.07 
 
2.3 The effects of the tax reform 
2.3.1 The tax committee’s proposal for a tax reform  
The Tax Committee published its proposal at the end of 2010. The committee 
was tasked with developing a model for restructuring the whole tax system, with 
the aim of improving the competitiveness of the Finnish economy and increasing 
the employment rate.  
The committee proposed to make tax collection more dependent on VAT revenue 
instead of income and corporate taxes as previously. This change should fit the 
anticipated in the Finnish population structure, as the population share of 
pensioners is increasing, while that of the working-age population is falling. 
Increases in excise taxes of various commodities with negative externalities (e.g. 
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alcohol, lot of sugar containing products, fuels and electricity) were also 
proposed, based on the inverse elasticity rule5. Income and corporate taxes, in 
contrast, would be lowered in order to encourage employment and the 
establishment of companies. The changes were intended to be budget neutral, i.e. 
without effects on total tax collection. 
Table 4 below presents in detail the planned changes, which have been used also 
as the shocks in the modelling scenarios. We impose the proposed changes on the 
rates implied by the model database. For most taxes, this is straightforward. We 
assume that the reform is phased in gradually, over the next four years starting in 
2012. After 2015 all tax rates are assumed to remain unchanged.  
Table 4 Proposed changes on different tax rates. Source: VM (2010), 
Statistics Finland 
                                              
 
5 Based on this rule, the optimal tax rate of a commodity should be inversely related to the 
demand elasticity of the product (e.g. Dahlby, 2008). The demand elasticities of all the products 
listed are relatively inelastic and provide, hence, an easy target for the collection of additional 
tax revenue. 
Tax type  Change in 
tax 
collection € 
% change  Notifications 
Income 
tax 
‐2060 
million € 
per year 
Total change in collected 
income taxes: ‐9,2 per cent, 
which equals average ‐1.75 
percentage point decrease in 
the income tax rate. 
Income deciles specific 
changes in income taxes 
were calculated from 
microdata with VATT’s TUJA‐
micro simulation model. 
Capital 
taxes 
+500 
million € 
per year 
Capital tax up from 28% to 30%  ‐Modelled together in the 
VATTAGE model 
 
Corporate 
taxes 
‐800 million 
€ per year 
Corporate tax down from 26% 
to 22% 
Value 
added 
taxes 
(VAT) 
+1200 
million € 
per year 
All VAT rates 2 percentage 
points up 
 
Excise tax  +1000 
million € 
per year 
‐ Alcohol tax up by 10% 
‐ Candy and ice‐cream tax up 
by 33% (on top of the tax raise 
of 2011) and the same tax 
percentage to be applied to all 
sweet bakings and comfiture 
‐ Tax on soft drinks up by 100% 
‐ Consumer electricity and all 
fuel taxes up by 10%  
These increases in excise 
taxes are additional to the 
energy and sugar product tax 
increases of 2011. 
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With regard to the excise taxes, the final report of the tax committee does not 
provide specific assumptions on the exact change per excise tax. The 
assumptions below on the per cent changes are based on the income inequality 
analysis of the report, p. 217 (VM, 2010). 
In Finland, as in other Scandinavian countries, the income tax rates are 
progressive (i.e. depend on the income level) and, hence, the new, lower income 
tax rates were also defined just as a new progressive tax rates varying by income 
(VM, 2010). In VATTAGE, income tax rates can be defined only for the 10 
different income deciles, not by the detailed progression function. Therefore, the 
changes in the income deciles specific average income tax rates were first 
calculated with household level microdata and the TUJA micro simulation model 
of VATT. Table 5 below specifies the calculated changes in the average income 
tax rate for all 10 household income deciles. The shocks in the first scenario 
follow strictly these new tax rates calculated by the TUJA model. The per cent 
changes inserted to the model as shocks are presented in the fourth column.  
Table 5 Change in the average income tax rate per household income 
decile 
 
Household income 
decile 
2010 Average 
income tax rate* 
New tax rate*  Change by 
2015, %, 
1  7,6  6,6  ‐12,8 % 
2  10,7  9,9  ‐7,8 % 
3  13,0  11,8  ‐9,0 % 
4  14,7  13,2  ‐10,1 % 
5  15,6  14,0  ‐10,4 % 
6  16,7  15,0  ‐10,2 % 
7  17,8  16,0  ‐9,8 % 
8  19,0  17,2  ‐9,7 % 
9  21,0  19,1  ‐9,4 % 
10  27,4  25,1  ‐8,1 % 
All  19,0  17,3  ‐9,2 % 
Source: VATT, TUJA microsimulation model 
* Income tax rate is specified as the average income tax percentage over a 
representative household in each household level income decile. 
 
In the VATTAGE model corporate taxes and capital taxes are summed up to a 
single capital tax rate. The net effect of a decrease in the corporate tax and an 
increase in the capital tax on this rate was estimated on the basis of the shares of 
these two respective tax forms in the accumulated capital tax collection. In the 
model, all corporate after-tax profits are assumed to be redistributed to the 
households since there is no information on the (future) dividend payout ratios. 
In practice, the dividend payout ratios have varied heavily from year to year and 
only a part of the dividends of Finnish companies are redistributed nowadays to 
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Finnish households. If corporate profits were assumed to be fully taxed again as 
capital income of households (as in practice corporate profits paid off as 
dividends are double taxed in Finland), the net shock of the two tax rate changes 
would be underestimated. Hence, taking the conservative approach, corporate 
profits distributed to the households were not assumed to be taxed again in the 
main modelling scenarios. In the main scenarios, the overall effect of the 
corporate taxes and capital income taxes then amounts to an average 1 per cent 
fall compared to baseline. We do, however, also consider the sector effects of the 
corporate tax cuts in one of our alternative scenarios, with the aim of exploring 
investment responses to the corporate tax cuts. 
The planned additional increase of 2 percentage points in all value added taxes 
(VAT) and in the above mentioned excise taxes are assumed to be phased in 
starting 2012. VATTAGE takes in to account both the value added taxes and 
excise taxes among the producer’s intermediate consumption tax rate and in the 
consumer’s consumption tax rate. The changes are commodity-specific, affecting 
all users of a commodity in equal proportion (that is, possible initial differences 
in commodity tax rates between users remain in place in the simulations). 
2.3.2 The macroeconomic effects of the tax proposal 
We now turn to the analysis of the actual proposal. In this main scenario, we 
assume competitive labour markets, with flexible real wages. We assume that 
only taxes on wage incomes and capital incomes are cut, and that social security 
transfers and pensions are indexed to overall consumer prices. The effects of the 
policy on expenditure aggregates are shown in Figure 2 in deviation form (i.e., 
the level change compared to baseline expressed in percentage changes). The 
results can be understood with the help of equations (9) and (17); the fall in 
employment leads to a fall in value added according to (9); Household 
consumption falls because of rising prices; Investment is initially boosted by the 
cut in capital taxes, which raises the expected rate of return on investment; 
Finally, since GDP is falling at the same time as domestic absorption in growing, 
the trade balance must eventually deteriorate. 
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Figure 2  Change in expenditure aggregates in policy 
 
 
 
The GDP effects can be decomposed into the contributions of changes in supply 
and demand components to the overall change in GDP, which shows the relative 
importance of each component. Figure 3 studies the contributions of the income 
aggregates and shows that the fall in primary factors (primarily labour) and other 
costs (including profits) are driving the fall in GDP. The contribution of taxes on 
GDP, on the other hand, is positive after a while, showing the effects of the 
change towards commodity taxes. Figure 4 shows the contributions of the 
expenditure aggregates. After the initial boost to investment, all expenditure 
aggregates decline. The deterioration of the trade balance, which shows as a 
negative contribution of exports to GDP growth, also has a positive contribution 
to GDP stemming from the falling imports.  
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Figure 3  Contributions of income aggregates on GDP in policy 
 
 
 
Figure 4  Contributions of expenditure aggregates on GDP in policy 
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We next study the effects of labour market rigidities on the welfare costs of a tax 
reform. We assume real wage adjustment to take the form  
 
 ,  
(18) 
 
where and are adjustment coefficients which take the values 0.4 and 1.1, 
following the estimates of McMorrow and Roeger (2000). Equation (18) states 
that current real wages only adjust with a lag to changes from the expected (old) 
baseline wages (W), employment (E), and labour supply (LS). The specification 
in (21) is compatible with many theories about centralized wage setting, as 
discussed in Dixon and Rimmer (2002) and does not necessitate the explicit 
modelling of the wage-setting unions’ target function in an application such as 
ours. The effect of wage rigidities following (21) in our setting is to drive a gap 
between labour supply and labour demand.  
The main effect of wage rigidities is that adjustment to changes in taxation takes 
place partly via employment since now the pre-tax real wage, which is 
determining equilibrium employment, falls by less than under flexible wages, 
since it is no longer driven by utility maximization and cost minimization. As a 
result, there is now a more pronounced fall in employment in the short run. This 
shows as a gap between labour supply – which is still determined by households’ 
utility maximization and the post-tax real wages - and labour demand, which 
implies an increase in the rate of unemployment.  In the longer run, however, 
employment tends to recover as real wages gradually adjust. 
It can be seen from Figure 5 that, under wage rigidities, most GDP aggregates 
fall deeper than under flexible wages. Consequently, the fall in exports is also 
larger as the labour costs are now adjusting with a lag. The pattern of our results 
matches well the empirical findings of e.g. Blanchard and Perotti (2002) on the 
dynamic effects of tax changes on GDP, consumption and investment.  
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Figure 5  Changes in expenditure aggregates under wage rigidities 
 
 
 
The larger fall in employment can also be seen from the contributions of income 
aggregates to GDP, shown in Figure 6. Since in the short run capital is fixed, the 
fall in employment causes a larger effect on GDP than under flexible wages. This 
can be seen from the income-side GDP aggregates in Figure 5, which show a 
larger negative contribution of primary factors on GDP than under perfect 
competition. The effects of the reform on demand aggregates in Figure 7 show 
that the wage rigidity makes the reform less beneficial for investment and 
aggravates the negative export effects.  
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Figure 6  Contributions of income aggregates on GDP in policy under 
wage rigidities  
 
 
Figure 7  Contributions of expenditure aggregates on GDP in policy under 
wage rigidities  
 
The dynamic effects of a tax reform in Finland 
57 
 
2.3.3 Distributional effects 
The tax reform proposal contains elements that can be expected to have 
distributional effects. Because of income tax progression, the higher–earning 
deciles should benefit relatively less from the tax cuts than the lowest income 
deciles. On the other hand, the share of labour income is much higher in the 
highest income deciles than in the lowest, whereas transfer income – age-related 
and social security – form the largest part of incomes in the lowest-income 
deciles.  
The proposed lower overall taxation of capital incomes might be expected to 
benefit the highest-earning deciles. However, the incidence of increased 
consumption taxes is not necessarily clear a priori; there are elements, energy 
taxes, for example, where previous studies have found evidence of regressive 
effects, but as the increases also apply to many services, whose consumption 
shares in the higher earning deciles are higher than in the lowest deciles, one 
could also expect some opposite effects.  
Here, we measure distributional effects in terms of equivalent variation. This is a 
broader measure than consumption-based measures alone, since it takes into 
account the effects of the proposal on labour supply as well as those on 
consumption and saving. 
Figure 8 shows welfare effects under the assumption of wage flexibility as 
deviations from the baseline. A striking result is that the proposal would only 
have a marginal effect the welfare of the lowest and highest income deciles. In 
the longer run, the welfare of the higher earning deciles would improve, 
however. There is a natural explanation for this. Over the course of the decade, 
labour markets will become tighter as labour supply is projected to start to fall 
towards the end of the decade. This is reflected in real wages, whose rise benefits 
especially the higher income deciles. Employment is also improving in the short 
run in many of the middle-income deciles, as shown in Figures 10 and 11, and 
even in the long run, may be falling less than average.  
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Figure 8  Equivalent variation under flexible wages (deviation) 
 
 
 
Conversely, the lower income deciles depend more on transfer incomes, and 
whether their incomes keep up with the general rise in purchasing power depends 
on the indexation of transfer incomes. Here, we assume that transfers are indexed 
to the consumer price index. Under this assumption, in Figure 10, we find that 
the lowest income deciles would eventually see its welfare decline. This is due to 
the high share of goods with high indirect tax content in their consumption 
baskets, which leads the price index of consumption for these particular deciles 
to rise more than the overall CPI does. Below, we study how the results would 
change if transfers were also indexed to real wages.  
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Figure 9 Equivalent variation under wage rigidities (deviation) 
 
 
Figure 10 Effects on employment under flexible wages 
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Figure 11  Effects on employment under wage rigidities 
 
 
The indexation of transfer incomes can be seen as a genuine policy decision. 
Here, we show that indexation has a large impact on the overall effects of the 
reform. Figure 12 shows that with indexation of the benefits to both pre-tax real 
wages and the CPI, the cut in income taxes is not large enough to compensate for 
the higher consumption taxes. Consequently, there is a more pronounced fall in 
household demand, and only the positive effects of lower capital taxes remain. 
Figure 13, in turn, shows that the distributional effects of the reform also depend 
on indexation; with the alternative indexation scheme, the lowest-income deciles 
stand to lose from the reform from the outset, as their incomes would deteriorate 
in relative to wage-earners – who would be compensated with the cut in income 
taxes - at approximately the rate of real wage growth.  
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Figure 12  Macroeconomic effects with indexation to real wages and CPI 
(deviation) 
 
 
Figure 13 Equivalent variation with indexation to real wages and CPI 
(deviation) 
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Figure 14  Equivalent variation with indexation to real wages and CPI, all 
income tax changes (deviations) 
 
 
2.3.4 Sector effects 
It has already been noted that the reform encourages investment by improving the 
returns to capital. Here, we consider the effects of the reform under two 
specifications. First, we evaluate the effects assuming a general fall in the capital 
income tax rate without taking into account the sector-specific effects of 
corporate taxes. Second, we allow for the effect of the corporate taxes on the 
perceived rate of return in each sector.  
Industry responses to the tax structure changes depend on their relative labour 
intensity, as well as intermediate goods intensity, since the tax reform raises the 
tax on many commodities. Figure 15 shows our results on employment for 
industry aggregates, while Figure 16 shows the results on investment under the 
first specification. It is clear from the results that the reform has the effect of at 
least initially encouraging investment in the capital-intensive, exporting sectors. 
Increased investment also drives an increase in employment in these sectors. 
Many service sectors are also relatively capital intensive, benefitting from the 
reform.  
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Figure 15  Effects on employment (deviation) 
 
 
Figure 16  Effects on investment (deviation) 
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Figures 17 and 18 show investment and employment under the second 
specification. Investment increases markedly more in most sectors, but especially 
in the labour intensive manufacturing industries, which include, for example, the 
electronics industry.  
Remarkably, under neither model specification does employment in the labour 
intensive industries increase permanently. We suspect that this may be an 
indication of a mismatch of skills, since, in the long run, labour supply increases 
only moderately or not at all in the deciles (from D4 upwards) that  have a high 
share in the high-skill, industrial occupations. For example, only about 18 per 
cent of process workers, who constitute over 40 per cent of manufacturing 
industry employees, are represented in the three lowest income deciles, whereas 
their share is close to or above 10 per cent in all deciles from D4 to D8, whose 
employment is falling more in the long run than that of the lower income deciles. 
Nevertheless, in the short run this problem does not appear to be present, since 
the middle-to high income deciles’ employment is increasing in the short run, 
and their labour supply even in the long run.   
 
Figure 17  Effects on employment, sector-specific corporate taxes 
(deviation) 
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Figure 18  Effects on investment, sector-specific corporate taxes (deviation) 
 
 
 
2.3.5 Effects on tax revenue and efficiency 
In this section, we summarize the effects of our simulations from the points of 
view of the sustainability of public sector finances and the efficiency of the tax 
system. We measure efficiency by calculating the Marginal Cost of Funds for the 
scenarios studied above. As Dahlby (2008) points out, changes in even one tax 
rate can have effects on the collection of other taxes due to the interdependency 
of different tax types. The advantage of MCF is that it summarizes the overall 
effects from the welfare point of view taking into account the effects of these 
interactions. We define the marginal cost of funds as:  
  ܯܥܨ ൌ ିEV୼ோ  ൌ
ିൣ௘൫௣బ,௎బ൯ି௘൫௣బ,௎భ൯൧
∆ோ    (19) 
where EV is the equivalent variation in welfare. It measures the monetary value 
of the loss in utility resulting from price changes due to the new tax policy. 
Equivalent variation is calculated with the help of the expenditure function 
e(p,U), in which p0 indicates the price of products at the pre-tax change situation 
and U0 and U1 the level of consumer’s utility at the pre-tax change and post-tax 
change situations respectively.  
Under this definition, the MCF for a pure tax increase would be greater than one, 
indicating that the collection of additional revenue involves a welfare cost. For a 
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tax reform, however, it is possible that MCF < 1, which implies that the reform is 
welfare improving. It is also possible that MCF is negative, whence it needs to be 
further specified whether the welfare effect is a Pareto improvement (positive 
welfare effect and positive change in tax revenue) or a deterioration (negative 
welfare effect with negative change in tax revenue).  
Figure 19 shows the changes in nominal tax revenue aggregates in millions of 
Euros in our central scenario with flexible wages and full indexation of social 
security and age benefits. In nominal terms, the reform starts with very near 
revenue neutrality, with increased commodity tax revenues compensating for the 
loss in income tax revenue. Over time, as structures adjust, the government starts 
running a surplus (negative deficit). Thus the reform would appear unbalanced in 
the long run from the point of view of real revenue and deficit.  
But there are other considerations. Since the economy is growing, it is not 
necessarily the contribution to surplus that matters, but the sustainability of 
public sector finances. This is studied in Figures 20 to 22, which show the 
deviation in net tax revenues – which is positive in our central case, showing the 
reform is actually revenue gaining even – under different specifications.  
A key finding of the study is presented in Figures 20 to 22. We find that the MCF 
for the reform would initially be fairly high, which is to be expected since it takes 
time for capital stocks to adjust. Eventually, however, the MCF would settle to 
around 0.5. This indicates that the reform would be welfare improving in the long 
run. The gains are undermined in the alternative transfer indexation scheme, 
since consumers’ incomes fall more on the average. Finally, under the sector-
specific corporate tax cuts, welfare gains are also evident, and they are also 
achieved sooner than in the main case.  
The figures also report the change in the EU sustainability indices in absolute 
terms compared to the baseline; a negative value indicates the index obtains a 
lower value than in the baseline, meaning overall taxation could be lowered 
while still reaching the same debt to GDP ratio target as in the baseline. The 
results then suggest that, in terms of sustainability, the reform is indeed neutral or 
even slightly sustainability-improving in our central case. 
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Figure 19 Changes in tax revenue (Mio euro) 
 
 
 
Figure 20 Effects on sustainability and efficiency 
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Figure 21 Effects on sustainability and efficiency,  sector-specific corporate 
taxes (deviation) 
 
Figure 22 Effects on sustainability and efficiency with real wage and CPI-
based indexation of transfers 
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2.4  Conclusions 
In the current study, we have examined the effects of the recent tax reform 
proposal of the Tax Committee on the economy as a whole and on the efficiency 
of taxation in particular. We have also studied the proposal’s distributional and 
sector effects.  
Our central findings are that while the proposed income tax cuts initially boost 
labour supply in some deciles, over time, aggregate labour supply is likely to fall. 
This effect is found in many other studies as well and is due to the positive 
income effect of the tax cut. Because of the fall in labour supply, GDP is also 
likely to fall. We find that the proposal would be likely to stimulate exports, 
investment in the short run, but in the long run, as consumption picks up, the 
effect on exports would be negative. The proposal would also initially reduce 
income differences, but in the long run, the distributional effects depend on the 
indexation of social security benefits and pensions, as well as the extent of 
income tax cuts on these incomes. In terms of efficiency, we find the proposal 
welfare improving in our central scenario, which assumes flexible real wages. In 
accord with many other studies, we also find that wage rigidities would 
undermine the efficiency gains in the short run.  
In some respects, our study also demonstrates the ambiguity in defining a tax 
reform. As in many other studies, we have assumed that public expenditure on 
commodities and investment does not respond to the real changes caused by the 
tax reform. Even so, there are many types of public expenditure that do depend 
on these changes, and consequently we find that a reform intended to be neutral 
does have effects on the government’s net tax revenues and its deficit over time. 
However, we show that on impact, the proposal is very nearly revenue neutral, 
and, moreover, it is close to neutral in the long run in the sense that it has only a 
small impact on the sustainability of a long-term debt target.  
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3. Population ageing in a small open economy  
– some policy experiments with a tractable general 
equilibrium model6  
 
Juha Kilponen – Helvi Kinnunen – Antti Ripatti 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Populations in most of the industrialized countries are ageing. Demographic 
patterns are especially pronounced in some European economies where old-age 
dependency ratio are set to rise considerably. The key factors behind this trend 
are a slowdown of population growth and a substantial increase in longevity. 
Many European countries have begun to prepare for demographic change. In 
many European countries where tax rates are already at very high levels, an 
additional fiscal burden on labour could have detrimental effects on future 
economic performance. 
One of the main ideas for resolving the issue has been to design pension reforms 
that increase incentives to work longer and/or to cut pension benefits. One 
prominent example from Europe is Finland, where the pension reform effective 
from the start of 2005 introduced a flexible retirement age of from 63 to 68. 
Under the latest pension reform, the pension level is now linked more explicitly 
than before to exit age and thus with to contributions made by the insured. This is 
expected to increase incentives to work longer. Furthermore, starting from 2009, 
changes in life expectancy will effect pension levels. In addition, pension 
indexation has been changed so that all pensions will be indexed using a weight 
of 0.8 for living costs and 0.2 for wages, in contrast to the earlier `midway index' 
applied up to age 65. This will contribute to some erosion of the value of 
pensions compared to wage level in the future. The latter reforms are clearly 
attempts to moderate the fiscal impact of growing pension expenditures. 
In this paper, we develop a tractable dynamic general equilibrium macro-
economic model that allows us to account for demographic transition. The model 
features dynamic optimization of a small open economy with an internationally 
given real interest rate and a non-stochastic balanced growth path determined by 
labour saving technological development and population growth. Optimal 
                                              
 
6 This is based on the Bank of Finland Discussion Paper Juha Kilponen - Helvi Kinnunen  
- Antti Ripatti: Population ageing in a small open economy - some policy experiments with a 
tractable general equilibrium model, Nro 28/2006, Bank of Finland. 
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consumption and labour supply decisions are based on Gertler's (1999) tractable 
overlapping generation model, extended for distortionary taxes and time-varying 
retirement and death probabilities7. Pensions are conditioned on aggregate wage 
level and on demographic trend, and the model features a partially funded 
pension system. The funded part of the pension system is considered contractual 
saving (assets accumulated by the pension fund) and the PAYG part as a transfer 
from workers to pensioners. These transfers are financed by collecting pension 
contributions from firms and workers. Finally, we quantify the uncertainty 
associated with demographic projections, by allowing for stochastic variation in 
the key variables driving demographic trends. 
The results of simulations highlight the key role played by feedback effects from 
taxation in the assessment of economic costs of ageing. When the responses of 
labour supply, real wages, and hence private consumption, to higher taxation are 
consistently accounted for, the economy settles at a level of taxation clearly 
above that generally estimated in mechanical sustainability calculations. Even if 
the effective retirement age were to increase as expected, the burden from 
pension payments alone would cause the tax rate to rise to a level above that 
witnessed in the worst years of Finland's recession of the mid-1990s. Results 
from stochastic simulations support this view, by showing that a lengthening of 
working time has only a minor alleviating impact on the fiscal burden of ageing: 
Only a small fraction of the stochastic variation in an endogenously determined 
income tax rate is explained by the stochastic variation in the length of working 
time. Finally, if the pension replacement rate falls, as seems likely under the 
current pension regime, there would be a much smaller increase in taxation in 
response to rising dependency ratio. The average decline in the level of pensions 
relative to wage developments, however, raises a concern that the falling 
purchasing power of pensions relative to wage developments will exert pressure 
on other social security schemes. The current pension scheme, which appears to 
be financially sustainable, may thus in practice generate costs to local and central 
government in the form of higher expenditures on income support and other 
benefits. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. 4. 2 introduces the model, including 
a description of the pension system. Sections 4.4 – 4.6 discuss the results from 
various policy experiments including a sensitivity analysis and stochastic 
simulations. Section 4.7 concludes. 
                                              
 
7 Keuschnigg and Keuschnigg (2004), Ferrero (2005), Roeger (2005), Kara and Thadden 
(2006), Fujivara and Teranish (2006), and Grafenhofer, Jaag, Keuschnigg and Keuschnigg 
(2006) develop the Gertler (1999) model further and study different aspects of population 
ageing in their models. 
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3.2 The model 
3.2.1 General features 
The model developed in this paper features dynamic optimization of a small open 
economy with an internationally given real interest rate and non-stochastic 
balanced growth path. On the balanced growth path, economic growth is 
determined by exogenously given growth of labour-saving technology and 
population. 
Households' saving decisions, and hence accumulation of financial assets, are 
influenced by households' desire to smooth consumption over time. Individuals 
are expected to have finite lives consisting of two distinct periods. Following 
Gertler (1999), we label the households living in these two different periods 
`workers' and `retirees'. 
The likelihood that a worker will lose part of his labour income at retirement, 
induces her to discount the future income stream at a higher rate than otherwise. 
This reduces consumption and increases saving. In this sense, workers save for a 
rainy day and for retirement.8 The planning horizon of pensioners is shorter than 
that of workers due to the periodic probability of death. Therefore pensioners' 
propensity to consume out of wealth is greater than that of the working-age 
population. 
In order to capture changing labour supply incentives of the elderly, we assume 
that `retirees' participate in the labour markets. However, compared to workers, 
their labour efficiency is lower. Lower labour efficiency can capture issues such 
as part-time work and possibly lower productivity. A more general, elastic labour 
supply allows demographic change to feed into adjustment of capital and 
investment via the capital-labour substitution effect. 
Individuals receive transfers from both the central government and pension 
funds. However, in order to maintain analytical tractability, pensions are related 
to the prevailing aggregate wage level, and not to individual characteristics9. The 
                                              
 
8 This view is generally consistent with the study of Gourinchas and Parker (2002), who find 
that empirically observed saving patterns accord with forward-looking optimizing behaviour in 
a life-cycle setup with income uncertainty. Their study suggests that the precautionary saving 
motive in early life implies that between 60 and 70% of non-pension wealth is due to 
precautionary saving. 
9 In contrast to large scale overlapping generations models, such as Auerbach-Kottlikoff (1987), 
we do not follow individual cohorts within the two age groups. This limits our ability to model 
the demographic change and pension system in a very detailed manner. We also need to abstract 
from many other potential sources of heterogeneity in consumption and labour supply 
behaviour, such as differing educational levels. However, we can still specify the retirement and 
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pension system is characterised as partially funded. We consider the funded part 
of the pension system contractual saving (assets accumulated by the pension 
fund) and the PAYG part as a transfer from workers to pensioners. These 
transfers are financed by collecting pension contributions from firms and workers 
as noted above. 
The model is closed by fiscal rules. Given that we distinguish between central 
government and the pension fund, one fiscal rule determines the pension fund's 
long-term net lending rate, while the other determines the central government 
`debt ratio'. Supply side (production structure) is based on CES production 
technology with factor augmentation in the underlying technological progresses 
and nominal and real rigidities. 
3.2.2 Demographics 
Consumers are assumed to be born as workers. Conditional on being a worker in 
the current period, the probability of remaining one in the next period is    
while the probability of retiring is  . These transition probabilities are 
independent of individuals' employment tenure, so that the average tenure of 
working is  . In order to allow for a non-stationary demographic structure, we 
allow for time varying probabilities.  Once an individual has retired she faces a 
periodic probability of death of (  . Given that the survival probability    
is assumed to be independent of retirement tenure, but that it may depend on 
calendar time, the average retirement period at each point of time is    
Allowing for time variation in the retirement and death probabilities enables us to 
generate demographic `shocks' that feed into the dependency ratio gradually 
rather than instantly. 
Let    denote the stock of workers alive at time t.  We then assume that  
  new workers are born at t+1. This implies that we can set worker 
population to grow at some exogenous gross growth rate of    
 (1) 
                                                                                                                                    
 
death probabilities, as well as the growth rate of working-age population, in such a way that 
demographic transition can be captured with reasonable accuracy at the aggregate level. 
Similarly, linking pensions to demographics, we can roughly mimic the associated trends in 
pensions and public expenditures. 
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where    Given age-independent probabilities of retirement and 
death and that cohorts are large, the retiree population    evolves according 
to  
  (2) 
where    refers to the stock of retirees population at time t. With some 
manipulation, it is shown that the retiree-to-worker ratio,  , evolves 
according to 
 
  (3)
 
Defining the stock of whole population as    we can express the 
growth rate for the whole population as a function of retiree to worker ratio and 
growth rate of working age population as follows  
  (4)
 
In the steady state the demographic change has ended, so that 
   (5) 
  (6)
 
3.2.3 Households 
3.2.3.1 Preferences 
A household's preferences are expressed recursively using the constant elasticity 
aggregator  
  (7) 
  is the value function, and    gives the subjective time preference. The 
parameter    captures intertemporal substitution. A special case of   , 
applied here, corresponds to a type of risk neutrality where agents are indifferent 
regarding risk but retain a non-trivial preference for the time at which 
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consumption occurs (cf. Farmer, 1990)10. This special case is analytically 
tractable, since it generates linear decision rules even with (idiosyncratic) risk to 
income, asset return and length of life. In addition to risk neutrality and a 
recursive structure of preferences, we assume that individuals enjoy utility from 
consumption,  , as well as leisure, , according to the utility functional 
   (8) 
where  is the elasticity of period utility with respect to consumption. 
Taking into account the two distinct periods of life, as well as retiring and death 
probabilities, the preferences of a household can be summarized as 
  
where 
  (9)
 
     (10) 
and where  indicates whether the individual is a worker or retiree 
respectively. The willingness to smooth consumption over time implies a finite 
(constant) inter-temporal elasticity of substitution The retirees 
effective discount factor  is adjusted to take into account the periodic 
probability of death. We assume a perfect annuities market in order to eliminate 
the impact of uncertainty about time of death: A retiree's remaining wealth at 
death is invested in a mutual fund, which invests it in the available financial 
assets in each period of time. Those surviving to the following period each 
receive a return that is proportional to his contribution to the fund. For instance, 
if  is the gross return per unit invested by the fund, the gross return for a 
surviving retirees is at time t   
                                              
 
10 Assumption of risk-neutrality is important. For instance, analysis of welfare effects of social 
security reforms are importantly affected by the treatment of risk. A mandatory social security 
system imposes an implicit tax on households, so that there is a reduction in expected life-cycle 
income (due to social security contributions). However, if the social security system reduces the 
variance of life-cycle income by pooling the income risk between young and old generation, 
there is potentially a tradeoff between a reduction in expected life-cycle income and the 
variability: The reduction of welfare due to mandatory social security would then be lower for 
risk-averse households than for risk-neutral ones. 
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Workers, in turn, face the risk of decline in wage income at retirement. However, 
since an individual's preferences are over the mean of the next period's value 
function, only a desire the smooth consumption over time will affect the 
consumption pattern in the face of idiosyncratic income risk. Thus a worker 
simply forms a certainty equivalent of his random utility, as shown in equation 
(9). 
3.2.3.2 Retirees 
A retiree born at time j and retiring at time k, and who survives at least until t+1, 
solves the maximization problem  
 (11)
 
s.t. 
  (12)
 
where  denotes after-tax gross rate of return on financial assets   ,    
denotes pensions, and    is the labour efficiency of retirees with respect to 
workers.   is a price index of consumption, to be determined later.  is the 
total labour income tax rate including pension contribution rate, , to be 
discussed later. From the first order condition for labour, we first derive a 
standard labour supply condition 
  (13)
 
Solving the retiree's maximization problem with respect to consumption, using 
(13)) and then aggregating over retirees results into following aggregate 
consumption equation 
           (14) 
 and  denote discounted after-tax values of labour income and pensions, and 
εtπt is retirees marginal propensity to consume out of wealth. More specifically 
              (15)
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              (16) 
Since total social security payments (pensions) are distributed equally among 
retirees, the gross growth rate of retirees  enters into the discount factor. The 
discount factor for human wealth is similarly augmented by . A retiree's 
marginal propensity to consume out of wealth  evolves according to the 
following non-linear difference equation 
 (17)
 
where . A retiree's marginal propensity to consume varies with the 
real interest rate  as well as with expected changes in real net wage 
income. Due to the fact that survival probability can vary over calendar time, it 
influences on retiree's effective discount rate and introduces additional dynamics 
into the marginal propensity to consume equation. 
As in the standard Yaari (1965) and Blanchard (1985) models, likelihood of 
death ( ) in (17) raises the retirees' marginal propensity to consume. This can 
be seen easily by considering a limiting case of logarithmic preferences ( ) 
and when survival probability is constant. In this case  
  (18) 
3.2.3.3 Workers 
As regards workers, the decision problem for the worker born at time s, is 
  (19)
 
s.t. 
 (20) 
denotes financial transfers to working age and  is the total labour income 
tax rate. The first order condition for labour yields standard labour supply 
condition  
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  (21)
 
Inter-temporal maximization in turn gives rise to a fairly complicated Euler 
equation, but again the workers' consumption plan aggregates to 
 
 (22) 
 is a worker's marginal propensity to consume, while  and  denote her 
human and social security wealth, respectively. Marginal propensity to consume 
out of wealth is a non-linear first order difference equation 
 (23)
 
where  is the factor that weights the gross real return ܴ௧ାଵ ௧ܲାଵ௖෢⁄ . This factor 
evolves according to 
 (24)
 
is the ratio of a retiree's marginal propensity to consume to that of a 
worker. The enlarged discount rate due to the presence of  in the 
denominator of (25) - (26) means that workers value human wealth and social 
security less than in the infinite horizon case. This in turn tends reduce worker's 
consumption and increase saving. Importantly, notice also that distortionary taxes 
increase the workers' discount factor. 
  in (22) is a discounted sum of worker's wage bill (in net terms) and  is the 
sum across workers alive at  of the capitalized value of social security (in net 
terms). Both of these measures take into account of corresponding discounted 
values at the time of retirement. Formally, 
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(25)
 
 and  are the values of human wealth and social security for a 
working retiree who retired at time t+1 but was still working at time t. The factor 
 augments the discount rate of the capitalized value of a worker's social 
security because with finite lives, the share of total social security entitlements 
going to those currently alive declines over time as the working-age population 
grows. By similar argument,  enters into the discount factor of human 
wealth.11 
3.2.4 Distribution of wealth and aggregate consumption 
Given our assumptions on preferences and population dynamics, there is no need 
to keep track of how assets and consumption are distributed within the groups of 
retirees and workers. However, since marginal propensities to consume differ as 
between the two groups, we must keep track of the distribution of assets between 
the two groups. Consequently, we need a state equation for distribution of 
wealth. 
Let  be the share of financial assets held by retirees and let  
be the share of financial assets held by workers. It can be shown that retirees' 
share of financial wealth evolves according to 
 (27)
 
                                              
 
11 Note that in the limiting case of logarithmic preferences ( 1 ) marginal propensity to 
consume is constant and equal to 1 . 
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Aggregate private consumption can then be obtained simply by summing up (15) 
and (22), using  and that all assets are eventually held by domestic 
consumers 
  (28) 
3.2.5 Assets 
There are several types of financial assets available for consumers: domestic 
government bonds , foreign bonds , and stocks issued by domestic firms 
. In addition, it is assumed that all the assets accumulated by the pension fund 
 are hold by domestic consumers. 
Domestic one-period bonds pay a nominal return  while the gross return on 
stocks is determined according to the profits of the firms in the model. Foreign 
bonds pay a return , which is exogenously given. The arbitrage condition 
equates ex ante returns of domestic and foreign bonds, to give rise to uncovered 
interest rate parity (UIP) condition. The share price is the nominal price (ex-
dividend) of a unit of equity in period t. The factor defining the gross return on 
stocks is the firms’ . This gross return is defined as 
 (29) 
where  denotes the corporate tax rate. Optimal consumption plans can be 
combined with the arbitrage equation for holding different assets. This yields two 
equations that relate the after-tax interest rates to each other 
 
 denotes the nominal exchange rate,  denotes domestic short-term nominal 
interest rate and  denotes corresponding foreign short term interest rate.  is 
tax rate at source. The latter is a standard UIP condition. In addition to this, we 
assume an exogenously determined risk-premium  vs. domestic bonds for 
stocks issued by the domestic firms. 
3.2.6 Labour markets 
The model features nominal wage rigidity in the form of quadratic adjustment 
costs. A worker faces quadratic adjustment if when it has been allowed to re-set 
her wage. For those not able to optimize in period t, the wage is adjusted using 
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the steady state growth rate of wages. This steady state growth rate of wages, 
denoted by , equals steady state productivity growth plus inflation. The 
behavior of aggregate nominal wages is then characterized by the following two 
wage rate equations 
 
where  is consumption of workers,  is worker population,  denotes 
the number of workers demanded,  is the exogenous probability that 
determines how often a randomly chosen worker is allowed to re-set her wage. 
The equation for optimal wage  is derived directly from the aggregate version 
of worker's labour supply decision. 
Given that workers' and retirees' labour efficiency differ, we define aggregate 
effective labour supply index  as 
 (34) 
Here  denotes the relative efficiency of a unit of retirees' labour. Labour 
demand for workers   is derived from (34) by assuming that retirees are 
always on their labour supply curve at prevailing wage ( ), and that the 
domestic intermediate goods producer is always on its labour demand curve. 
3.2.7 Public sector 
The general government (public sector) is divided into two sectors, labeled state 
(central government) and pension funds. The state collects taxes on labour 
income at the rate  from capital gains at  and from consumption at . The 
state consumes  and pays transfers to workers and to retirees. In the budget 
constraint these total transfers are denoted In addition, the state issues one-
period government bonds amounting to  and paying a nominal return of . In 
each period, the following budget constraint holds 
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 (35)
 
3.2.8 Fiscal policy rule 
Typically, models like this are closed by either a tax rule or by a lump sum 
transfer rule. We use a rather general form of tax rule that stabilizes the evolution 
of government debt via labour income tax. Formally, the tax rule takes a partial 
adjustment form12 
 (36) 
The tax rule has two attractors  and  towards which the tax, and 
consequently the debt to output ratio are stabilized. Benchmark values for the 
parameters  and  have been calibrated to 0.3 and 0.1 respectively.  and 
 can be set such that the public debt to output ratio reach wanted steady 
state values. 
3.2.9 Statutory pension fund 
There are several motivations for considering the pension fund(s) separately from 
the central government. First, when the pension scheme is defined benefit and 
partly funded, we should consider the funded part of the pension system as 
contractual saving, as opposed to discretionary saving, while the PAYG part 
should be considered a direct transfer from young generation (workers) to old 
generation (pensioners).13 In Finland, where approximately 25% of the pensions 
are funded both features are quantitatively important. 
Second, pension contributions are considered at least partly as taxes. 
Analogously with the previous section, this means that the way in which the 
increasing fiscal burden of aging is financed along the demographic transition 
                                              
 
12 See e.g. Railavo (2004) for discussion of alternative fiscal policy rules and their stability 
properties 
13 In Finland, approximately 25% of the pensions are funded. 
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path is of crucial importance for the economy's labour market responses to 
ageing. The tradeoff is clearly between proportions of demographic transition 
financed by changing the pension fund asset position and by changing the 
contribution rates.14 
Accordingly, we assume that the economy's pension fund is administrated 
separately from the central government. The fund collects pension contributions 
from the private sector and distributes pensions to retirees totaling . Pension 
funds accumulate financial assets . In each period, therefore, the following 
flow budget constraint holds for the pension fund 
 (37)
 
where     is overall pension contribution rate, consisting of employer 
and employee contributions. Finally  denotes pensions and other transfers 
from pension funds to retirees. 
3.2.10 Contribution rule 
Inter-generational distribution of the fiscal burden of ageing is not actively 
managed by institutional control built into current pension schemes in general. 
According to Fenge and Werding (2003) `it merely just happens'. Consequently, 
inter-generational distribution is hardly an issue in devising the contribution rule 
for a model like ours. In a defined benefit pension system, such as in Finland, the 
contribution rate is adjusted to maintain the pension fund's fiscal balance. One 
way to write the pension fund's contribution rule, is to assume that the 
contribution rule stabilizes the net lending-to-total wage ratio at some 
predetermined long-run level.15 Consequently, we write a simple `net lending' 
rule that stabilizes the net lending-to-total-wages ratio at a pre-specified target 
level. Formally  
                                              
 
14 A third important consideration is that pension funds hold the savings for the households that 
are completely illiquid. Households are thus not able to borrow, or are limited to a small 
amount, against their savings accumulated in the pension funds. This means that households do 
not see pensions accumulated in pension funds as perfect substitutes for more liquid forms of 
saving, such as bonds and equity. This is supported by empirical findings according to which 
growth in partially funded pension schemes does boost personal saving, but not one-to-one. The 
current version of the model, however, does not address this issue. 
15 Indeed, in Finland, pension funds' total net lending relative to aggregate wages has been 
rather stable during the last 25 years. 
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 (38)
 
Where  is the target level for net lending-to-total-wages and  is an 
adjustment parameter. This form is flexible enough for policy option 
experiments. For instance setting  at zero and  high represents a pure PAYG 
system. In our benchmark simulations, we set  and . 
3.2.11 Pension expenditures 
Allowing idiosyncratic historical dependence in social security and pension 
payments would make the model more realistic, but it would sacrifice analytical 
tractability. We thus link the model's pension expenditures/transfers to the 
demographic structure and aggregate wages, by writing 
 (39) 
where  is the average pension rate evaluated at the initial steady state 
level of aggregate wages . Since the wage rate  is endogenous, we obtain 
projections for pension expenditures once we set a deterministic path to average 
pension rate . Total pension expenditures  are thus linked to average wages 
and number of pensioners in the model. Furthermore, making use of our 
demographic assumptions, we can express pension expenditures per capita in 
terms of the dependency ratio, wages and pension rate: 
 (40)
 
3.2.12 Production sector 
The supply side is based on a single intermediate good that can be used in the 
production of final goods. Producers of this intermediate goods combine capital 
and labour using a constant-elasticity-of- substitution (CES) production function 
and operate in monopolistic product markets. Prices of final goods are sticky in 
the form of Calvo-pricing. Domestic producers of intermediate products purchase 
their capital inputs (capital services) in a competitive capital market (from 
companies providing capital services) in which capital is freely sold and 
transferable for use by other companies. Building up new capital generates cost - 
adjustment costs - in the form of lost capital stock. 
Domestic intermediate goods are combined with imported intermediate goods to 
produce final goods of three kinds: consumption goods, capital goods and 
exported goods. The production function ԟ or, rather, aggregator ԟ is CES. The 
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production differs across final goods in terms of elasticity of substitution. All 
three types of final producers operate in competitive product markets, in which 
they take the market price for their products as given in their own decision-
making. 
Finally, nominal import prices are assumed to be sticky in a manner 
corresponding to domestic intermediate goods prices. It is also assumed that, in 
the short run exchange rate pass-through to import prices is incomplete. This is 
due to the fact that a fixed portion of import companies price their products in the 
local currency. 
3.2.12.1 Domestic intermediate goods producer 
The domestic composite intermediate good, , is produced according to a 
constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production function, which combines a 
continuum of individual goods  (Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977) 
 
The parameter    determines the elasticity of substitution   . 
Cost minimization implies the following conditional demand function for the 
individual good  
 
The price index for the composite domestic intermediate good is 
 
Domestic intermediate goods, , are produced by producers operating in 
monopolistic market. The production technology and the factor augmenting 
technical trends are exogenously given. The production function is of the CES 
type and takes a specific constant-returns-to-scale form16  
 
                                              
 
16 Jalava, Pohjola, Ripatti and Vilmunen (2006) provide evidence that this may be a reasonable 
approximation for the Finnish post-WWII data. 
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The factors of production include homogeneous capital services, , and labour 
input . ߉௧௄ and ߉௧௅ denote time-varying17 capital and labour-augmenting 
technical progress respectively. The elasticity of technical substitution is given 
by , where  is the substitution parameter and  the share parameter in 
the production function. The technical change is labour-augmenting, , in the 
balanced growth path. 
Cost minimization implies the following real marginal costs  
 
where  denotes the nominal rental price of capital services and  
represents nominal labour costs including employers' pension and social security 
contributions. In the steady-state prices  are determined by markup, 
 over marginal costs 
 (41) 
The first order conditions (in logs) with respect to capital services and labour are 
given by  
 
Due to the monopolistic competition in the market for output, the slope of the 
demand curve, , enters into both first order conditions. 
The dynamics of the price level  of producer  arise from the assumption 
that a firm changes its price level when it receives a random `price-change 
signal'. A constant probability of receiving a price change signal is given by 1–ζ(
). Since there is a continuum of intermediate producers, 1–ζ also 
represents the share of producers that have received such a signal and thus are 
able to change their prices. The average time between price changes is given by 
. Solving the first order condition and linearizing in a standard way 
yields the following aggregate pricing equation for the intermediate goods 
producer 
                                              
 
17 See Ripatti and Vilmunen (2001) for further discussion of their properties and estimates using 
aggregate Finnish data. 
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Inflation is determined by expected inflation and log markup υ over the real 
marginal costs . 
3.2.12.2 Capital rental firms 
Capital is a homogeneous factor of production that is owned by a firm that rents 
capital to producers of domestic intermediate goods. It operates under perfect 
competition. Physical capital accumulation generates real adjustment costs in the 
form of lost capital stock. Capital accumulation is given by  
 (45) 
where  denotes the adjustment costs of physical capital stock and    is the 
capital depreciation factor. The capital rental firm maximizes its expected 
discounted profits 
 (46)
 
subject to the capital accumulation equation (45) and the definition of capital 
services,18 . Its momentary profits are given by 
 (47)
 
The price index of investment goods, , is the price index of the domestic 
investment good retailer and    denotes rental rate for capital. Future profits are 
discounted using the nominal stochastic discount factor (pricing kernel) 
. The first order condition with respect to capital 
stock  is given by 
                                              
 
18 For simplicity we assume that capital services are determined by the lagged value of physical 
capital stock. In a more general case by Ripatti and Vilmunen (2004) capital services depend 
also on the endogenous utilization rate. This extension alters the results only in business cycle 
frequencies and is thus beyond the interest of this study. 
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 (48)
 
Due to the end-of-period timing of physical capital stock, the accumulated 
physical capital is in use in the following period. Hence, the expected following 
period's rental rate  governs the current period investment decision. The 
adjustment cost function is quadratic in changes of the physical capital stock 
  (49)
 
The usual `investment equation' can be obtained by substituting the parametric 
version of adjustment costs into the first order condition. 
3.2.12.3 Production of final goods 
The economy is inhabited by two retailers that produce final goods, one 
producing consumer goods and the other capital goods. They combine domestic 
intermediate inputs, produced by intermediate goods producers, and imported 
goods and services, and operate under perfect competition. The demand for 
retailers' output is given by consumption and investment of the private and 
general government sectors. The output of the consumption-goods retailer 
divides into the private consumption and public purchases of market goods, 
. The capital-goods retailer faces similar demand comprising 
private sector and public sector investment, . The production 
technology is CES for both retailers19  
 
 is the respective share parameter and  the respective substitution parameter 
( ).  denotes imports and  the domestic intermediate good. 
Cost minimization generates following price indices, 
 
                                              
 
19 We abstract from the time-varying factor augmenting technical progress, which reflects 
changes in preferences for domestic and imported intermediate goods. 
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and the conditional factor demands,  
 
The consumption-goods retailer pays the indirect taxes, . Hence the tax base 
for indirect taxes consists of private consumption and government purchases. No 
indirect taxes are levied on investment goods. 
The elasticity of substitution between imported consumption goods and domestic 
intermediate products has been estimated by Ripatti and Vilmunen (2004). Using 
cointegration techniques they find that  (standard error 0.049) 
implying that the elasticity of substitution is 4.4.  is calibrated at 0.87. The 
estimation of elasticity of substitution between imported investment goods and 
domestic intermediate goods suggests a value of 2.2, which is given by the 
estimate of  (standard error 0.183). This means that the factors are 
gross-substitutes. The calibrated value of the share parameter  is 0.67. 
The exporter is a firm that combines domestic intermediate inputs  and 
imported raw materials  to produce export good  in competitive markets. 
Technology and preferences are identical to those of the retailers. Ripatti and 
Vilmunen (2004) assume that the imported-raw-materials-augmenting technical 
change may contain a deterministic linear time trend. This trend captures the 
structural change in input usage of exports. The estimate of the elasticity of 
substitution is 0.45, implying that  (standard error 0.378). Not 
surprisingly, the point estimate suggests that the imported raw materials and the 
domestic intermediate input are gross-complements in the production of exported 
goods and services. The calibrated value of the share parameter  is 0.51. 
3.2.12.4 Importing firms 
Imported goods and services are used by the retailers and the exporter. They 
combine imported and domestically produced intermediate goods to produce 
final consumption, capital and exported goods. The consumer goods and services 
(including 5% of imported energy) are used by the consumption-goods retailer, 
capital goods and services are used by the capital-goods retailer, and the exporter 
uses energy and intermediate goods in producing exported goods. Both retailers 
operate under perfect competition in the output markets. A model for import 
prices of imports by main use, i.e. for the retailer sector, is derived by via the 
approach of Betts and Devereux (1996) and (2000) applied to the Finnish 
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aggregate import data by Freystätter (2003). A portion of importers price their 
products in local (Finnish) currency and the other importers in producers' own 
currencies. Their pricing contains identical frictions in the form of Calvo 
(1983b), ie they can change their price only if they receive a random signal 
allowing them to optimize a new price. Their marginal costs are identical. The 
aggregation of pricing behaviour over these two types of importers yields an 
import-price Euler equation where import prices depend on expected future 
import price inflation, current and expected future changes in foreign exchange 
rates, and on importers' real marginal costs. This brings incomplete exchange rate 
pass-through into the model.20 
3.2.13 Market equilibrium 
All markets are in equilibrium at all point of times. The capital goods market is 
in equilibrium when the supply of capital services by the capital-rental firm 
equals the demand for capital services by intermediate goods producers. 
Similarly the labour markets are in equilibrium when the demand for labour 
equals its supply, . In the intermediate goods sector, the demand for 
intermediate goods by retailers and exporters equals total supply  
 
(50)
 
Markets for final goods clear when  
 (51)
 
where  is the aggregated export price of competing economies and  is 
aggregate imports of export markets. When market clearing conditions hold, the 
workers' and pensioners' budget constraints and , the general government budget 
constraint (12) and (20) the pension fund's budget constraint (budget, pension 
fund) imply the following equation for the accumulation of foreign assets  
 (52)
 
                                              
 
20 As incomplete exchange rate pass-through is not essential for the ageing simulations provided 
in this paper, we abstract from explicit derivation. Derivation is provided in Ripatti and Viertola 
(2004). 
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The current account balance is given by  and the factor income 
account by  
3.3 Policy designs 
3.3.1 An overview of the pension system and pension reform in Finland 
The model developed above will be used to study population ageing and policy 
experiments in the small open economy of Finland. First, we set out the Finnish 
pension scheme and pension reform effective since 2005. 
The pension scheme in Finland is defined benefit in the sense that pension 
benefits are not directly dependent on contributions of workers to employment 
pension schemes or/and the yields of pension funds. Instead, of total benefits 
being changed, it has been contribution rates that have been altered in response to 
possible shortfalls in the balance. When there has been a danger of a shortfall in 
the agreed funding rate, the level of contributions has been raised. The second 
general feature of the Finnish system is the negligible role of private and 
occupational pension schemes of private firms. Nearly all old age pensions are 
provided by employment pension institutions or national pension institutions 
closely controlled by the state. 
The latest reform, effective from the start of 2005, changed the pension system in 
line with more actuarial principles. With the introduction of flexible retirement 
age, 63 to 68, the level of pensions becomes linked more explicitly than before 
with exit age and thus with contributions made by the insured. Furthermore, 
starting from 2009, changes in life expectancy will have an effect on pension 
levels. In addition, pension indexation has been changed so that all pensions will 
be indexed using weights of 0.8 for living costs and 0.2 for wages, whereas 
before a `midway index' was applied up to age 65. This will contribute to a 
comparative erosion in pension values, and thus to a decline in the pension 
replacement ratio  compared to wage level. Contributions are collected from 
employers and employees. Currently, 16.8% is collected on average from 
employers and 4.6% from employees. It has been agreed that further changes in 
contribution rates will be shared equally (50-50) between employers and 
employees. Due to the benefit-based nature of the Finnish employment pension 
system, long-term aggregate pension expenditure can be approximated simply 
from demographic factors and parameters determining average pension benefits. 
The most important factors are naturally demographic trends and the average age 
at which people start to draw pensions, which together determine the total 
number of pensioners. The average level of pensions is affected by wage levels 
and the pension index, and thus by consumption prices and productivity 
developments. In addition, changes in life expectancy will have an effect on level 
of benefits so that the replacement rate became dependent on exit age. 
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3.3.2 Model's calibration – initial steady state 
For the purpose of simulating the model, the quantity variables are de-trended by 
the labour-augmenting technical factor  population  and the numeraire 
price level  As for labour market variables, the nominal wage is scaled by the 
labour augmenting technical change  and consumption deflator  Labour 
supply indices are scaled by population  Finally, all the other price variables 
are de-trended by the numeraire price level   
In order to set up the model for demographic simulations and policy experiments, 
we assume that the economy is initially in the steady state. The economy is 
growing on the balanced growth path and the demographic structure is stable. 
The model's key parameters are then calibrated to reflect the main features of the 
Finnish economy. The key parameters are calibrated so that the key `great ratios', 
factor shares, participation rates, demographic structure as well as fiscal variables 
reflect the situation in the Finnish economy on average during the last 10 years. 
The parameters of the production functions were estimated using co-integration 
methods (Johansen, 1995), and the parameters related to capital stock adjustment 
costs, depreciation function and import prices are estimated using GMM.21 
Tables (calibemand) ԟ (calibupply) characterize the calibration of some of the 
key parameters and resulting values of the key endogenous variables. We next 
comment on the calibration of key parameters. 
In order to fit the participation rates observed we set the relative efficiency of 
retirees at roughly 30%. Elasticity of periodic utility with respect to consumption 
was at 0.8 and inter-temporal elasticity of substitution at 0.4. The public-finance 
literature tends to use values well below unity for the inter-temporal elasticity of 
substitution, while the RBC literature prefers large value of  Typically, smaller 
value of  makes the economy react more strongly to fiscal stimulus (Table 1). 
Reflecting a calibrated value of periodic utility of consumption, the value for the 
Frisch elasticity of labour supply for workers is in line with international 
microeconomic studies, which report the values of 0.15 - 0.32.22 Kuismanen 
(2005a, 2005b) has also estimated compensated labour supply elasticities using 
Finnish Labour Force survey data. Depending on the data sample and methods 
used, his estimates range from 0.08 to 0.30. The distribution of wealth between 
working-age and elderly persons seems reasonable in light of the demographic 
structure: 17% of the model economy's total financial wealth is owned by 
retirees.  is an additional factor that multiplies the worker's discount factor. 
                                              
 
21 For detailed description of estimation strategies, see Ripatti and Vilmunen (2004). 
22 Bayomi, Laxton and Pesenti (2004) use the value 0.33 in the standard calibration of GEM for 
the euro area. 
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This additional discount factor is clearly higher than those obtained in Gertler 
(1999). The difference is largely explained by the distorting nature of taxes. 
Similarly, retirees marginal propensity to consume is `only' 60% higher than that 
of the workers.23 
Table 1  Calibration of key demand side parameters 
 
Variable  Explanation  Value 
     subjective discount factor, parameter      
     elasticity  of  periodic  utility  with  respect  to 
consumption 
    
     Inter‐temporal elasticity of substitution, parameter      
     Labour efficiency of retirees, parameter      
     Relative marginal propensity to consume, variable      
     Worker's marginal propensity to consume, variable      
     Distribution of financial asset wealth, variable      
     Additional discounting factor      
     Frisch elasticity of labour supply (workers), variable      
     Frisch  elasticity  of  labour  supply  (pensioners), 
variable 
    
 
 
Regarding parameters affecting most strongly to pension system and 
demographic structure, we assume that individuals work on average  years and 
stay in retirement for about 15 years. Annual growth rate of working age 
                                              
 
23 We assume that average expected time between price changes is 5 quarters, while wage 
changes occur on average only every 8 quarters. In comparison to the literature, wage changes 
occur seldom, but the values reflect the Finnish centralized wage setting system and the fact that 
centralized wage contracts are usually set for 1 - 2 years time in Finland. Similarly, the Calvo 
parameter for prices is on the high side. 
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population is set at 0.18% per annum (Table 2). The steady state retiree worker 
ratio then amounts to %, in accord with recent data The pension rate is 
calibrated at 0.55, which, given endogenous average wage and demographic 
structure means, that pension expenditures amount to 20%% of total wages, also 
roughly in accord with recent data. Finally, the pension contribution rate to 
employees is 3.9 per cent, while the employees' contribution rate amounts to 
15.4%, so that overall pension contribution rate is 19.3%. 
 
Table 2  Calibration of key parameters of the pension system 
 
Variable  Explanation  Value 
     Expect 
ed time of retirement, in years, parameter 
    
     Expected time of working, in years, parameter      
     Annual growth rate of working age%, parameter      
     Old age dependency ratio, variable      
     Pension contribution rate of the workers%, implicit      
     Pension contribution rate of the firms%, parameter      
     Pensions,% of wage sum, variable      
     Pension rate      
 
Regarding public sector (excluding pension fund) it is assumed that the steady 
state debt to output ratio is 60%, while total public consumption amounts to 
20.8% of output (Table 3). Total social security transfers to workers are 6.4% of 
output. Finally labour income tax rate is calculated endogenously so as to satisfy 
the state's budget constraint, while the rest of the tax parameters have been set 
exogenously reflecting the current tax system in Finland. 
33
1
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1
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 0. 33
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Table 3  Calibration of key parameters of the state 
 
Variable  Explanation  Value 
     Fiscal rule adjustment, parameter      
     Debt (% of output), variable      
     Income tax rate% of workers, implicit      
     Corporate tax rate%, parameter      
     Indirect tax rate%, parameter      
     Firm's social security contribution rate, parameter      
     Public consumption (% of output), variable      
     Total transfers to workers (% of output), variable      
 
Regarding the supply side of the economy, we assume that the real interest rate is 
about 2.4% per annum (Table 4). The economy grows on the balanced growth 
path at the rate of 2.3% per annum, reflecting the labour-saving technical change 
and steady state growth rate of the population. Given the small size of Finland in 
the euro area, the feedback from Finnish economy to euro area level is very 
modest. Thus a reasonable approximation is that the euro area policy rate is 
exogenous and that the nominal exchange rate is fixed. The foreign nominal 
interest rate determines the domestic nominal interest rate up to the UIP 
condition. On the balanced growth path, inflation is set at 2.0% in accord with 
the inflation target of the ECB. 
Price markup and the share price-to-equity ratio are roughly in accord with 
empirical evidence,24 while capital share parameter and elasticity of substitution 
between capital and labour have been estimated from historical data by Ripatti 
and Vilmunen (2001). Capital depreciation rate is set to 8% per annum. 
                                              
 
24 Kilponen and Santavirta (2005) estimate from microdata that the percentage share of 
operating profits in the value of gross output in Finnish manufacturing firms was roughly 8% 
during the last decade. 
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Finally, Table 5 summarizes key `great ratios', factor shares, net foreign asset 
position and employment rates at initial equilibrium. Comparison with recent 
data shows that the model fits the data reasonable well. The model's current 
calibration, however, involves some difficulties in capturing the relatively low 
investment and private consumption shares observed in the data. 
 
Table 4 Calibration of key parameters for the supply side 
 
Variable  Explanation  Value 
     Real interest rate, p.a., variable      
     Output growth rate, p.a., variable      
     Labour saving technical change p.a., parameter      
     Capital depreciation rate, parameter      
     Price markup, parameter      
     Price to equity ratio, variable      
     capital share parameter      
     El. of substitution between capital and labour      
 
cF PR ˆ/ 2.4

Y 2.3
Lˆ 2. 08
K 0. 08
 1. 08
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Table 5 Great ratios, factor shares and participation rates 
 
Variable  Explanation  The data  
1995‐2005 
Steady State 
     Private  consumption  share, 
% 
         
     Private investment rate, %           
     Export share, %           
     Import share, %           
     Labour share, %           
     Capital intensity             
     Net foreign assets, %       
     Employment rate, %             
     Workers             
     Retirees             
Shares calculated in nominal terms except for capital intensity 
 
3.3.3 Policy experiments 
In order to facilitate analysis of fairly complex general equilibrium effects 
associated with ageing and different assumptions that can be made about the 
pension parameters, we designed some alternative demographic scenarios and 
policy experiments. The long-run implications of ageing population are treated as 
shocks to the initial state of unchanged demographic age structure and steady 
pace of population growth. We performed five different simulations altogether, 
as reported in table Shocks. 
Hc 51.3 54.0
i 15.8 18.6
x 39.8 34.0
m 31.1 34.0
ls 49.5 51.5
lk / 4.8 4.3
wa 5.42 3.23
l 58.6 55.4
wl 56.6 53.8
rl 2.1 5.2
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Table 6 Demographics shocks relative to initial steady state 
 
                                                            Experiment 
Change  I  II  III  IV  V 
Expected period of retirement, years  5.0  5.0  5.0  5.0  5.0 
Growth  rate  of  workers,  percent 
annually 
  ‐0.5  ‐0.5  ‐0.5  ‐0.5 
Expected working time, years      2.5  2.5  2.5 
Pension replacement rate, %‐points        ‐10  μ* 
*endogenous           
 
The shock simulating population ageing incorporated both the higher life 
expectancy projected in the population forecast and the slowdown in the growth 
of working-age population. Higher life expectancy was simulated by increasing 
the expected period of retirement by 5 years (table Shocks, columns I-II) and 
then supplementing the shock with a longer expected working time of 2.5 years, 
while taking into account the slowdown of the growth of working age population 
(Table 6, column III). 
Experiment II is a pure demographic shock that captures the main demographic 
trends. According to the latest population prognoses, the fastest growth in the old 
age dependency ratio will take place in the 2020s and 2030s, when the baby 
boom generation, born after the Second World War, retires. After that, the ratio 
will grow at a slower pace. The overall dependency ratio is projected to level off 
by the 2030s. Immigration is forecast to remain insignificant, at only 5000 
persons a year net. Finally, according to Statistics Finland estimates, the life 
expectancy for men will rise from the current 75.1 years to 82.1 years by 2040. 
For women the corresponding figures are 81.8 and 86.8 years. 
Features inherent in the pension scheme, i.e. deferred retirement in response to 
accelerated accrual and a lower replacement rate, were built into the demographic 
effects by lowering the pension replacement rate by 10 percentage points 
(column IV). The analysis was completed with an equilibrium calculation where 
the replacement rate was endogenously defined while the rate of employee 
contribution was kept unchanged, at its initial steady state level (column V). 
Juha Kilponen – Helvi Kinnunen – Antti Ripatti 
102 
 
3.4 Long-run effects of ageing 
3.4.1 Increasing life expectancy 
Increase in life expectancy projected in the demographic forecast for Finland 
alone would have a pronounced effect on the economy's long-run equilibrium. 
Extension of the period of retirement by five years, as assumed in the calculation, 
would imply an increase in the old-age dependency ratio of 11 percentage points. 
This would lead to 6.3 percentage point increase in total pension expenditures 
relative to total wages. Tax burden on labour would raise by more than 3.7 
percentage points and would be reflected in falling employment rates. The total 
contribution rate would rise by 6.7 percentage points. (Table 7, column I). Given 
age cohorts of the same size and a stable fertility rate, higher life expectancy 
alone would impose a considerable burden on the economy. The falling 
employment rate of workers is attributable to a higher tax burden on labour, so 
that the after-tax wage rate declines slightly. These factors are reflected in rising 
real wages in the long-run. The consumption response, measured as a share of 
output, reflects households' different marginal propensities to consume. Retirees 
own a larger share of the economy's financial wealth and are more willing than 
workers to consume it. Mirror effect of this is that capital share is higher in the 
aged economy. 
3.4.2 Declining fertility rate 
Considering that age cohorts entering the labour market are smaller than those 
withdrawing, the old-age dependency ratio would increase by almost 16 
percentage points (Table fiscalongerm, column II). Tax rate and employment 
responses would also be pronounced, in that the pension contribution rate would 
increase by 8.8 percentage points and the income tax rate by 3.4 percentage 
points. The employment rate would fall by almost 6 percentage points reflecting 
a marked increase in real wages. The private consumption share would increase 
by 6.2 percentage points relative to the initial state of constant population 
growth. The major increase in tax rates is related not only to pension 
expenditures but also to the strong response of workers' employment rates. This 
reduces tax bases, even if retirees supply more labour. Retirees positive labour 
supply response is attributable to a longer retirement period. 
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Table 7 Long-run effects of ageing 
 
                                                  Final Steady State, Change 
Variable  Explanation  I  II  III  IV  V 
     Old‐age dependency ratio**   10.9  15.5  13.0  13.0  13.9 
     Contribution rate**   6.7  8.8  7.0  1.3  0.0 
     Labour income tax rate**   2.3  5.0  3.4  0  ‐0.7 
     Pension  expenditure/wage 
sum**  
5.3  8.0  6.7  2.0  1.0 
       Real wage*    5.4  5.3  6.0  9.5  10.3 
     After‐tax real wage*   ‐0.38  ‐5.6  ‐1.6  9.5  11.5 
     Private consumption share*   5.1  6.2  6.4  6.8  13.6 
     Wealth distribution**   3.4  6.1  5.2  5.5  5.6 
     Employment rate**  ‐3.7  ‐5.7  ‐4.7  ‐3.3  ‐3.0 
     Workers  ‐4.3  ‐6.2  ‐5.2  ‐4.3  ‐4.2 
     Retirees  2.1  1.8  1.6  3.5  3.7 
     Capital share*  21.0  23.5  22.4  21.1  21.0 
     Net foreign assets**   4.8  21.1  27.1  51.2  56.7 
     Pension replacement rate**   0  0  0  ‐10.0  ‐12.0 
     Output, efficiency units  ‐1.7  ‐5.5  ‐3.4  ‐0.5  0.12 
* Percentage change relative to initial steady state 
** Change, percentage points relative to initial steady state 
a) Contribution rate kept fixed at initial steady state, b) endogenous, c) in effociency units 
 

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y
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3.4.3 Pension reform and a lower replacement rate 
It has been estimated that the pension reform will extend labour force 
participation by an average of 2 - 3 years. This alone would clearly ease the 
burden of an ageing population (Table 7, column III). The need to increase the 
contribution would be reduced by 1.8 percentage points. Similarly, the need to 
raise the labour income tax rate would decrease almost as much, compared to the 
pure demographic shock. This would in turn be reflected in smaller employment 
losses in the long-run. 
The decline in average replacement induced by the rules of pension indexation 
also has a considerable effect on sustainability of the pension scheme. This effect 
was measured by the assumption that the ratio of average pension to average 
wage would decline by 10 percentage points, i.e. clearly less than that suggested 
by the calculation discussed above. This would considerably reduce the need to 
raise the contribution rate in response to population ageing in the long-run. The 
labour income tax rate could be kept at the current level, and contribution rates 
would need to be raised only by 1.3 percentage points. (Table 7, column IV). 
Pension expenditure would raise 4.7 percentage points less than the figure 
returned by the previous simulation (column III). 
According to the results of the equilibrium calculation based on given rate of 
contribution, we find that pensions would, in the long-run, have to decline from 
their current levels by 12 percentage points relative to average wages (Table 7, 
column V). This would ensure that the ratio of pension expenditure would 
increase only by 1% percentage point relative to total wages in response to 
population ageing. However, real wages would still increase by 10%, while the 
employment rate would fall by 3 percentage points. Once more, retirees' 
incentives to work would be improved, primarily because of the wealth effect 
compared to the previous experiment. Finally output would remain virtually 
intact in this case. 
3.5 Dynamic effects 
Dynamic optimization and perfect foresight assumption implies that the 
transition paths of the macroeconomic variables reflect the way in which 
optimizing agents prepare for a new demographic situation. These adjustment 
paths are further complicated by our assumption that demographic structure is 
changing over time. The adjustment paths can typically involve over- or 
undershooting of forward looking variables, even though the transitional path of 
a demographic shock is a smooth slowly evolving process. One such variable is 
consumption, which typically initially jumps and then begins gradually to adjust 
to the new long-run steady state. This is reflected in over- or undershooting of 
wages and employment, given that leisure and consumption are non-separable in 
the periodic utility. 
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Figure1 shows how the model economy responds to a pure anticipated shock to 
retirement age (I) and to the shock where the fertility rate drops as described in 
experiment II.25 
Figure 1 Pure demographic shocks and transition.(Blue line corresponds 
to experiment I and red line to experiment II. Periods are 
quarters.) 
 
 
After a temporary drop in distribution of wealth (in favour of workers), retirees 
eventually hold a larger share of the economy's financial wealth. The worker's tax 
burden on labour follows a similar pattern. Aggregate consumption reacts in 
advance of anticipated demographic change and starts stabilizing well before the 
demographic change is over. Beyond the response of aggregate consumption, 
there are opposite responses of retirees and workers. While the workers increase 
saving for retirement by reducing their consumption, and also because of a higher 
tax burden, retirees respond positively. Retirees are also now more numerous as 
shown by the gradual rise in the dependency ratio. A lower fertility rate, besides 
                                              
 
25 All the simulations were done using DYNARE, version 3.051. 
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increasing life expectancy, gradually increases the dependency ratio and leads to 
a further increase in the pension contribution rate. This effect is also associated 
with a slightly higher consumption share and lower employment rate.26 
Figure 2 illustrates how an extension of working life and a lower replacement 
rate alleviate the effects of a pure demographic shock. Consumption share is 
practically intact (red (lighter gray) line), while the need to increase contribution 
rates gradually ease along with a less pronounced increase in the dependency 
ratio. Capital share increases initially with the extension of working life but 
eventually returns to a very close to the same level as with a pure demographic 
shock. Longer working time means that there is a roughly one percentage point 
improvement in employment rate compared to a pure demographic shock. 
Extending the simulation by taking into account also a lower pension 
replacement rate shows that the consumption share may now fall in the short and 
medium term. A drop in the replacement rate reduces pensioners' permanent 
income, with a subsequent temporary fall in consumption levels. As the need to 
raise the contribution rate gradually eases, employment improves rather quickly, 
while consumption bounces back only after a several decades. Mirroring this, 
there is also a temporary fall in capital share and a permanent fall in distribution 
of wealth held by the retirees.27 
                                              
 
26 Higher long-run capital and consumption shares are compatible with the Blanchard-Yaari 
asset market equilibrium condition. In essence, the condition produces a positive relationship 
between consumption and capital stock, as required by the current account balance in an open 
economy. 
27 These results are naturally subject to uncertainty regarding calibrated and estimated parameter 
values of the model, as well as assumptions on the external environment of the economy and 
demographic projections. In particular inter-temporal substitution ( ) and elasticity of periodic 
utility with respect to consumption (  ) guide the dynamic and long run response of 
consumption, real wages and employment, which in turn matter how the tax burden on labour 
evolves in response to population ageing. Subsequent sensitivity analysis shows that a higher 
value of inter-temporal substitution mitigates the effects of pure demographic shock on taxes, 
while the opposite is true for lower values of  Parameter  affects primarily on the long-run 
response of the economy to population ageing as well as the initial steady state. Sensitivity 
analysis suggests that higher values of  lead to somewhat smaller response of the contribution 
rate which in turn is associated with a slightly smaller negative response of employment.   


. 

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Figure 2.  Extensions of working life and lower replacement rate ease fiscal 
burden of ageing.(Red line corresponds fo experiment III, blue 
line to experiment IV; baseline is a pure demographic shock; 
periods are quarters. 
 
 
 
3.5.1 Demographic uncertainty 
Population scenarios and ageing reflect projected changes in fertility rates and 
longevity. These population scenarios are however subject to much uncertainty. 
OECD (2005) has reported that in the case of Finland, overall uncertainty 
surrounding longevity and fertility rate projections suggests that the dependency 
ratio will fluctuate ±10 percentage points around the official scenario.28 Rather 
similar results were obtained in the project `Uncertain Population of Europe' 
(UPE) funded by the EU Commission. In this project, stochastic population 
forecasts were generated by simulating 3,000 alternative paths of future 
development for age-specific mortality, fertility and net migration for different 
European countries. These different scenarios were then combined into 
                                              
 
28 Assessing the robustness of demographic projections in OECD countries, Frederic Gonand, 
Economics Department Working Papers, No. 464, OECD) 
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population scenarios using the classical cohort-component book-keeping 
equations. Based on the resulting age-specific cohort tables from different 
simulations, table demographic uncertainty, Table 1 summarizes the statics 
related to the old-age dependency ratio relevant to the model. This helps us 
anchor the degree of uncertainty related to the old-age dependency ratio in 
Finland and thus quantify the degree of uncertainty related to demographic 
trends. The table suggests that risks of making large errors in population 
forecasts increase after 2020, making the confidence limits expand quite fast (see 
also Alho (1998)). 
Table 8 Summary statistics from stochastic population simulations (based 
on own calculations from http://www.stat../tup/euupe/ ) 
  
Year  Min  Mean  Max  S.E. 
2010  0.40  0.42  0.43  0.005 
2020  0.48  0.54  0.61  0.019 
2030  0.49  0.64  0.74  0.043 
2040  0.41  0.65  0.94  0.071 
2050  0.36  0.67  1.08  0.099 
 
In order to quantify how the demographic uncertainty feeds into the model's 
outcomes, we take experiment III as a baseline (see table Shocks), but allow for 
stochastic variation in retirement probability ( ), survival probability ( ) 
and worker's growth rate . Allowing for stochastic variation in these variables 
generates stochastic variation for the model's endogenous variables along the 
transition path.29 We calibrate the uncertainty in retirement probability and 
survival probability such that the 90% confidence intervals for working time and 
retirement are respectively ±2 and ±4 years at the final steady state of the model. 
Furthermore, we assume that the population growth rate has a 90% confidence 
interval of 0.5% in annual terms. This generates empirically plausible variation in 
dependency ratio, amounting to a 4% standard error. Figure 3 shows the 90% 
confidence intervals generated by these assumptions on the relevant demographic 
                                              
 
29 DYNARE's functions forecast and stoch_simul allow mixing of deterministic and stochastic 
shocks.We are indebted to Michel Juillard for developing these functions. 
t1 t
w
tNˆ
Population ageing in a small open economy 
109 
 
variables, while table demographic uncertainty, Table 9 summarizes the results 
for selected endogenous variables at the final steady state. 
 
Figure 3 Mean outcome and 90% confidence intervals generated by the 
stochastic variation in retirement probability, survival 
probability and population growth rate. 
 
 
It is evident that there much uncertainty about economic outcomes of the model, 
once uncertainty as to demographic structure is accounted for. A standard error 
of 4% for the dependency ratio translates to roughly a 3 percentage point 
standard error in the labour income tax and contribution rates. Variation in the 
employment rate is roughly 2 percentage points. 
Stochastic simulations allow us also to quantify the relative importance of 
different demographic shocks to economic outcomes. This can be done by 
looking at (asymptotic) variance decomposition as generated by the stochastic 
simulations of the model. Although the results of variance decomposition depend 
on the assumed relative standard errors of the shocks, columns 5 - 7 in table 
demographic uncertainty, Table 2 clearly suggest that lengthening the working 
time has rather minor effect on alleviating the fiscal burden of ageing: Only 
about 3% of the stochastic variation in the contribution rate is explained by the 
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variation in working period. Stochastic variation in the time spent in retirement is 
clearly more important. 
 
Table 9  Asymptotic moments from stochastic model simulations for 
selected model’s variables 
 
Variable  Explanation  Mean  Standard Error  Variance Decomposition 
        ω  ௧ܰௐ   γ 
     Dependency ratio  0.46  0.04  3.7  3.8  92.5 
     Contribution rate  0.28  0.03  3.7  1.6  94.7 
     Labour  income  tax 
rate 
0.42  0.03  3.7  2.1  94.2 
     Pension  exp/wage 
sum 
0.28  0.02  3.6  3.9  92.4 
     Output,  efficiency 
units 
0.18  0.01  3.6  1.9  92.4 
     Employment rate  0.49  0.02  3.5  2.8  93.7 
   Working time, years  45.5  1.2       
 
  
Retirement, years  19.4  2.5       
     Growth  rate  of 
workers 
‐0.33  0.3       
a) All the moments are evaluated at final steady state 
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3.6 Conclusions 
As industrialized countries prepare for population ageing, pension reforms have 
been designed with the aim on increasing incentives to work longer and/or 
cutting pension benefits. One prominent example from Europe is Finland, where 
the latest pension reform introduced a flexible retirement age of between 63 and 
68. 
Using a tractable dynamic general equilibrium model calibrated to Finland, we 
show that even if the effective retirement age were to increase as expected, the 
burden from pension payments alone would cause the income tax rate to rise to a 
level above that witnessed in the worst years of recession in the mid-1990s. A 
stochastic simulation exercise suggests also that lengthening the working time 
has a rather minor impact on alleviating the fiscal burden of ageing: only a minor 
part of the stochastic variation in the contribution rate is explained by the 
variation in working period. 
On the contrary, if the replacement rate falls, as seems likely under the current 
pension regime, there would be a much smaller increase in taxation in response 
to growing expenditure on pensions. The average decline in the level of pensions 
relative to wage developments in turn raises several concerns. In Finland, where 
supplementary pension funds are of minor importance by international standards 
there is a risk that the falling purchasing power of pensions relative to wage 
developments will exert pressure on other social security schemes. The employee 
pension scheme, which appears to be financially sustainable, may thus in practice 
generate costs to local and central government in the form of higher expenditure 
on income support and other benefits. 
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4. Government funds and demographic transition 
 - Alleviating ageing costs in a small open economy30 
 
Helvi Kinnunen 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Population ageing will have profound effects on PAYG public pension schemes 
all over the western world. Financing of promised pension benefits requires large 
tax hikes causing distortions for the labour market and income distribution across 
generations. For the European countries, where the old age dependency ratio is 
expected to roughly double during the next four decades, the ageing stress is 
particularly severe. Consequently, in order to ensure sustainability of public 
pension schemes, a series of pension reforms are considered. In addition, 
provisions for prefunding of public pension schemes are taken in most European 
countries 31. By funding part of the future pension outlays governments try to 
smooth the tax burden over time. 
This paper focuses on the role of government funds during demographic 
transition. More specifically, we analyse to what extent public pension funds can 
be used as an instrument to lower the adjustment costs during the demographic 
transition. Adjustment is considered under condition that the long term 
sustainability of the public pension schemes will be maintained. We consider the 
role of the public pension funds in Finland, which contains features crucial from 
the point of this study. The Finnish pension system is partly funding PAYG with 
defined benefit features. Most importantly, substantial public pension funds are 
already collected but nevertheless the situation of public finances is 
unsustainable requiring increases in pension contribution rates in the long term. 
Other key feature from the point of view of this study is that pension funding is 
collective. This means that pension funding rate do not affect the expected future 
wealth of households. In addition, while pension benefits are earnings-related at 
invidual level32, on the aggregate level changes in the general contribution rates 
                                              
 
30 This is based on the Bank of Finland Discussion Paper Helvi Kinnunen: Government funds 
and demographic transition - alleviating ageing costs in a small open economy Nro 21/2008, 
Bank of Finland. 
31 See discussions on European pension reforms for example in Holzmann, MacKellar and 
Rutkowski (2003) 
32 Pension contributions accrue to future pension benefits according to certain accrual rates 
without upper limits in pension benefits. 
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do not affect pension benefit. Accordingly, changes in contributions will have the 
same kinds of efficiency costs as those attributed to wage taxation. Finally, 
Finland is hit by an exceptionally large demographic shock, and, contrary to most 
other European countries, in Finland demographic change is already in progress. 
In addition, unlike in most European countries, the coverage of the mandatory 
public pension scheme is extensive. In practice, private voluntary pension 
insurance is quite negligible. 
Role of the pension funds in alleviating economic reactions on demographic 
change arises from the distortiory effects of the labour taxation. If taxation could 
be lowered by cutting down prefunding, we could reduce the distortions on 
behaviour arising particularly from the substitution of leisure for work in 
response to taxation on labour. By reducing deadweight loss, the lower taxation 
could also change allocation of resources. In a small open economy labour 
market reactions lower wage levels and, accordingly, pension costs, which for its 
part increase the share of pension payments the return on pension funds covers. 
These channels are incorporated into the DSGE model we use in this study. It 
includes two age groups and facilitates analysing distortionary effects of fiscal 
and pension policy responses to ageing. The defined benefit PAYG pension 
system with wage-dependent pension benefits and collective prefunding is 
incorporated into the model. Households' wealth includes social security wealth 
in the form of discounted pension entitlements, independent of funding and 
contribution rates, and ageing shocks represent current population prognoses. 
The model contains separate fiscal policy rules and accounts for the state and 
public pension institution. Moreover the supply side is explicitly modelled. 
Kilponen, Kinnunen, Ripatti (2006) considered demographic shock and the 
consequences of some policy experiments using the same DSGE model. It was 
calibrated to represent the Finnish pension scheme, demographic developments 
as well as macroeconomic relations. That paper highlighted the central role of 
responses of workers and retirees to tax changes. This paper extends this analysis 
by modifying fiscal policy rules in order to give an active role to the pension 
funds in smoothing ageing effects on the economy. Focus is also more on the 
near future when the demographic shock is largest. Other literature relating this 
paper is Guest (2008) of tax smoothing between generations with explicit 
distortionary tax effects. Also Oksanen (2003 and 2008) examined 
intergenerational tax smoothing but without explicit tax reactions. Close to our 
point of view is also funding adjustment in a small open economy examined in 
Bovenberg and Knaap (2008). Pension funding and fiscal policy rules are studied 
in Jafarov and Leigh (2007). Generally, in the literature of pension funding, the 
focus has been in analysing consequences of movement from a publicly provided 
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PAYG based pension scheme towards private investment based funding 33. Also 
the effects of pension funding on financial markets, capital movements and the 
macroeconomy in multiregion models have been investigated 34. Otherwise 
ageing-related stress on the economy has been typically analysed by evaluating 
pension reforms under clear tax-benefit links, where efficiency losses in terms of 
employment have been typically absent 35. In addition, since the analysis usually 
have concentrated on the closed economy case, a funding-induced increase in 
national saving tends increase real capital formation and productivity, thereby 
improving long term growth prospects. In our case, under a public prefunding 
framework with weak or absent tax-benefit linkages, the advantages of funding 
are not clear-cut, particularly since in a small open economy framework real 
interest rate reactions do not support economic growth. Besides the costs of tax 
distortions, in defined benefit framework, prefunding does not increase the 
wealth of households. 
Simulation experiments of this study indicate that substantial gains can be 
achieved by funding adjustment during demographic transition. Cutting down on 
pension prefunding at a time when the pace of ageing is at its peak reduces the 
necessary tax hikes and stimulates labour supply growth at the moment when the 
labour market is tightest. Under lower funding, ageing leads to less growth of 
labour costs, better employment and faster production growth. Given the 
collective nature of pension funding, cutting back on funding did not redistribute 
welfare between retirees and workers. By lowering wage pressures and 
consequently pension benefits, a smaller prefunding is needed to produce the 
same welfare level than in the benchmark with unchanged pension funding rate. 
In the steady state, cut down of funds by 20 percentage points of the wage bill 
did not lower the welfare level. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 introduces the model, 
including a description of the pension system. Sections 3.3 discuss the results 
from policy experiment. Section 3.4 concludes. 
4.2 The Model 
Our analysis is based on Gertler's (1999) overlapping generations model. It 
merges the perpetual youth model of Yaari (1965) and Blanchard (1985) with an 
important aspect of life-cycle behaviour. The model is an extension of Gertler's 
                                              
 
33 See for example Feldstein (2005), Bergstrom and Hartman (2007), Demange (2007) and 
MCMorrow and Roeger (2004) as well as OECD (2007) for discussions of costs of pension 
prefunding. 
34 Attanasio et al. (2006) and Börsch-Supan et al. (2003) as well as Saarenheimo (2004) 
35 See for example Jaag, Keuschnigg, and Keuschnigg (2007) and Nickel, Rother and 
Theophilopoulou (2008). 
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model in the sense that it allows for distortionary taxation and time varying 
demographics. Households are forward looking with stochastic transition from 
work to retirement and from retirement to death, which captures the life cycle 
behaviour of households. The defined benefit pension system is part of 
households' social security wealth and, accordingly, future pension entitlements 
are considered equal to other public transfers. 
OLG features of the model facilitate investigating intergenerational aspects. 
Supply side (production structure) is based on CES production technology with 
factor augmentation in the underlying technological progress and nominal and 
real rigidities. The model is closed by fiscal rules. Budgetary solvency of public 
finances is achieved by setting an explicit target for public pension funds and a 
debt target for other government finances. In a small open economy, any 
imbalance between domestic savings and investment is reflected in the net 
foreign asset position. 
Given our focus on the policy of public funding, the key relationships are the 
setting of fiscal policy rules and the way taxation affects the labour market, 
households' wealth and intergenerational wealth distribution 36. The benchmark 
for the simulations is an economy where ageing-related demographic change is 
already incorporated in the model outcome.  
4.2.1 Households 
A household smooths consumption over the lifecycle and lives for two distinct 
periods: in the first period as a worker and in the second as a retiree. Transitions 
from work to retirement and from retirement to death are captured by parameters 
measuring the length of the working period and life-expectancy. 
4.2.1.1 Demographics and preferences 
Demographic parameters vary in time and are set to produce a realistic 
demographic structure. Dependency ratio,  w
t
r
t
N
N
t   , is expressed as 
w
t
t
tw
t
t
w
t
r
t
t NNN
N
ˆˆ
1 1 
   (1)
 
where the number of working population  wtN 1ˆ   grows at an exogenous growth 
rate  wtn 11    and  t   is the probability that an individual remains a worker in the 
                                              
 
36 The model and the impact of population ageing in a DSGE model is reported in detail in 
Kilponen, Kinnunen and Ripatti (2007). 
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next period, while the probability of retiring is  t1  . Once an individual has 
retired, she faces a periodic probability of death of )1( t . 
In the steady state, the demographic change has ended, so that 

 

Nˆ
1
   (2) 
rw NNN ˆˆˆ      (3) 
Households smooth consumption over the lifecycle and maximize a welfare 
function formulated separately for worker and retiree. Workers' preferences 
reflect the period at work and the expected period at retirement while retirees 
take into account, beyond retirement period, also the 'interim' period when they 
participate in the labour market upon retirement. This categorising is needed to 
enable us to capture the tax effects on labour supply of retirees. Preferences are 
summarized as  
   ccc zVElCV ttzvztvztzt   1)]|([])1([ 11    
where 
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ttt VrVE        (5) 
 rwz ,  indicates whether the individual is a worker or retiree. The finite 
(constant) intertemporal elasticity of substitution  )1/(1 c    indicates the 
willingness to smooth consumption over time. Parameter     is the elasticity of 
periodic utility with respect to consumption. The retirees' effective discount 
factor  r   takes into account the periodic probability of death. 
A Retiree 
The maximisation problem for a retiree born at time  j  , retiring at time  k   and 
surviving at least until  1t   is:  
   ccc
rjk
t
rjk
t
rjk
ttt
vrjk
t
vrjk
t
rjk
t
lC
VElCV   1)]([])1([max 11
,

 
 (6)
 
Helvi Kinnunen  
120 
 
s.t. 
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where  tR   denotes after-tax gross rate of return on financial assets  At
rjk  and  rjktT   
denotes pension benefits. Retirees who participate in the workforce are assumed 
to have lost part of their efficiency compared to workers. Relative efficiency is 
denoted by  1  . Efficiency slow-down captures, besides real labour 
productivity, also other factors that lowers retirees' labour input as measured by 
work days, such as part time work. Parameter     is the subjective discount 
factor,  ctP   is a price index for consumption and  tt   is the total labour income 
tax rate including pension contribution rate, WPtt  . 
Retirees' human capital is  rtH   and social security wealth  rtS  . Wealth is valued 
on a net basis, after wage taxes and taxes levied on pension income as well as 
pension contributions. Maximizing with respect to consumption and aggregating 
over retirees results in the following aggregate consumption equation for retirees 
].[ rt
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where  tt   is retirees' marginal propensity to consume out of wealth.  H tr   and  
Str   represent discounted after-tax labour income and pensions. They evolve as 
111
1
/ˆ
)1(


tt
r
t
r
tr
ttt
r
t RN
LW 
HH t
      (9) 
.
/ˆ 111
1


tt
r
t
r
tr
t
r
t RN 
STS       (10) 
The growth rate of retirees  rtN 1ˆ    is entered into the discount factor because total 
social security payments (pensions) are distributed equally among retirees. Also 
the discount factor for human wealth is augmented by the growth rate of retirees. 
Retiree's marginal propensity to consume out of wealth  tt   evolves according 
to the following non-linear difference equation: 
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where  ctctct PPP /ˆ 11    . A retiree's marginal propensity to consume varies with the 
real interest rate,  ,ˆ/ 11 ctt PR    as well as with expected changes in real net wage 
income. In addition, the survival probability  ,  influences a retiree's effective 
discount rate, thereby introducing further dynamics into the marginal propensity 
to consume equation. 
A Worker 
The maximation problem for a worker born at time  s   is 
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where  ws
tT  denotes financial transfers to workers and  tt   is the total labour 
income tax rate. After intertemporal maximization, the worker's consumption 
plan aggregates to  
].[ wt
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where  t   is the worker's marginal propensity to consume and  H tw   and  Stw   
denote human and social security wealth. 
Marginal propensity to consume out of wealth follows a non-linear first order 
difference equation: 
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where  1t   is the factor that weights the gross real return  ctt PR 11 ˆ/   . This factor 
evolves according  
to  
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where  11 t  is the ratio of a retiree's marginal propensity to consume to that of 
a worker. 
 wtH   is the discounted sum of a worker's wage bill (in net terms) and  wtS   is the 
sum across workers alive at  t   of the capitalized value of social security (in net 
terms). Both of these measures take account of the corresponding discounted 
values at the time of retirement. Formally, 
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 )1(1trtH   and   11 trjtS   are the values of human wealth and social security for a 
working retiree who retires at time  1t   but is still working at time  t  . The 
enlarged discount rate due to the presence of  11  t   in the denominator means 
that workers value human wealth and social security less than does a retiree. This 
tends to reduce the worker's consumption and increase saving compared to a 
retiree. 
The factor  wtN 1ˆ    augments the discount rate of the capitalized value of a worker's 
social security because the share of total social security entitlements going to 
those currently alive declines over time as the working-age population grows. By 
a similar argument,  wtN 1ˆ    enters into the discount factor of aggregate human 
wealth. 
4.2.1.2 Labour and wages 
Standard labour supply for a retiree born at time  j  , retiring at time  k   and 
surviving at least until  1t   and a worker born at time  s   evolve as 
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where  t t   denotes taxes levied on labour income. 
In the model, the worker faces a quadratic adjustment in re-setting the wage rate. 
A fraction of workers is assumed to adjust wages in each period. For those not 
able to optimize in the period, the wage is adjusted using the steady state growth 
rate of wages, denoted  dw , which equals the steady state productivity growth 
rate plus the inflation rate. 
The behaviour of aggregate nominal wages is then characterized two wage rate 
equations: 
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where  PtcCtw   is consumption of workers,  Ntw   is worker population,  Ltw   denotes 
the number of workers demanded,  )1,0(q   is the exogenous probability that 
determines how often a randomly chosen worker is allowed to re-set her wage. 
The equation for the optimal wage rate,  Wt,   is derived directly from the 
aggregate version of worker's labour supply decision. 
Workers' and retirees' aggregate labour supply is derived by multiplying 
individual labour supplies by population shares: 
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Aggregate labour supply is measured by the effective labour supply index,  Lt,  
which takes into account differences in workers' and retirees' labour efficiency: 
(21) 
(22) 
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Labour demand for workers,  Ltw,   is derived by assuming that retirees are always 
on their labour supply curve at the prevailing wage ( W  ), and domestic 
intermediate goods producers are on their labour demand curve. 
4.2.1.3 Wealth distribution, financial assets and aggregate consumption 
Since workers discount wealth at a higher rate than retirees, they tend to consume 
a smaller part of any wealth increase. This means that the distribution of wealth 
is an essential element in aggregate consumption. 
Using previous equations for human and social security wealth, the share of 
financial wealth held by retirees  
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where  rtH   and  rtS   denote discounted after-tax values of labour income and 
pensions as defined above, and  tt   is retirees marginal propensity to consume 
out of wealth. 
Assuming that all assets are eventually held by domestic consumers, aggregate 
private consumption is  
  ][]1[ rtrtttrttwtwtttrttHtct ARARCP SHSH    (27) 
Individuals receive transfers from both the central government and pension 
funds. However, in order to maintain analytical tractability, pensions are related 
to the prevailing aggregate wage level but not to individual characteristics. 
Financial assets available to consumers consist of three items: domestic 
government bonds, AtS , foreign bonds,  AtW  , and stocks issued by domestic firms,  
AtF . Pension funds invest in the same assets. Their investment is denoted by  
p
tA . In simulations, asset returns on domestic and foreign bonds are assumed to 
equalize ( Ft
S
t rr   ). The share price  rtD   is the nominal price (ex-dividend) of a 
unit of equity in period  t  . The factor defining the gross return on stocks is firms' 
profits, Dt . This gross return is defined as 
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where  t tK   denotes the corporate tax rate. 
4.2.1.4 Welfare 
Workers welfare can be written using (Vrjk) and (Vws) and the corresponding 
optimality condition for consumption and labour as 
  )
)1(
1(/ 1
1
v
t
c
t
v
c
t
w
tt
w
t Wt
PvPCV  
 
 (29)
 
Retirees' welfare evolves analogously to that of the workers with differences only 
in propensity to consume and in labour efficiency rate: 
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Given that agents maximise welfare over their life-cycles, welfare measures 
represent discounted future value for an average worker or a retiree at each 
moment. Consequently, the welfare effects of a policy or economic shock 
depends on its direct impact on wealth and on its impact on discount rates. 
Moreover, welfare is affected by tax-distortions from the labour market. 
4.2.2 Social security 
4.2.2.1 Pension expenditures and fiscal balances 
The model's pension expenditures are linked to the demographic structure and 
aggregate wages such that  ,t
r
tt
R
t WNT   where  t     Wet /   is the average 
pension rate evaluated at the initial steady state level of aggregate wages  W  . 
Total pension expenditures,  TtR ,   are thus linked to average wages and the 
number of pensioners. Making use of our demographic assumptions, we can 
express pension expenditures per capita in terms of the dependency ratio, wages 
and pension rate: 
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Pension expenditure is the component that brings ageing structure to social 
security wealth. Other transfers for households are assumed to evolve in line with 
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production growth. In simulating demographic shocks, we have pension benefits 
depend on wage developments over the longer time, thereby imitating the 
actuarial structure of the pension system. 
General government is divided into two sectors: state government (central and 
local governments) and pension funds. Separation of sectors allows us to 
investigate pension funding apart from other fiscal policy questions. This is well-
grounded from the intergenerational viewpoint since tax treatment differs for 
retirees and workers. On the public spending side, in turn, pension outlays are in 
principle equal to other public transfers not linked to tax payments. In that sense 
pension funding is equivalent to government debt37. 
The fiscal balance of the state consists of three taxes: labour income is taxed at 
the rate  t tWS  , capital gains tax levied at the rate  t tK   and consumption taxed at the 
indirect tax rate  t tC  . State expenditure items are consumption,  CtS ,  transfers to 
firms and households,  TtS ,   and interest payments on government debt with 
nominal rate of ,  rt.  The state issues government bonds amounting to  AtS   in a 
net basis. In each period, the following budget constraint holds: 
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Accordingly, the fiscal balance of public pension funds consists of pension 
contributions levied on wage income. Pensions are financed by collecting 
pension contributions from firms and workers as well as from revenue from 
pension funds. The overall pension contribution rate is  Ptt    ,WPtFPt tt    with 
separate rates for employers' and employees' contributions. Pensions to retirees 
                                              
 
37 In practice, separation is well-grounded also because administration of pension funds is 
usually independent from the central government. For example in Finland pension policy is 
quite independent from other public administration and fiscal policy setting. Even though the 
govenment in the end makes formal decisions on contribution rates, pension funds are de facto 
governed by an entity outside the government consisting of three parties: labour union, nsurance 
companies and the government. For more detailes see Finnish Centre for Pensions (2007). 
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total  TtPR   and include, besides old age pensions, disability pensions and other 
pensions. Pension funds accumulate financial assets  AtP  . 
In each period the following flow budget constraint holds for the pension fund: 
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4.2.2.2 Fiscal rules 
The model is closed by the tax rule and contribution rate rule set separately for 
the state and the public pension funds. Fiscal targets are set to maintain 
sustainability in terms of the SGP requirement for general government finance. 
The state targets the debt/GDP ratio and adjusts the labour income tax rate to 
stabilize debt at the targeted level within a 'proper' time horizon. The fiscal rule is 
of tax difference type 38: 
 /)(/)( 21 tSSttSStwst YAAYAA    (34) 
where  t
S YA /   is an exogenous target for the actual indebtedness ratio. If the 
government spending ratio is exogenous, the debt will also render the steady state 
tax rate exogenous, in effect determined unambiguously by the debt ratio. The 
parameters  1  and  2   determine the speed of adjustment. In the benchmark 
simulations, the debt ratio is a constant set at the steady state value of 0.5. Values 
of the adjustment parameters were set at  1  =0.08 and  2  =0.9, which cause the 
debt ratio to proceeding smoothly to the target within the period of demographic 
changes. 
Using the same analogy, the pension contribution rate is targeted at the pension 
funds to wages ratio. Formally,  
 /)(/)( 21 ttPPtttPPtPt LWAALWAA    (35) 
where  ĀP /    WtLt   is the target level for the pension fund. In benchmark 
simulations, we set 
                                              
 
38 See the discussion of Mitchell, Sault and Wallis (2000) on the properties of fiscal rules in 
macro models. See also Railavo (2004) for a discussion of alternative fiscal policy rules and 
their stability properties. 
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P LWALWALWA      (36) 
where  t   is old age dependency ratio and  6.1/ ttP LWA   is the targeted value 
of the pension fund relative to the wage sum in the steady state. The faster the 
change in the dependency ratio, the slower the funding rate will approach the 
target. 
Altogether, in our benchmark, given targets will bring the net debt of general 
government to about 20 per cent of GDP, which represents the sustainability ratio 
of unchanged net debt position that is applied as a sustainability criteria of in the 
framework of public surveillance in the EU. 
4.2.2.3 Production 
The supply side is based on a production structure where domestic intermediate 
goods are combined with imported intermediate goods to produce final goods, 
broken down into consumption goods, capital goods and export goods. Producers 
of intermediate goods combine labour and and capital using CES production 
technologies with factor-augmenting technical trends exogenously given. The 
production differs across final goods in terms of elasticity of substitution. 
Production of Intermediate Goods 
The production function for intermediate goods,  ),( jYt   is  
     .)1()( /1     FtLttKtt LKjY  
where  Kt   is capital,  LtF   labour, parameters  Kt   and  Lt   denote time-varying 
capital and labour-augmenting technical progress respectively,  )1/(1    is 
elasticity of technical substitution with     the substitution parameter and    the 
share parameter in the production function. The technical change is labour-
augmenting on the balanced growth path. 
Cost minimization implies the following real marginal costs:  
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where  Rt   denotes the nominal rental price of capital services and  
t
F
t
F
t WW )1( t   represents nominal labour costs including employers' pension 
and social security contributions. 
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In the steadystate, prices  )( jP   are determined by the markup,  )( 1z   over 
marginal costs: 
)()( jMCjP   (37) 
The first order conditions (in logs) with respect to capital services and labour are 
given by  
).)(1(log)log()1log(
))(1(log)log(log
tt
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The aggregate pricing equation for intermediate goods producers, assuming 
Calvo pricing, is of the form 
 1 ttttt pmcpEp     (40) 
where     captures the frequency of price changes  . Inflation is determined by 
expected inflation and log markup     over the real marginal costs  tt pmc   . 
Production of Final Goods 
Final goods producers combine domestic intermediate inputs and imported 
goods. Producers take the market price for their products as given, since product 
markets are set to be competitive. The demand for retailers' output is given by 
consumption and investment of the private and general government sectors. The 
output of the consumption-goods retailer divides into the private consumption 
and public purchases of market goods, SFt
H
t
T
t CCC   . The capital-goods retailer 
faces similar demand comprising private sector and public sector investment, 
S
tt
T
t III   . 
The production technology for consumption and investment goods is:  
    Tjtjjtjjt CIjMYQ jjj ,,)1( /1  
    
 j   is the respective share parameter and  j   the respective substitution 
parameter ))1/(1( jj   . jM  denotes imports and  jY   the domestic 
intermediate good. Cost minimization generates following price indices, 
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(39) 
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and conditional factor demands  
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The consumption-goods producer (retailer) pays the indirect taxes, t tC  . Hence 
the tax base for indirect taxes consists of private consumption and government 
purchases. No indirect taxes are levied on investment goods. 
The exporter is a firm that combines domestic intermediate input, YtX , and 
imported raw materials,  MtR , to produce export good, Xt,   in competitive 
markets. Technology and preferences are identical to those of the retailers. 
Capital rental firms 
Production capital is modelled as a homogeneous factor of production that is 
owned by a firm that rents capital to producers of domestic intermediate goods. 
The capital rental firm operates under perfect competition. Physical capital 
accumulation generates real adjustment costs in the form of lost capital stock. 
Capital accumulation is given by  
   1,, 121 Kptptptpttpt KKKKIK  S  (41) 
where  )(S   denotes adjustment costs of physical capital stock and  K   is the 
capital depreciation factor. The capital rental firm maximizes its expected 
discounted profits  
max ,
0}{
K
ststt
s
tI
ME
t




 (42)
 
subject to the capital accumulation equation (41) and the definition of capital 
services39,  ptt KK 1  . Its momentary profits are given by  
                                              
 
39 For simplicity we assume that capital services obtain a lagged value of physical capital stock. 
In a more general case capital services would depend also on the endogenous utilization rate. 
This extension alters the results only in business cycle frequencies and is thus beyond the scope 
of this study. 
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The price index for investment goods, PtI  , is the price index of the domestic 
investment good retailer and  Rt   denotes rental rate for capital. Future profits are 
discounted using the nominal stochastic discount factor (pricing kernel)  
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stt PCUPCUM     . The first order condition with respect to 
capital stock  Kt
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Due to the end-of-period timing of physical capital stock, the accumulated 
physical capital is in use in the following period. Hence, the expected following 
period's rental rate,  ,1tR  governs the current period investment decision. The 
adjustment cost function is quadratic in changes of the physical capital stock: 
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The usual `investment equation' can be obtained by substituting the parametric 
version of adjustment costs for the share parameter in the first order condition. 
4.2.3 Market Equilibrium 
All markets are in equilibrium in every period. The capital goods market is in 
equilibrium when the supply of capital services by the capital-rental firm equals 
the demand for capital services by intermediate goods producers. Similarly, the 
labour markets are in equilibrium when the demand for labour equals its supply, 
D
t
s
t LL   . In the intermediate goods sector, the demand for intermediate goods by 
retailers and exporters equals total supply:  
.t
X
t
I
t
C
t YYYY   (46) 
Markets for final goods clear when  
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where PtW  is the aggregated export price of competing economies and MtW  is 
aggregate imports of export markets. When the market clearing conditions hold, 
the workers' and pensioners' budget constraints (7) and (13), the general 
government budget constraint (36) and the pension fund's budget constraint (37) 
imply the following equation for the accumulation of foreign assets:  
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The current account balance is given by )( 1WtWtt AAS   and the factor income 
account by .Wtt
F
t ASr   
4.2.4 Key model parameters 
The following model's key parameters are calibrated to reflect the main features 
of the Finnish economy40. 
Table 1  Key model parameters 
 
Households 
β Subjective discount factor, parameter  0,99 
υ Elasticity of periodic utility wrt consumption  0,80 
σ Inter‐temporal substitution elasticity, parameter   0,45 
ξ Labour efficiency of retirees, parameter  0,30 
є Relative marginal prospensity to consume, variable  1,59 
π Worker's marginal prospensity to consume, variable  0,019 
Ω Additional discounting factor  1,10 
w  Elasticity of workers' labour supply, variable  0,26 
r  Elasticity of pensioners' labour supply, variable  0,23  
                                              
 
40 Calibration principles are described and discussed in detail in Kilponen and Ripatti (2006). 
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Production 
Lˆ  Labour‐saving technical change p.a., parameter  2,08 
K   Capital depreciation rate, parameter  0,08 
   Price markup, parameter  1,08 
/FA Price to equity ratio, variable  15.0 
   Capital's share, parameter  0,10 
   Elasticity of substitution between capital and labour  0,72 
 
Public Finances 
 1   Fiscal rule adjustment, parameter  0.08 
 2   Fiscal rule adjustment, parameter  0.90 
 Sa   Central government debt (% of output)  0.50 
 Pa   Pension funds (% of wage bill)  1.70 
 cS   Public consumption (% of output)  20.8 
 
SWT   
Transfers to workers (% of output)  6.40 
 K   Corporate tax rate %, parameter  19.2 
 C   Sales tax rate %, parameter  21.0 
 
Real interest rate 
cF PR ˆ/   Real interest rate, p.a., variable  2,40 
 
Given our interest in distortionary effects of taxes, the crucial parameter affecting 
our results is the periodic utility of consumption, which determines the labour 
supply elasticities. The elasticity of utility is calibrated at 0.80 and it produces 
uncompensated labour supply elasticity values of 0.23-0.26. This is broadly in 
line with elasticities applied in the standard European models. Elasticity of 
labour supply is of course highly uncertain. Concerning the ageing issues, some 
authors have argued that European elasticities could be much higher if, for 
example, all the ways in which taxes affect labour-supply decisions of retirees 
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were taken properly into account41. An actuarially unfair defined benefit system, 
in particular, tend to raise the implicit tax rate for a retiree. High tax rates also 
create incentives for early retirement. Unfortunately, our model setting does not 
allow us to investigate these impacts. In principle for Finland, where mandatory 
public pension scheme is exceptionally extensive and tax-benefit links are 
particularly weak, the calibrated values of labour supply elasticities can be 
considered conservative. 
4.3 Simulations 
4.3.1 Benchmark economy 
The benchmark for simulations is an economy where demographic changes have 
already passed through to the economic structure, e.g. labour market, production 
and public finances. After demographic shock, the economy grows along a new 
steady state growth path where the old age dependency ratio is permanently 
higher than in the initial steady state without ageing. The demographic shock is 
calibrated using parameters for the dependency ratio and probability of death to 
closely represent the situation Finland is facing. 
Public finances are sustainable in terms of the SGP definition with government 
net debt remaining unchanged in the long term42. The wage tax rate and pension 
contribution rates adjust to keep the state debt and pension funds at the currently 
prevailing level in relation to GDP or wage bill. Other tax parameters, as well as 
government consumption as a share of GDP are assumed to remain unchanged. 
Table 2 presents the main fiscal and macroeconomic variables at the steady state 
before and after a permanent demographic shock. 
 
                                              
 
41 According to Jacobs (2008) uncompensated elasticity of tax base could double in Europe if 
besides labour supply, also retirement and learning are endogenised. 
42 More precisely, the sustainability condition represents sustainability with the S2 indicator 
fulfilling the intertemporal budget constraint over an infinite horizon. 
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Table 2  Public finances, labour market and households' welfare: The 
steady state in the economy without ageing and in the aged 
economy (benchmark) 
 
  Without ageing  Aged economy 
Income tax rate % of workers, implicit  29.2  39.9
Pension contribution rate (firms and workers), implicit  19.9  27.0
Pension expenditure (% of output), variable  11.3  15.0
Employment rate, workers  0.75  0.61
Employment rate, retirees  0.17  0.32
Output growth, %  2.20  1.70
Private consumption per capita  4.70  4.00
Distribution of financial asset wealth, variable  0.17  0.25
Capital‐output ratio  1.93  1.92
Net foreign assets % of output  ‐21.1  35.6
 
Under unchanged government net funds, reflecting the steep increase in the old 
age dependency ratio, labour tax rates had to increase altogether by about 17 
percentage points in the long term (table 2)43. Both the pension contribution rate 
and wage tax rate should increase. As a consequence, because of distortionary 
taxation, the employment rate of workers would be in the steady state much 
lower than under stationary demography. That dominates the overall employment 
developments. Retirees' employment rate increases slightly, which is due to the 
fact that retirees' desire to compensate a decline in after tax wealth dominates the 
negative effect caused by a decline in wage compensation. Also real growth will 
be slower, consumption per capita lower and retirees' share of financial wealth 
much larger than in the initial steady state. A more detailed description of ageing 
effects is reported in Kilponen, Kinnunen and Ripatti (2007). 
                                              
 
43 Note that possible effects of pension reform were not included. According to Ministry of 
Finance (2007), the direct effect of ageing on general government would amount to 8 p.p. of 
GDP. Finnish Centre of Pensions estimates that pension contribution rate should be increased 
by 4 p.p.(see Biström et al.(2008) ). Both institutions took reform into account. 
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Altogether, in the benchmark, sustainability of public finances requires large tax 
hikes. The tax burden should increase during the period when government is a 
net creditor in the financial market and the labour market is extremely tight. 
4.3.2 Funding adjustments during demographic transition 
In this section we consider government assets as an policy option in alleviating 
ageing stress. Simulation results are compared to the benchmark situation where 
government funds remain unchanged in relation to GDP. In the following 
simulations we change pension fund targeting in two ways: We endogenise 
funding rate to respond inversely to changes in the dependency ratio (see 38) and 
reduce the target fund-to-wage sum ratio from the current 1.7 to 1.4 after 
completion of demographic change by the end of the 2050s. The magnitude of 
targeted pension funds represents the level that would maintain sustainability of 
the public finances and would keep tax rates close the benchmark in the steady 
state. In terms of general government net assets to GDP, that means a decline 
from the prevailing level of 25 per cent of GDP to about to 10 per cent (Figure 
1). Net lending of General Government would turn in to a slight deficit 
amounting to 1 percentage point of GDP at its highest at the beginning of the 
period. 44. 
 
Figure 1 Adjustment in government funds 
 
 
                                              
 
44 Since under normal assumption the real interest rate exceeds the real growth rate, reducing 
funding will weaken pension fund balances and cause contribution rates to increase later. 
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Given the small open economy environment with fixed interest rates, the 
counterpart of the weakening of the general government financial position is in 
net foreign financial assets. A reduction in government assets means that the 
current account surplus declines due to lower national saving. Net foreign assets 
decline by about 10 percentage points as a consequence of fund run-down in the 
long run (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2 Foreign net assets in the benchmark and simulation 
 
 
 
The top panel of figure 3 shows that the slowing of pension fund accumulation 
would clearly ease the tax burden on labour. The need to raise the pension 
contribution rate remains about 3 percentage points lower up to 2020 and the 
increase in wage taxes would remain about 2 percentage points smaller during 
the same time. The difference versus the benchmark in overall tax burden on 
labour peaks to 5.5 percentage points at the midpoint of the 2020s. Pension 
contribution rates could stay lower than in the benchmark also for quite a long 
time, covering the entire period of demographic transition. In our experiment, tax 
rates actually do not reach the benchmark level until after four decades. 
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Figure 3  Results of an experiment where funding rate declines 
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Labour market reactions to lower tax rates indicate substantial employment gains 
(second and third panel of Figure 3). The employment rate of workers would be 
nearly one percentage point higher on average during the next 15 years and 
retirees' employment would improve even in absolute terms as a reaction to a tax 
cut. Retirees' labour supply reacts stronger than workers' reflecting a wage set-up 
for the model with retirees reacting along their labour supply curve. Workers' 
employment reactions are more subdued because an increase in average wage 
will reduce labour demand. Due to the increase in average wages and labour 
supply, the capital-labour ratio declines after a tax cut but increases later on, at 
around 2015. 
A lower tax burden increases the present value of the net human capital as well 
as social security wealth, since pension benefits are subject to income taxation 
(Figure 4). Improved wealth boosts consumption and labour demand. The 
consumption level would stay during the demographic transition about 2 
percentage points above the benchmark. GDP real growth will exceed benchmark 
by more than 1 percentage point on average during the same period. This 
represents substantial economic gains for the economy. 
The model with heterogeneous agents allows us to consider intergenerational 
effects of fund adjustment. Figure 4 shows that consumption of retirees 
constantly rises a bit more than that of workers. Retirees and workers differ with 
respect to planning horizon and combination of wealth. Retirees' shorter planning 
horizon means that any policy changes that affect their net present value of 
wealth is smoothed over a shorter period than that of workers. This and retirees' 
larger marginal propensity to consume out of wealth lead them to respond more 
strongly than workers to tax changes. But lower funding has practically no effect 
on income distribution. Welfare measures confirm the overall result. During the 
transition period, both retirees and workers are better off with rather similar 
welfare gains amounting to 1-2 per cent (Figure 4, bottom panel). 
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Figure 4  Results of an experiment where funding rate declines 
 
 
 
4.3.3 Sensitivity analysis 
In sensitivity analysis we used alternative assumptions of some key parameters of 
the model. We conducted the same simulation experiment allowing parameter 
estimates to vary around the values used in the base simulations45. 
First we set the periodic elasticity of consumption,  v  , at slightly higher or lower 
than in the benchmark. Fund adjustments are particularly sensitive to cuts in the 
elasticity parameter (Figure 5). In particular, a lower elasticity value strengthens 
the labour supply reaction (see 29 and 20). Then lower funding with a lower tax 
rate gives a stronger boost to labour supply, allowing for larger tax reductions. 
This also improves after tax wealth compared to the benchmark simulations and 
                                              
 
45 The chosen procedure was not quite accurate since the balanced growth paths were not 
controlled for. If steady state values change substantially, due to parameter changes, then the 
analysed deviation from benchmark might not be guite comparable. This bias seems to relate to 
low values of the parameter  v   and particularly the reactions of retirees' participation. The 
employment rate of retirees gets quite different initial and final steady state values with a lower 
parameter value than in the benchmark.  
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can be seen to have larger effect on consumption per capita. Instead, an increase 
of the same magnitude in the elasticity of consumption would make hardly any 
difference compared to the benchmark (see Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5  Alternative reactions on funds adjustment: elasticity of periodic 
utility of consumption varies 
 
 
 
Secondly, we varied the intertemporal elasticity of substitution parameter,  . 
Figure 6 indicates only a slight variation in tax rates, employment and 
consumption. Lower values for the IES parameter, when households are slightly 
more willing to allow consumption to vary over time, brings foreword slightly 
the gains of funds adjustment in terms of consumption per capita. 
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Figure 6 Alternative reactions on funds adjustment: Intertemporal 
elasticity of substitution (IES) varies 
 
 
 
Finally, the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour,   was varied. A 
noticeable effect is that, with a higher elasticity of substitution, employment of 
workers improves a bit more but somewhat later then in the benchmark  
(Figure 7). If capital and labour are more readily substitutable, lower pension 
contribution rates for employers induce them to demand more labour (see e.g. 
41). 
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Figure 7 Alternative reactions of the adjustment: Elasticity of substitution 
between labour and capital varies 
 
 
 
Besides uncertainties associated with parameter values, important risks are 
naturally related to demographic trends. Using stochastic population forecasts for 
Finland, Lassila and Valkonen (2008) reported substantial variations in forecasts. 
For example, they found a 50 per cent probability that the number of prime age 
workers in Finland is between 2.4 million and 2.8 million. Uncertainty as to 
aggregate labour supply however increase with a long lag when the fertility risk 
is realised, which will take place after 2-3 decades. 
4.3.4 Steady state results 
The simulation experiment shows that ageing costs can be lowered by adjusting 
funding rate to smooth tax reactions during the transition period of demographic 
change. In the long term, there exists a lower level of funding rate that produces 
the same welfare level and tax rates than in the benchmark economy where 
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funding rate was assumed to remain unchanged. Table 3 shows that in the steady 
state the levels of labour taxation, employment, consumption and welfare remain 
practically the same as in the benchmark, even though some 20 percentage points 
of GDP less financial resources were devoted to pension funding. This is because 
smaller tax increases than in the benchmark led to a slightly lower wage level 
thereby making the production structure slightly more labour intensive. A lower 
wage level also means lower pension benefits compared to the benchmark. 
Consequently, the property income of pension funds will cover a larger share of 
pension payments, which helps to reach the benchmark welfare and consumption 
levels with smaller prefunding. Note also that, even under larger fund 
adjustments, tax rates and welfare effects remain quite modest (Figure 8). For 
example, moving from a pure PAYG system to current funding level would 
lower the tax ratio by only some 2 percentage points. This would reduce the 
welfare of consumers by about 1 percentage point. 
 
Table 3 Long term effect of funding adjustment 
 
  Steady states   
  Benchmark  Lower funding 
Pension funds, % of wage bill  1.70 1.40
State debt, % of GDP  0.50 0.50
Pension contribution rate  27.0 27.4
State taxes  39.9 40.1
Employment rate, workers  0.61 0.61
Employment rate, retirees  0.32 0.33
Wealth distribution  0.245 0.245
Consumption per capita  3.976 3.954
Welfare, workers  0.00346 0.00345
Welfare, retirees  0.00266 0.00264
Capital‐output ratio  7.87364 7.86974
 
Government funds and demographic transition 
145 
 
Figure 8 Reactions of welfare and pension contribution rate on funding 
adjustment in the steady state 
 
 
 
 
4.3.5 Discussion of Results 
In the above analysis the lack of a tax-benefit link is crucial. Changes in 
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individual level, depend only on accrual parameters and past wages. Distortions 
from the labour market are of key importance for our results. In the related 
literature on pension policy, the degree of actuarity has typically been pinpointed 
as a crucial condition for macroeconomic reactions and intergenerational income 
distribution. If adjustments in pension parameters would directly affect 
individual pension benefits, it would render contribution payments similar to 
investments in annuities. Any policies that improve the actuarial rate will then 
lessen the distortionary effects of the pension system. For example Fischer and 
Keuschnigg (2007) found that reforms that strengthened the tax-benefit link 
clearly stimulated labour supply, even though the responses of older workers and 
prime age workers went in opposite directions. Even in a DB pension scheme, 
changes in contribution rates do not entail efficiency losses if the benefits change 
accordingly. Jaag, et.al. (2007) also reported pronounced economic gains from 
Austrian pension reform, which greatly improved the actuarity of the pension 
system. Also Nickel, Rother and Theophilapoulou (2008) found that steady state 
consumption improved under a policy package comprising a cut in pension level 
and a cut in proportional corporate taxes. Supply side gains from lower tax 
distortions boosted long term gains by changing factor prices. 
In the present study, despite prefunding, there is no direct link between fund 
return and pension benefit. In other words, the size of pension fund affect 
households' social security wealth only through changes in contribution rates. An 
individual's benefit at retirement depends, not on the performance of asset prices 
during that time, but on his earnings during his working years. Unlike in an 
investment-based system, the actuarial present value of benefits is not equal to 
that of social security savings. Consequently, funding affects distortions only to 
the extent that it reduces pressures for contribution rate hikes. This contrasts with 
the literature of pension funding, where typically economic gains from funding 
have been found to come from a reduction in distortions. For example, according 
to Feldstein (2005), deadweight losses from social security insurance could 
clearly be diminished by moving towards an investment-based funding system. 
On the other hand, the result extends that of Guest (2008) who considered tax 
smoothing effects under tax distortions. Guest reported lifetime utility gains for 
future generations that would outweight the losses to current generation available 
by smoothing tax by funding. Our results indicate that under tax distortions, 
further gains are available if funding rate would be adjusted to respond large 
demographic shocks. 
4.4 Conclusions 
Given the growth in the old-age dependency ratio, ensuring sustainability of 
public finances requires a substantial increase in tax burden or a down-grading of 
social security in most European countries. This burden differs by country, 
depending on timing of ageing, coverage and generosity of the public pension 
scheme, as well as the degree of prefunding. Our experiment highlighted the use 
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of the option of adjusting public funds in Finland where ageing problems are 
more severe than in any other European country, but where, on the other hand, 
quite focal policy measures have already been taken to prepare for ageing stress. 
In this paper already collected public funds were used as an additional policy 
option to alleviate the costs tax hikes pose for the economy during the transition 
to an older population structure. The analytical tool was the DSGE model, which 
features the Finnish pension scheme with defined benefit, high but collective 
funding and tax distortions. 
A simulation experiment illustrates that, during the transition to an older 
population structure, ageing costs can be lowered allowing the decline in public 
funds to smooth the tax reactions. Lower tax rates stimulate labour supply when 
the labour market is tight. Easing the funding target leads to a slower growth in 
the costs of labour, better employment and faster production growth. Given the 
collective nature of pension funding, a reduction in funding redistributed welfare 
between retirees and workers. Altogether, the experiment indicated quite 
substantial gains achievable with a funding adjustment during demographic 
transition. Since interest rate reactions were absent in the open economy, even 
temporarily lower taxation could change factor prices thereby rendering the 
production structure more labour intensive. In the experiment, the funding rate 
could be lowered by 20 percentage points of the wage bill without any losses in 
welfare. 
As discussed in this paper, Finland's public pension scheme is unique in many 
respects. Still, our experiment highlights issues common to all public pension 
schemes. Concerning efforts to increase public pension funding in other 
European countries, the long term costs of funding depend on how funds could 
be used to smooth ageing pressures. In most European countries, the old age 
dependency ratios start to accelerate in about 20 years time, which means that 
pension funds, could be accumulated before the labour market becomes 
extremely tight. This creates room for fiscal policy to alleviate labour shortages 
when ageing stresses are at their highest level. 
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5. Assessing the sustainability of health and long-term 
care financing  
-  and the usefulness of policy guidelines based on 
demographic forecasts 
 
Jukka Lassila, Tarmo Valkonen and Juha M. Alho46 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Sustainability of public finances is essential for preserving the possibility to carry 
out sovereign fiscal policy. This prerequisite is emphasized when the policy 
objective is to run an extensive welfare state, as in Finland. The long-term fiscal 
sustainability of a welfare state is vulnerable especially to demographic risks.  
Experiences show that a country can lose its fiscal autonomy for a long period of 
time due to lack of foresight and fiscal discipline. The welfare losses caused by 
fiscal crises can be large and their incidence arbitrary. Yet despite its importance, 
astonishingly little research has been done on fiscal sustainability under 
uncertainty. Long-term sustainability of public finances is regularly assessed by, 
e.g., the European Commission. The problem is that the accounting-based 
evaluations consider future uncertainty as an issue that can be managed by 
presenting a baseline scenario and some more or less ad hoc alternatives.  These 
calculations also miss the potential feedback from high public debt to the 
economy. Quoting Leeper (2010), fiscal policy is based on alchemy and 
monetary policy on science.  
We employ an improved method to evaluate the long term sustainability of fiscal 
policy under demographic uncertainty. We highlight how this method can be 
used to test a risk sharing rule that shifts the extra expenditure burden of very 
unfavorable demographics from municipalities to the state. More specifically, we 
assume that a ceiling is put on the average municipal tax rate. If demographic 
developments increase municipalities’ health and long-term care expenditure 
more than allowed by this ceiling, the state finances the shortfall by debt.  We 
also study cases where the government uses the information provided by 
demographic projections to prepare for bad future outcomes by reducing public 
indebtedness.  
                                              
 
46 We thank Eija Kauppi for efficient model programming. We are grateful for the National 
Audit Office of Finland for financial support and their staff for stimulating discussions. We also 
thank Outi Honkatukia and Niku Määttänen for comments. 
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We use 200 sample paths from a stochastic population projection as an input in 
an economic model to assess probabilistically the sustainability of public 
finances. The economic model is a numerical overlapping-generations model of 
the type originated by Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987). We have previously tested 
various policy rules assuming that the realized sample path from a stochastic 
population projection is immediately observed by the agents of the model and 
followed with perfect foresight until death (Lassila and Valkonen, 2008). In the 
current study households and firms expect demographics to evolve according to 
forecasts. Each period a new population projection is generated and the agents re-
optimize their decisions.  
In the next section the economic model and the links between population 
projections and future public health and long term care expenditures are 
established. Section 5.2 also justifies our attention to demographic uncertainty by 
showing how radically population projections have changed during the last 
decade. The section also describes how forecast revisions can be embedded in 
stochastic population projections. Section 5.3 presents the baseline stochastic 
assessment of the sustainability of health and long-term care financing in 
Finland. In section 5.4, some policy alternatives and guidelines are studied. 
Section 5.5 concludes with key findings of the sustainability outlook and remarks 
on future developments of the approach used.  
5.2 Modeling the economics and demographics of ageing 
Finland  
5.2.1 The economic model 
A thorough analysis of the interaction between public finance and population 
ageing necessitates the use of economic models that are able to fully use the rich 
information in population statistics and projections. The model should, e.g., be 
able to aggregate the reactions of the individuals, representing birth cohorts of 
various sizes, to total private consumption and labour supply. It should also 
encompass with sufficient preciseness the interaction between the population 
structure and public sector revenues and expenditure. Moreover, the model 
should describe the behavior of the individuals in situations that have not been 
experienced before, such as in case of living longer in the future.  
Dynamic general equilibrium models, with overlapping generations of 
household, take into account the interaction between demographic structure and 
the factor markets of the economy, encompassing thereby implications of growth 
models. They can also produce outcomes with similar preciseness as actuarial 
pension models and generational accounts, since it is possible to model the 
pension system rules and detailed links between age of the household generations 
and public expenditures and revenues. They suit well to policy analysis, since 
households and firms react to policy. For the same reason, they are able to track 
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the sensitivity of the public sector finances to variation in factors outside 
domestic policy’s reach. The numerical models that satisfy these conditions can 
be classified as successors of the overlapping-generations model of Auerbach and 
Kotlikoff (1987).  
We use in our simulations a model called FOG, which is based on the Auerbach - 
Kotlikoff model tradition. The model, which is described in more detail in, e.g., 
Lassila and Valkonen (2008), is modified to describe a small open economy  
and calibrated to the Finnish economy. The population projections with their 
embedded forecasts are used as inputs in the model.  
The driving forces of the model economy are the transitions in the demographic 
and educational structure of the population and the trend growth of labour 
productivity. Population is ageing due to longer lifetimes, low fertility rates and 
the transition of baby boomers from working age to retirement. Educational level 
improves in the future since the current middle-aged generations have on average 
lower level of education than the young ones. Each household generation in the 
model is divided into three educational groups with different lifetime 
productivity profiles determined by empirical observations of recent wage 
profiles. The educational shares are supposed to develop in future in line with the 
official projections. This raises the average productivity of labour. 
Public expenditures have strong connection to the age of individuals in the 
model. Provision of public services is allocated mainly either to the early years 
(day care and education) or to the last ten years (health care and old age care). 
Similarly, income transfers are distributed mainly either to young families or to 
retired individuals. This is why changes in the demographic structure are so 
important for public expenditures. We assume that all income transfers (except 
the earning-related pensions) are fully indexed to wages because any other 
assumption would have dramatic consequences to income distribution in the very 
long term analysis. Expenditure that is not age-related is assumed to grow at the 
same rate as the GDP. 
The growing number of people in old age and near death increases the demand 
for health and old age care; this is described in subsection 5.2.2. We assume that 
these demography-driven additional services are produced by the private sector, 
but the public sector pays for all the production costs. These services are 
produced using labour and intermediate goods as inputs. There is no productivity 
growth in the production. The shares of employees in private and public sector 
are kept constant.  
Public sector revenues originate from two types of sources. The majority of the 
receipts are accumulated by income taxes, consumption taxes and social security 
contributions. Another noteworthy revenue source is the yield of the public 
sector wealth. The yield of the wealth is important especially for the pension 
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funds, but also the state has substantial financial assets. Some of the state’s assets 
are less liquid and yield less than the market rate, such as loans of the Housing 
Fund of Finland. The lower liquidity may turn out to be a problem if the gross 
debt threatens to reach very high levels. 
We assume that the modeled subsectors of the general government - the 
municipal sector, the public and the private sector pension fund, and the national 
social security institute ԟ have their own budgets, which are balanced either by 
social security contributions or earned income taxes. The only exception is the 
state budget, which is balanced by borrowing. Earned income tax brackets are 
adjusted with the growth of the economy. The pension funds follow their current 
prefunding plans, and pension contributions are endogenous. Households are 
modeled to react to the income and substitution effects of taxes and social 
security contributions.  
Labour input is determined partly by exogenous assumptions and partly by 
endogenous adjustments in the model. Exogenous factors are trend growth of 
labour productivity (1.75% per annum in private goods production), 
demographics, educational gains and unemployment. The model is calibrated so 
that the trend labour productivity growth and the following higher wages do not 
affect the otherwise endogenous labour/leisure choice of the households.  
The FOG model consists of five sectors and three markets. The sectors are 
households, enterprises, the general government described above and a foreign 
sector. The labour, goods and capital markets are competitive and prices balance 
supply and demand period-by-period. There is no money or inflation in the 
model. The unit period is five years, and the model has 16 adult generations 
living in each period.  
We assume that the pre-tax rate of return on saving and investments is 
determined in global capital markets. The country has, however, some monopoly 
power in the trade of goods, which makes the terms of trade endogenous. Foreign 
economies are assumed to grow with the trend growth rate of the domestic labour 
productivity. Real wage adjusts to equalize the value of marginal product of 
labour and labour costs in the private production (excl. private health care and 
LTC). The rest of the workers, who provide tax-funded services produced in the 
private and the public sector, earn the same wage.  
In our analysis we substitute the perfect foresight assumption with an approach 
where decision makers sequentially optimize their behaviour according to revised 
demographic forecasts. We justify the use of a revised forecasts methodology by 
two viewpoints: First, it seems clear that households in reality do not take 
uncertainties related to their future contribution rates or benefits fully into 
account when making their savings and labour supply decisions. These 
uncertainties are very seldom discussed, let alone quantified, in e.g. the popular 
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press. Second, by making the extreme assumption that households ignore these 
uncertainties altogether and base their decisions on deterministic forecasts, we 
avoid the difficulties related to general equilibrium heterogeneous agent models 
with aggregate uncertainty. This allows us to use a model that includes detailed 
descriptions of rather complex pension and other welfare systems.  
5.2.2 Health and long-term care expenditure in ageing Finland  
Some illnesses and injuries both hasten the death and increase the health and 
long-term care (LTC) costs in the last years of life. Thus when modeling the 
dependence of health and LTC expenditure on population and its age structure, it 
is reasonable to include also mortality as an explanatory variable. This can be 
used in long-term projections also, since population forecasts include also 
mortality, implicitly or explicitly. 
Our starting point is Häkkinen et al. (2006), who used individual-level health and 
LTC expenditure for a large sample of persons in ages 65+ in 1998. According to 
their calculations, 49% of health expenditure and 75% of LTC expenditure went 
to persons who died in 1998 – 2002.  
From these figures one can deduce that 51% of health and 25% of LTC 
expenditure was not directly death-related, because they occurred to persons that 
were still alive five years later. Furthermore, part of the expenditure for those 
who died obviously had no causal connection with death. A person who died 
because of lung cancer in 2002 may have been treated for a dislocated shoulder 
in 1998.  
Using mortality data, we can estimate the share of expenditure occurring to those 
who die within five years, assuming that proximity to death has no effect on the 
expenditure. To do this by age group, we have to use also data for 2006, and 
implicitly assume that the per capita supply and unit costs of health and LTC 
services were the same as in 1998. The weighted average of this share, estimated 
over 5-year age groups for persons aged 65 and above, was 28% of health and 
48% of LTC. These are smaller shares than Häkkinen et al. (2006) report. The 
difference in health expenditure share, 21%, can be interpreted as a lower limit 
for the health cost that proximity to death causes. A corresponding lower limit 
for LTC is 27%. Thus 21 – 49% of health expenditure and 27 – 75% of LTC 
expenditure has links to proximity to death. 
Thus the Finnish data shows that there are costs that depend on the proximity to 
death and costs that do not depend on it. Assuming that the latter, within each age 
group, are on average the same per capita, we could calculate the share of the 
former. This was 29% in health expenditure and 51% in LTC expenditure.  We 
modeled it to be the same per capita, irrespective of the person’s age. Thus the 
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total expenditure depends both on the number of people in each age group and 
the number of people who will die within the next five years. 
The results concerning health expenditure are presented in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1  Health care costs per capita at 2006 prices 
 
 
 
 
Average health costs per capita in different age groups vary between 1000 and 
4000 €. Proximity to death causes an additional cost of about 5000 €. Since most 
deaths occur in old age, the total costs in old age groups are much higher than in 
young or middle-aged groups. 
The corresponding results for LTC are in Figure 2 Proximity to death again 
causes an additional cost of about 5000 €, almost the same as in the case of 
health. The age profile of LTC costs is very different from health care. There are 
very small costs below age 75, but after that the costs rise rapidly and exceed 
20 000 € for the oldest group.  
Although per capita LTC costs are much higher than health costs in very old 
ages, aggregate health costs are higher than LTC costs, because the bulk of the 
population is in ages below 75. 
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Figure 2  Long-term care costs per capita at 2006 prices 
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services. Although cost-wise we are on the optimistic side here, our results show 
that financing these costs will not be unproblematic. 
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There were large and systematic changes also in the number of working-age 
population and the number of elderly. These changes can be traced back to 
changing views on fertility, migration and longevity. They have affected 
empirical sustainability evaluations in various ways. There are more people 
working (good for tax revenues), more retirees (costly for public finances) and 
people live longer (good for individual welfare but costly for public finances). 
Figure 4 shows the forecasts for the number of people aged 65 and over. 
Although the changes have been significant, they all show the basic feature of an 
ageing society: the number is growing. The issue is quantitative – population is 
ageing but we don’t know how much.  
Statistical methods of expressing demographic uncertainty have been developed 
by many researchers (see e.g. Alho and Spencer, 2005). These methods quantify 
uncertainty probabilistically, based on analyses of past demographic data and the 
views of experts. Fertility, mortality and migration are considered as stochastic 
processes. The parameters of these processes are fitted to match the errors of past 
forecasts (see Alho et al., 2008). Again, judgment may be used. Thereafter, 
sample paths for future population by age-groups are simulated. We deal with 
demographic uncertainty by using such stochastic population projections.  
We also pry more information out of stochastic population projections than has 
been done previously. In essence, we add demographic forecasts for the future 
that start in different time points in simulated population paths. Given the 
uncertainty of population forecasting, it might seem that trying to forecast what 
future population forecasts are like, would be nearly hopeless. We argue, 
however, that forecasts are, for both theoretical and practical reasons, more 
regular than actual developments. As a practical reason, it should be mentioned 
that the development of the recent past often has a heavy influence on projections 
of the remote future.  
Stochastic population projections are produced by a computer program PEP (for 
a description, visit http://www.joensuu.fi/statistics/juha.html). Another computer 
program FPATH extends the application of results from PEP to forward-looking 
OLG models, where agents are allowed to revise their lifetime economic plans as 
they realize that population has not evolved according to the expected path. For 
this purpose FPATH calculates a numerical approximation to the conditional 
expectation of future population at future years for a (typically random) subset of 
paths We can think of the conditional expectation as being a forecast of what 
would be a forecast in a future year. This methodology is new, and is described 
in more detail in Alho (2011) and in Lassila, Valkonen and Alho (2011).  
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Figure 3  Population in Finland, as forecasted by Statistics Finland 
 
 
Figure 4 Population in ages 65+ in Finland, as forecasted by Statistics 
Finland 
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The stochastic projection for population in ages 65+ in Finland is presented in 
Figure 5. Half of the simulation outcomes are in the shaded area around the 
median. 10% of the outcomes are above the 90% line and 10% are below the 
10% line. 
Figure 6 describes population in ages 65+ in one path of the simulated population 
projections for Finland, produced by the program PEP. The solid line is the 
actual simulated path, and the dotted lines represent the forecasted forecasts for 
the path. The forecasts lie nicely below the actual path, resembling those in 
Figure 4. This is not generally true in other simulated paths, where the forecasts 
can and do both overestimate and underestimate the ‘actuals’.  
 
Figure 5.  Predictive distribution of population in ages 65+ in Finland  
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Figure 6.  Population in ages 65+ in Finland in one simulated path 
 
 
 
5.2.4 Stochastic sustainability analysis 
A well-known definition of the sustainability of fiscal policies is the OECD 
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detected. The quality of data and the elabourateness and sophistication of the 
models used have developed a lot in the past few years, but there is still much 
room for improvement47.  
                                              
 
47 “The process of developing long-term budgets is in its infancy, and there is neither a single 
analytical approach nor a fiscal rule for sustainable development that has achieved agreement as 
best practice.” Ulla (2006).  
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Our stochastic sustainability analysis can be described by four steps48. Firstly, a 
large number of sample paths of the key variables are produced using stochastic 
models. Secondly, future public expenditure and taxes associated with each of 
these paths are simulated using an economic model. Thirdly, the simulation 
results are described and the probability of sustainability problems is evaluated. 
Fourthly, alternative policies are formulated, their results are simulated, and the 
outcomes are evaluated.  
Studies that utilize stochastic population projections mainly use accounting 
models to analyze the sustainability of pension systems (e.g. CBO, 2001 and 
Auerbach and Lee, 2006). The method of stochastic forecasting has been applied 
also to the unit costs of health care, see Boards of Trustees (2003).  Lassila and 
Valkonen (2004) analyze how prefunding could smooth the costs of health and 
LTC in time. The effects of both economic and demographic uncertainty on 
aggregate public finances are studied in a similar accounting framework by Lee 
and Tuljapurkar (2001). Alho and Vanne (2006) and Sefton and Weale (2005) 
used generational accounting to perform a corresponding risk analysis.  
Alho et al. (2002) and Alho, Jensen, Lassila and Valkonen (2005) were the first 
to analyze ageing using a large set of OLG model simulations; the application 
concerned the Lithuanian economy. Fehr and Habermann (2006), Draper et al. 
(2008) and Alho et al. (2008) present similar results for some other countries. 
Lassila and Valkonen (2008) analyze fiscal sustainability of the Finnish public 
sector using stochastic projections to describe the uncertain future demographic 
trends and asset yields. They also analyze three policy options aimed at 
improving sustainability.  
5.3 Sustainability of publicly financed health and long-term 
care  
There is a policy baseline that is used in each of the 200 model runs. It is our 
interpretation of ‘the policy currently on books’. In this baseline, welfare 
transfers and services are provided according to current rules and practices. In 
case of statutory pensions and expenditures municipalities, the current financing 
rules are followed. State tax rates are held constant, so variation in expenditure 
and tax bases causes variation in public debt. 
Pension contribution rate adapt to expenditure and to the wage bill, which vary 
from one demographic path to another. Aggregate health and long-term care 
                                              
 
48 There is also another branch of numerical stochastic sustainability analysis. It analyses the 
vulnerability of debt to adverse shocks. Sustainability simulations are performed typically for 
the short or medium term using highly aggregated econometric models (see e.g. Mendoza and 
Oviedo, 2004).  
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costs depend on population age structure and proximity to death. They are 
financed by municipal taxes, which thus also depend on demographic variables. 
Part of health care and LTC expenditure is, however, financed by state grant to 
municipalities. The rules of state grants in the model are in line with our 
advanced projections of the health and long term care expenditure, explained in 
section 5.2.2. The current rules give too much weight to age structures, and using 
them in the model would result in a different public debt and municipal tax 
combination. 
We describe the outcomes of this baseline policy first on gross public debt and 
on a total tax measure, which consists of social security contributions, municipal 
taxes and all state taxes. Both debt and taxes are related to GDP. Figure 7 
describes the outcomes that we can expect this base policy to produce in the 
2060s. Each dot represents the situation in one population path. The outcomes 
are separated only by demographic developments, and the economic reactions of 
the households and firms to both projected and actualized demographics.  
Figure 7  Public debt and taxes in Finland in the 2060s 
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2000. In all the simulations the tax rate rises markedly but stays below that in 
Sweden in 2000, 51.8% of GDP, which is the highest rate recorded so far in the 
EU’s tax statistics. 
Despite growing total taxes, indebtedness is also likely to increase. State tax rates 
are held constant, and the increase in state grants to municipalities, due to growth 
in health care and LTC expenditure, is financed by borrowing. The gross 
debt/GDP ratio is likely to rise over the Maastricht limit, and with a 10% 
probability over the 90% level that Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) consider harmful 
for economic growth. Moreover, such a jump in the debt ratio would represent a 
huge resource shift from future generations to the current ones.  
The baseline demographic projection generates a fairly small sustainability gap, 
about 2% of GDP.   
But certainly the possibility of much bigger problems cannot be ruled out. There 
is about 30% chance of taxes becoming higher than ever before in Finland and at 
the same time debt exceeding the Maastricht criterion. Furthermore, there is an 
8.5% chance for the very difficult outcome that tax rates are higher than in 2000 
and indebtedness exceeds 90%. It is very likely that a radical policy change 
would take place long before such numbers are realized. In that sense the 
baseline simulations presented give a probabilistic view of the resilience of the 
current policy rules to demographic uncertainty.    
If total taxes in the society limits social expenditure, then there is a trade-off 
between pensions on one hand and health and LTC expenditure on the other 
hand. Thus we cannot evaluate the sustainability of health and LTC financing 
entirely alone.  
Total taxes may not, however, be the most relevant tax measure in assessing the 
sustainability of health and LTC financing. They are financed to a great extent by 
municipal taxes, which we assume to rise according to expenditure.  The 
following Figure 8 shows the relationship between the simulated health care and 
LTC expenditure and the average municipal tax rate in the 2060s. Again, each 
dot represents different demographic scenario. The positive correlation is easily 
observable. The unfavorable demographic scenarios generate high expenditure, 
which compel the municipalities to raise taxes. The highest average municipal 
tax rates are not likely to occur, since they would mean very high tax rates in the 
municipalities with the oldest population structure.  
There is also a similar positive correlation between the state and municipal 
finances. This is shown in Figure 9. From the viewpoint of the aggregate 
sustainability of the public finances this positive correlation reduces the 
possibilities of risk sharing between the state and municipalities. Note though 
that although ageing affects the states and municipalities in many similar ways, 
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their quantitative consequences differ. Outlay pressures and tax base effects  
do differ. When municipal expenditure is high, so is the state’s, and in our 
simulations this leads to high debt. But high debt can occur also without high 
municipal taxes.  
Figure 8  Health and long-term care expenditure and municipal taxes in 
the 2060s in Finland 
 
Figure 9  Public debt and municipal taxes in the 2060s in Finland 
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5.4 Sustainability and policy rules 
The base policy contains many rules that affect the way public finances adjust to 
changing demographics. Besides those concerning pension contributions and 
municipal taxes, there is longevity adjustment of pension benefits, and several 
indexing rules. Despite these adjustments, it seems from the 2060 outcomes that 
fiscal policy does not react to expected difficulties in public finances in a 
sufficient manner. In many empirical sustainability analyses this is the case 
throughout, as Leeper (2010) criticizes. In our model-based analysis we can go 
further and study the effects of specific additional policy rules.  
Since the baseline is problematic from the point of view of municipalities, the 
state may consider taking over the responsibility for health and LTC financing. 
We assume that in such a situation the state finances the whole health and LTC 
service costs above a certain limit value for the average municipal tax rate. This 
could happen in practice in the form of e.g. national insurance proposed by Forss 
(2003). We illustrate this by selecting a limit of 23% for the average municipal 
tax rate, and call this Policy rule 2 (Rule 1 is the baseline policy; see Table 1). 
The average for 2010 was about 19%. If the differences in municipal tax rates 
will stay the same as in 2010, an average of 23% would mean that the top rates 
would be at least 25% and the lowest rates above 20%.  
The 23% limit for municipal taxes is met with close to 20% probability. From 
Figure 9 it is evident that they are all cases where public debt is problematic in 
any case. If the state continues to keep tax rates constant, taking more 
responsibility for health and LTC financing inevitably leads to even higher 
indebtedness. This is illustrated in Figure 10. As these outcomes must be 
considered unsustainable, we study alternatives where the state reacts by raising 
the VAT rate, based on different policy rules or guidelines.  
We study two alternatives (Policies 3 and 4 in Table 1) where the state acts on 
expected average municipal tax rate. The measure is to increase the VAT rate 
permanently by 2%-points. The question is then, how far decision-makers should 
look, in order to improve things. We compare a rule where the state looks 
forward, and bases the VAT decision on the 10-year forecast of the municipal tax 
rate, to a backward-looking rule where the state acts on the observed municipal 
tax rate. We show that the debt problems become smaller if the state acts on 
forecasts than if it acts on observed developments. The improvement is not big, 
however, and does not remove the threat of a debt problem. A much better result 
is obtained if the VAT increase is based on expected development of the 
debt/GDP ratio, instead of the expected average municipal tax rate (Policies 5 
and 6 in Table 1).  
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Figure 10  Public debt and municipal taxes, with ceiling, in the 2060s in 
Finland 
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Table 1  Base policy and policy rule outcomes in 2060 (share of cases in 
different debt-tax categories,%) 
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Increasing the VAT rate means increasing the total tax burden in the economy. 
Still the debt-based policies, (5) and (6) in Table 1, increase the probability of 
outcomes within the ‘normal debt and normal taxes’ area. They do increase the 
tax rate but not enough to exceed the Finnish record in 2000. Figures 11 and 12 
compare the most effective policy (6) with baseline amended with the municipal 
tax ceiling.  
Figure 11  Frequency distribution of public debt, as% of GDP, in the 2060s 
 
  
Figure 12  Frequency distribution of total taxes, as% of GDP, in the 2060s 
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Figure 11 confirms the view that forward-looking tax policy can effectively 
reduce the threat of future debt problems.  Figure 12 shows that taxes in total 
increase because of this policy, but not very much. The expected value of total 
taxes/GDP, marked with a circle in the figure, increases by about half a per cent. 
5.5 Summary and conclusions 
Analysing fiscal sustainability and calculating sustainability gaps relies heavily 
on demographic projections. These projections are changed at regular or irregular 
intervals. These changes are not always minor – in fact they are often large. In 
this paper we have analysed what implications these inevitable changes have for 
sustainability analysis and for policy conclusions.  
We have specifically focused on the fiscal pressures that financing health and 
long-term care (LTC) with municipal taxes, with help from state aid, will bring 
about in ageing Finland. We ask whether this financing system is sustainable in 
the specific sense that citizens can rely on receiving the services in the future. As 
future is inevitably uncertain, no definite answer can be given. We can, however, 
quantify some uncertainties and illustrate and evaluate their effects. We can form 
a probabilistic view of the public debt and taxation developments that financing 
health and LTC will cause. This view then serves as a basis for our evaluation of 
the sustainability of the system, or, phrased differently, of the credibility of the 
promise concerning publicly financed health and LTC services in the future. 
We chose the time span so that it should suffice for those who are about to leave 
the labour market. If one is 50, then the horizon should be at least 50 years, for 
living up to 100 years will not be rare. If a 50-year old does not think that 
promises concerning future welfare services are fully credible, she or he still has 
10 – 20 years to take individual precautionary measures while being part of the 
labour force. 
General assessment of sustainability 
Even with our assumptions of future health and LTC demand, which are low 
compared to those used in other fiscal projections made for Finland, difficulties 
in sustainability loom large.  
In our baseline policy, municipal taxes adjust to health and LTC expenditures 
and changes in the tax base, and pension contributions adjust to pension outlays. 
In an ageing society, it is the nature of this baseline policy that taxes will 
increase. The total tax/GDP ratio has about one-third chance of exceeding the 
highest value thus far in Finland, 47.2% in 2000. In all simulations the tax rate 
stays below that in Sweden in 2000, 51.8% of GDP, which is the highest rate 
recorded in EU’s tax statistics. 
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Despite growing tax rates, indebtedness is also likely to increase. The debt ratio 
is likely to rise over the Maastricht limit, and with a 10% probability over the 
90% level that Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) consider harmful for economic 
growth. 
Whether this policy line would be sustainable or not, is a matter of opinion. 
Some may find most of the outcomes generally plausible, others not.  But as 
future users of these welfare services we are not satisfied with the outlook. The 
possibility of problems is too high. There is about 30% chance of taxes becoming 
higher than ever before in Finland and at the same time debt exceeding the 
Maastricht criterion. Furthermore, there is an 8.5% chance for the very difficult 
outcome that tax rates are higher than in 2000 and indebtedness exceeds 90%. 
We think that the likelihood of cuts in health and LTC services in the future is 
too high with the baseline policy, and thus some amendments or alternatives 
should be considered.  
Note also that if total taxation in the society limits social expenditure, then there 
is a trade-off between pensions on one hand and health and LTC expenditure on 
the other hand. Thus we cannot evaluate the sustainability of health and LTC 
financing entirely separately. If pension financing would be solved in a similar 
way to that in Sweden, with a fixed contribution level, then this problem would 
disappear. 
Municipal aspect 
An additional and independent sustainability risk comes from the municipal 
sector. If the average tax rate rises to a high level, it is very likely that some small 
municipalities would need to raise their taxes to a level that would not be 
acceptable in practice. The state would need to step in. We assume here that in 
such a situation the state finances the whole health and LTC service costs above a 
certain limit value for the average municipal tax rate. We illustrate this by 
selecting a limit of 23% for the average municipal tax rate. The average for 2010 
was about 19%. If the differences in municipal tax rates will stay the same as in 
2010, an average of 23% would mean that the top rates would be at least 25% 
and the lowest rates above 20%.  
Whether municipal taxes reach the limit, depends on the demographic 
developments in the future. In our simulations this happens in almost 20% of the 
cases. But if that happens, the state is already indebted. In all baseline 
simulations where the average municipal tax rate exceeds 23%, the public debt 
exceeds 60% of GDP. Even if the state would increase its own tax rates to cover 
the financing task that exceeds the limit, the debt problem is bound to be large. 
The standard of services would no doubt be under threat.  
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Can the state do better? Yes. It can prepare in advance. We first study 
alternatives where the state acts on expected average municipal tax rate. The 
action is a permanent increase in the VAT rate. The question is then, how far 
should the decision-makers look, in order to improve things. We show that the 
likelihood of future debt problems become much smaller if the state has a 10-
year horizon than if it acts on observed developments.  
Secondly, we study policies where the VAT rise is conditioned on the public debt 
situation instead of municipal taxes. These policies turn out to be more effective. 
And again, a 10-year horizon ahead is better than a backward-looking rule.  
Although demographic forecasts are erroneous, they appear to contain enough 
information to be useful in policy design. 
Policy lessons 
We have shown that any sustainability measure is uncertain, and that the 
uncertainty is large. This is in accord with previous studies, and by itself bound 
to make policy considerations difficult. The good point is, we can give 
quantitative assessment of the uncertainty and illustrate the various outcomes of 
the base policy.  
Although the magnitudes of ageing are uncertain, and forecast errors probably 
large, ageing policies must respond in advance. Uncertainty should not imply 
inaction. Inaction is a policy choice, and here a rather poor one. Our simulations 
show that forecasts contain information and can be used in policy design. 
There should be a plan for worse than expected future developments. Actions can 
include postponed conditional measures. They should form a coherent program, 
with well-defined thresholds. They should also be credible. The credibility 
requirement may be difficult to operationalize, but as long as the situation is 
good or looks good, relying on future actions may be a viable option. 
There is not much point in arguing about the exact size of the sustainability gap. 
The question is whether the policy currently on books is sustainable in the 
foreseeable future with a reasonable probability. Relying on expected 
developments, with a 50% probability, is not reasonable. It is a gamble, like 
tossing a coin. Heads, and you’ll get the services at least as promised, tails, and 
you’ll get less? Certainty is not achievable, but the risk can be reduced. 
Any alternative policy outcome is also uncertain. But we can again describe and 
illustrate them. This hopefully helps us to think of possible ways that problems 
and difficulties may arise. 
The policy rule analysis could have been used to derive also the welfare effects 
of different policy choices in addressing sustainability problems. This could be 
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especially useful when considering postponing decisions. Their costs, and whom 
they occur to, can be illustrated, thus avoiding one of the critical faults in using 
unsustainable paths described in Leeper (2010). We consider such work a 
necessary ingredient in future analysis. 
Methodological lessons 
We have amended stochastic population projections with embedded and 
gradually updated demographic forecasts. At each time-point on each population 
path considered there is also a simulated demographic forecast for the future. The 
agents in the economic model make their future plans based on this demographic 
forecast that prevails there and then. A new demographic forecast is made when 
the economy moves to the next period, and agents update their plans.  
Technically the tree-like combination of stochastic population projections with 
embedded demographic forecasts is obtained by joint use of computer programs 
FPATH and PEP. The ranges of forecast revisions seem quite relevant, when 
compared to the adjustments in demographic forecasts by Statistics Finland 
between 2002 and 2009. 
Using periodically updated population projections as an input in a forward-
looking economic model produces results that, we think, have strong links to 
decisions that are considered or actually made in the real world. Each update in 
the official population projections changes our conception of the future. All 
public policies and private behaviour contingent to the conception of the future 
are subject to change. 
Introducing forecasts embedded in stochastic population projections allows us to 
analyze policies that are based on forecasts. There is an obvious way forward 
here. Analyze all relevant policy rules, and compare results. This is very tedious, 
and difficult. There are many parameters that could be changed and should be 
analyzed. In our rather simple policy rules such parameters are the threshold 
values and length of the period they are calculated from, and other specifications 
related to them. The size of the triggered policy measures should also be studied. 
For pedagogical purposes, rough examples may suffice. For quantitative policy 
guidelines, much more work is needed.  
This type of analysis produces a vast amount of simulation results – so vast that 
choosing what to present is an essential part of any study. The economic model 
output consists of stylized national accounts for each period, added by household 
behavior by 5-year birth cohorts, three educational groups and a maximum age of 
100 years. 50 years with a 5-year unit period and a 50-year horizon of forecasts 
means that the baseline consists of 100 national accounts for each of the 200 
population paths used, in total 20,000 national accounts.  
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